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3Letter from the Co-Chairs 
george J. mitcHellcHristoPHer s. “kit” BoND HeNrY cisNeros mel mArtiNeZ
we formed the Housing commission to help set a new direction for federal housing policy. more 
than five years after the collapse of the housing market, it is now all too apparent that current policy, 
and the institutions that support it, are outdated and inadequate.   
this report, the culmination of a 16-month examination of some of the key issues in housing, 
provides a blueprint for an entirely new system of housing finance for both the ownership and 
rental markets. Under this new system, the private sector will play a far greater role in bearing 
credit risk and providing mortgage funding, and taxpayer protection will be a central goal. we 
also propose a new, outcome-oriented approach to the distribution of federal rental subsidies that 
responds to the housing needs of our nation’s most vulnerable households and rewards providers 
who demonstrate strong results at the state and local levels with increased flexibility in program 
administration. the report highlights how our nation’s burgeoning senior population and dramatic 
demographic changes will present new challenges and opportunities for housing providers in 
communities throughout the country.
over the years, republicans and Democrats have worked together to establish policies to address 
the diverse housing needs of the American people. After world war ii, for example, republican 
senator robert taft worked with President truman to remedy a national housing shortage and 
respond to the housing needs of America’s returning veterans with the Housing Act of 1949. two 
decades later, President Johnson and everett Dirksen, the republican senate leader from illinois, 
worked collaboratively to pass the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Both parties came together again to 
pass the tax reform Act of 1986, which created the low income Housing tax credit. there is a 
simple explanation for this history of bipartisanship: Americans of all political backgrounds intuitively 
understand that ensuring access to decent, suitable, and affordable housing is a goal worth striving 
for, and one that our country must never abandon. the commission follows this bipartisan tradition.
we wish to express our gratitude to our fellow commissioners who have labored long hours, and 
made many sacrifices, over the past 16 months. it has been a great privilege to work with this 
distinguished group of Americans, and their dedication to solving some of the most perplexing 
issues in housing has been an inspiration to us.  
the challenges we face in housing are so great and so urgent, that new ideas and approaches must 
be brought to the policy table. it is our hope that our work will contribute to the dialogue and help 
further the housing policy reform debate. 
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7Executive Summary and Recommendations
•	 A	responsible,	sustainable	approach	to	homeownership	
that will help ensure that all creditworthy households have 
access to homeownership and its considerable benefits.
•	 A	reformed	system	of	housing	finance	in	which	the	
private sector plays a far more prominent role in bearing 
credit risk while promoting a greater diversity of funding 
sources for mortgage financing.
•	 A	more	targeted	approach	to	providing	rental	assistance	
that directs scarce resources to the lowest-income renters 
while insisting on a high level of performance by housing 
providers.
•	 A	more	comprehensive	focus	on	meeting	the	housing	
needs of our nation’s seniors that responds to their 
desire to age in place and recognizes the importance of 
integrating housing with health care and other services.
in preparing the recommendations that follow, an 
overarching goal of the commission was to ensure that the 
nation’s housing system enables individuals and families to 
exercise choice in their living situations, as their needs and 
preferences change over time. while today’s challenges are 
great, the opportunity to create a new system that expands 
the range of housing options for individuals and families is 
even greater. 
our nation’s numerous and urgent housing challenges 
underscore the need for a review of federal housing policy. 
since the collapse of the housing market in 2007, the federal 
government has stepped in to support the vast majority of 
all mortgage financing, both for homeownership and rental 
housing. At the same time, rental demand is increasing in 
many regions throughout the United states, and the number 
of renters spending more than they can afford on housing 
is unacceptably high and growing. these developments are 
taking place against a backdrop of profound demographic 
changes that are transforming the country and our housing 
needs. these changes include the aging of the Baby 
Boomers, the formation of new households by members of 
the “echo Boom” generation (those born between 1981 and 
1995), and the growing diversity of the American population.
in many respects, our housing system is outdated and 
not equipped to keep pace with today’s demands and the 
challenges of the imminent future. the Bipartisan Policy 
center (BPc) launched the Housing commission in october 
2011 to develop a new vision for federal housing policy that 
provides a path forward during this period of great change. 
this report, the centerpiece of an ongoing effort by the 
Housing commission to examine key issues that together 
form the basic elements of a resilient housing system, 
proposes: 
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finance system must provide open access to lenders of all 
types and sizes, including community banks and credit 
unions. it must also serve as wide a market as possible and 
assure consumers fair access to sustainable and affordable 
mortgage credit.
While private capital must play a greater role in the 
housing finance system, continued government involvement 
is essential to ensuring that mortgages remain available 
and affordable to qualified homebuyers. the commission 
recommends the establishment of a limited, catastrophic 
government guarantee to ensure timely payment of principal 
and interest on qualified mortgage-backed securities (mBs). 
this guarantee should (1) be explicit and fully paid for 
through premium collections that exceed expected claims 
(with a safe reserve cushion); (2) be triggered only after 
private capital in the predominant loss position has been 
fully exhausted; and (3) apply only to the securities and not 
to the equity or debt of the entities that issue or insure them.
As part of this rebalancing, the commission proposes the 
winding down and ultimate elimination of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac after a multiyear transition period. the business 
model of these government-sponsored enterprises (gses)—
publicly traded companies with implied government 
guarantees and other advantages—has failed and should 
not be repeated. During the transition period, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency should continue its efforts to 
reduce the size of the gse portfolios and move the gse 
pricing structure closer to what one might find if private 
capital were at risk. congress should also gradually lower 
the gse loan limits to allow larger loans to flow to the private 
sector.
Through the gradual reduction in loan limits to pre-crisis 
levels, the commission also supports a more targeted FHA 
that returns to its traditional mission of primarily serving first-
time homebuyers. 
Reforming Our Nation’s Housing 
Finance System
A successful housing finance system should maximize the 
range of ownership and rental housing choices available at 
all stages of our lives. meeting our nation’s diverse housing 
needs requires a strong and stable system of housing 
finance. this system, when functioning at its full potential, 
offers millions of Americans and their families the opportunity 
to choose the type of housing that best responds to their 
individual situations. the mortgage boom and bust has 
rocked the system on which the United states has relied 
for more than 75 years and has forced a reevaluation of 
the government’s role in supporting mortgage credit and 
how this role should be structured. Private, risk-bearing 
capital in the mortgage market has shrunk dramatically, 
while the tremendous uncertainty surrounding the future of 
our housing finance system has greatly limited consumers’ 
choices, particularly for creditworthy borrowers seeking to 
obtain a mortgage. in response to this recent unraveling and 
subsequent uncertainty, the commission proposes a blueprint 
for a new system of housing finance that will support 
homeownership and provide for a vibrant rental housing 
market.
Key Policy Objectives
The private sector must play a far greater role in bearing 
credit risk. greater federal intervention was necessary 
when the market collapsed, but the dominant position 
currently held by the government is unsustainable. today, 
the government supports more than 90 percent of single-
family mortgages through entities such as Fannie mae, 
Freddie mac, ginnie mae, and the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) as well as roughly 65 percent of the 
rental mortgage market. reducing the government footprint 
and encouraging greater participation by risk-bearing 
private capital will protect taxpayers while providing for a 
greater diversity of funding sources. A durable housing 
9responsible for establishing an affordability threshold that 
would primarily support the development of rental housing 
that is affordable to low- and moderate-income households. 
Obstacles to the Housing Market Recovery
The commission has identified a number of regulatory 
obstacles that are restricting mortgage credit and inhibiting 
the housing market’s recovery. these obstacles include 
overly strict mortgage lending standards; the lack of 
access to mortgage credit for well-qualified self-employed 
individuals; uncertainty about the extent of “put-back” 
risk for mortgage lenders; the demand for multiple 
appraisals and the use of distressed properties as market 
comps; the application of FHA compare ratios; and the 
uncertainty related to pending mortgage regulations and the 
implementation of new rules. 
To overcome these obstacles, the commission recommends 
that the President of the United States direct the Department 
of the Treasury, in coordination with the various federal 
banking agencies, to assess the impact of current and pending 
regulatory requirements on the affordability and accessibility 
of mortgage credit. the treasury Department should develop 
a plan to align these requirements as much as possible to 
help get mortgage credit flowing again. A top official within 
the treasury Department or in the white House should be 
tasked with day-to-day responsibility for coordinating the 
implementation of this plan.
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The Structure of the New System
The commission proposes to replace the GSEs with an 
independent, wholly owned government corporation—
the “Public Guarantor”—that would provide a limited 
catastrophic government guarantee for both the single-family 
and rental markets. Unlike the gses, the Public guarantor 
would not buy or sell mortgages or issue mBs. it would 
simply guarantee investors the timely payment of principal 
and interest on these securities. the model endorsed by 
the commission is similar to ginnie mae, the government 
agency that wraps securities backed by federally insured or 
guaranteed loans. other than the Public guarantor, all other 
actors in this new system—originators, issuers of securities, 
credit enhancers, and mortgage servicers—should be 
private-sector entities fully at risk for their own finances 
and not covered by either implicit or explicit government 
guarantees benefitting their investors or creditors.
In the new system, the limited catastrophic guarantee of the 
Public Guarantor would only be triggered after all private 
capital ahead of it has been exhausted. the government 
would be in the fourth-loss position behind (1) borrowers 
and their home equity; (2) private credit enhancers; and (3) 
the corporate resources of the issuers and servicers.
The Public Guarantor will have significant standard-
setting and counterparty oversight responsibilities. these 
responsibilities include (1) qualifying institutions to serve 
as issuers, servicers, and private credit enhancers; (2) 
ensuring that these institutions are well-capitalized; 
(3) establishing the guarantee fees to cover potential 
catastrophic losses; (4) ensuring the actuarial soundness 
of two separate catastrophic risk funds for the single-
family and rental segments of the market; and (5) setting 
standards (including loan limits) for the mortgages backing 
government-guaranteed securities. with respect to rental 
finance, the Public guarantor would also have the authority 
to underwrite multifamily loans directly and would be 
Meeting our nation’s diverse housing 
needs requires a strong and stable 
system of  housing finance. 
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counseling services be expected to contribute to the cost of 
the service.
Affordable Rental Housing
The nation’s 41 million renter households account for 35 
percent of the U.S. population. in the coming decade, the 
number of renters is likely to grow significantly as members 
of the echo Boom generation form their own households for 
the first time and as members of the Baby Boom generation 
downsize from their current homes. growing pressure for 
rental housing may push rents further out of reach for the 
low-income households that are least able to afford it. our 
nation’s housing system should aim to minimize the trade-
offs these households often face when seeking affordable 
housing—in terms of neighborhood quality, access to good 
jobs and high-performing schools, and spending on other 
essentials like health care and nutritious food. 
Federal Assistance Falls Far Short of What’s Needed
Nationally, a majority of extremely low-income renter 
households spend more than half of their incomes on 
housing. For the most part, renters live in housing that 
meets basic quality standards. However, nearly half of 
renters at all income levels report paying more than 30 
percent of their income for rent—the federal standard for 
housing affordability. Among extremely low-income renters 
(those with incomes at or below 30 percent of area median 
income), the situation is far worse. Nearly 80 percent of 
these lowest-income households report spending more than 
30 percent of their income for rent, and nearly two-thirds 
spend 50 percent or more. 
There are far more extremely low-income renters than 
available units they can afford. 
Federal housing assistance meets only a fraction of the need. 
Federal assistance programs currently help approximately 
five million low-income households afford housing. 
The Continuing Value of 
Homeownership
Homeownership will continue to be the preferred housing 
choice of a majority of households. According to research 
performed for the commission, the national homeownership 
rate is likely to remain above 60 percent for the 
foreseeable future. millions of Americans continue to see 
homeownership as a critical cornerstone of the American 
Dream with benefits well beyond the financial investment. 
this sentiment is especially strong within the growing 
Hispanic community.
Despite the collapse of the housing market, the commission 
strongly believes that, when responsibly undertaken, 
homeownership can produce powerful economic, social, 
and civic benefits that serve the individual homeowner, 
the larger community, and the nation. A combination 
of proper regulation, adequate liquidity, and the right 
incentives in the private market can help ensure that 
homeownership remains a vital housing and wealth-building 
option. when coupled with reasonable down payments, 
solidly underwritten, fixed-rate mortgages—as well as 
straightforward adjustable-rate mortgages with clear terms 
and limits on adjustments and maximum payments—can 
also open the door to homeownership and its benefits for 
individuals with modest wealth and incomes.
Housing counseling can improve prospective borrowers’ 
access to affordable, prudent mortgage loans, especially 
for families who otherwise might not qualify or who may 
experience other barriers to conventional lending. Four 
key elements are necessary: (1) a strong counseling 
infrastructure; (2) clear standards; (3) an understanding 
of the proper role for counselors; and (4) the adoption of 
best practices for integrating counseling into the mortgage 
market. the commission supports continued federal 
appropriations for housing counseling and recommends 
that all stakeholders who benefit from a borrower’s access to 
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The commission recommends federal funding to minimize 
harmful housing instability by providing short-term emergency 
assistance for low-income renters (those with incomes 
between 30 and 80 percent of area median income) who 
suffer temporary setbacks. this assistance, delivered as a 
restricted supplement to the Home investment Partnerships 
program, could be used to help cover payment of security 
deposits, back rent, and other housing-related costs to 
improve residential stability and prevent homelessness.
These recommendations, if fully implemented, would help 
to meet the needs of an additional five million vulnerable 
renter households and contribute to the elimination of 
homelessness—through production, preservation, and rental 
assistance.
The commission recommends a new performance-based 
system for delivering federal rental assistance that 
focuses on outcomes for participating households, while 
offering high-performing providers greater flexibility to 
depart from program rules. the commission proposes 
a new performance-based system that will evaluate 
housing providers’ success in five key programmatic 
areas: (1) improving housing quality; (2) increasing the 
efficiency with which housing assistance is delivered; (3) 
enabling the elderly and persons with disabilities to lead 
independent lives; (4) promoting economic self-sufficiency 
for households capable of work; and (5) promoting the 
de-concentration of poverty and access to neighborhoods 
of opportunity. Providers that achieve a high level of 
performance across these five areas should be rewarded 
with increased flexibility to depart from standard program 
rules, while substandard providers should be replaced. 
the federal government spends tens of billions of dollars 
annually to support the nation’s valuable infrastructure 
of publicly and privately owned rental housing. Neither 
landlords nor program operators who fail to provide tenants 
with homes and services of reasonable quality should 
benefit from this investment.
However, only about one in four renter households eligible 
for assistance actually receives it. Because demand so far 
outstrips supply, these scarce rental subsidies are often 
allocated through lengthy waiting lists and by lotteries.
Responding to the Crisis
The commission recommends that our nation transition to 
a system in which our most vulnerable households, those 
with extremely low incomes (at or below 30 percent of area 
median income) are assured access to housing assistance 
if they need it. Assistance should be delivered through a 
reformed Housing choice Voucher program that, over time, 
limits eligibility to only the most vulnerable families. 
The commission recommends increasing the supply of 
suitable, affordable, and decent homes to help meet both 
current and projected demand. to achieve this goal, the 
commission recommends:
•	 Expansion	of	the	Low	Income	Housing	Tax	Credit	(LIHTC)	
by 50 percent over current funding levels and the 
provision of additional federal funding to help close the 
gap that often exists between the costs of producing or 
preserving liHtc properties and the equity and debt that 
can be raised to support them. 
•	 Additional	federal	funding	beyond	current	levels	to	
address the capital backlog and ongoing accrual needs in 
public housing to preserve the value of prior investments 
and improve housing quality for residents.
Growing pressure for rental housing 
may push rents further out of  reach 
for the low-income households that 
are least able to afford it. 
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The Importance of Rural Housing 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) bears primary 
responsibility for administering housing assistance in the 
nation’s rural areas that, under the current definition used 
by USDA, are home to one-third of the U.S. population. 
overall, rural areas tend to have higher poverty rates and 
lower incomes, so although housing costs are often lower 
than in other parts of the country, a substantial portion of 
rural households spend an unsustainable share of income 
on rent or mortgage payments. UsDA offers both rental 
housing and homeownership programs to enable lower-
income residents of rural areas to afford high-quality homes.
The commission supports current approaches to the 
administration of housing support in rural areas. more 
specifically, the commission recommends that housing 
assistance in rural areas continue to be delivered through 
UsDA and the standards currently used to define “rural 
areas” maintained through the year 2020. 
The commission also recommends enhancing the capacity 
of USDA providers to serve more households. modest 
incremental funding for the section 502 Direct loan 
program, in particular, would enable UsDA to provide 
homeownership assistance to more low-income rural 
households at relatively low cost. in light of recent elevated 
delinquency rates, however, the commission believes 
that any additional federal support for the section 502 
Direct loan program should be conditioned on a thorough 
program evaluation. UsDA providers should also be 
provided with resources to improve the delivery of technical 
assistance and the technology used to process loans, collect 
data, and monitor program performance.
Funding the Solutions
In light of today’s difficult fiscal environment, the commission 
recognizes that a transition period will be necessary before 
these recommendations can be fully implemented. the 
commission therefore recommends that its approach 
for meeting the needs of the nation’s most vulnerable 
households be phased in over time. 
The commission supports the continuation of tax incentives 
for homeownership, but as part of the ongoing debate 
over tax reform and budget priorities, the commission 
also recommends consideration of modifications to these 
incentives to allow for increased support for affordable rental 
housing. the commission is aware of the difficult issues that 
will need to be addressed in the coming years to balance 
federal budget priorities. the federal government currently 
provides substantial resources in support of housing, 
the majority of which is in the form of tax subsidies for 
homeownership. the commission supports the continuation 
of tax incentives for homeownership—recognizing the 
importance of this tax policy to homeowners in the United 
states today. the commission notes that various tax 
benefits provided to homeowners, including the mortgage 
interest deduction, have been modified over the years. in 
the ongoing debate over tax reform and budget priorities, 
all revenue options must be evaluated. in that context, 
the commission recommends consideration of further 
modifications to federal tax incentives for homeownership 
to allow for an increase in the level of support provided to 
affordable rental housing. Any changes should be made 
with careful attention to their effects on home prices and 
should be phased in to minimize any potential disruption 
to the housing market. A portion of any revenue generated 
from changes in tax subsidies for homeownership should be 
devoted to expanding support for rental housing programs 
for low-income populations in need of affordable housing.
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The commission supports better integration of aging-in-place 
priorities into existing federal programs and urges a more 
coordinated federal approach to meeting the housing needs 
of the growing senior population. the scope of the U.s. 
Department of energy’s weatherization Assistance Program 
should be expanded to include home assessments and 
modifications for aging in place. in addition, steps should 
be taken to provide effective guidance to ensure consumers 
understand the mechanics of reverse mortgages, including 
the risks and benefits of these products. A white House 
conference could bring together top federal officials and key 
players in the private and public sectors to draw national 
attention to the issue of senior housing and to catalyze 
development of a coordinated approach to aging in place.
 
Aging in Place: A New Frontier in 
Housing 
The aging of the population will necessitate major changes 
in the way we operate as a nation, including in the housing 
sector. while the number of Americans aged 65 and 
older is expected to more than double between 2010 
and 2040, we are still largely unprepared to meet the 
needs of the overwhelming numbers of seniors who wish 
to “age in place” in their own homes and communities. 
industry groups have begun to educate their members 
about ways to improve the safety of existing homes through 
relatively simple modifications, and the importance of 
applying universal design principles in the construction 
of new homes. states and localities have also risen to 
the challenge, targeting programs to deliver health care 
and other supportive services to the naturally occurring 
retirement communities where older residents are aging in 
place. 
The commission recommends better coordination of federal 
programs that deliver housing and health care services 
to seniors. the U.s. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) and the Department of Health and 
Human services (HHs) should jointly identify and remove 
barriers to the creative use of residential platforms for 
meeting the health and long-term care needs of seniors. 
in evaluating the costs of housing programs that serve 
frail seniors, congress and the office of management and 
Budget should identify and take into account savings to the 
health care system made possible by the use of housing 
platforms with supportive services.
We are still largely unprepared to 
meet the needs of  the overwhelming 
numbers of  seniors who wish to “age 
in place” in their own homes and 
communities. 
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homes in many communities. A very high percentage of 
renters today, primarily those with modest incomes but also 
increasingly more economically secure households, are 
forced to spend large shares of their income on rent. 
Housing is also a critical driver of the U.s. economy. For 
generations, our nation has looked to housing as a source of 
economic vitality and growth. statistics like “sales of new and 
existing homes” and “multifamily starts” have become key 
indicators of national economic performance. when these 
indicators are trending upward, it generally means the U.s. 
economy is on the march; when they are trending downward, 
the economy is often in trouble. what is clear is that a stable, 
vibrant housing market directly translates into more jobs, 
higher family incomes and household wealth, and a stronger, 
more prosperous nation. it is equally clear that a strong 
economy with robust employment and income growth is the 
surest way to support strong housing markets throughout the 
country. when these elements lag and families cannot keep 
pace with the rising costs of a home, all parts of the housing 
sector suffer, with impacts reverberating throughout the 
economy. 
the unprecedented collapse of the housing market that 
began in 2007 has undermined our confidence in the 
system built over the last 75 years. in the wake of regulatory 
and market failures that enabled the growth of unsafe and 
unstable mortgage products and an unsustainable increase 
in house prices, that system is in disarray. the impact of the 
collapse is still being felt today, as millions of families have 
lost their homes, trillions of dollars in household wealth have 
vanished, and scores of communities remain decimated by 
foreclosures. the federal government’s conservatorship of 
Fannie mae and Freddie mac—the institutions established 
by congress to ensure a stable supply of mortgage financing 
through the sale of mortgage-backed securities—has cost the 
taxpayers tens of billions of dollars to date.1 And mortgage 
credit continues to elude millions of creditworthy borrowers as 
very tight credit practices have become the norm.
our homes are where life among family and friends is 
centered and nurtured. they are the backbones of our 
communities—where our children prepare to go to school, 
where we form attachments with our neighbors, and where 
we participate in civic life. our homes are the very platforms 
from which our lives develop. increasingly, we have come to 
understand that our homes and the communities in which 
they are located are also important determinants of specific 
outcomes: early childhood development and health; access 
to quality educational opportunities; and our ability to reach 
stable, good-paying jobs. As the population ages and as 
we stay longer in our homes, where we live will increasingly 
affect how critical medical and social services are delivered 
and will shape the quality of seniors’ lives.
owning a home has been a strong aspiration since at 
least the mid–20th century, when the postwar economic 
expansion, new government support for veterans and working 
families, the construction of new highways, and suburban 
development created opportunities for families to buy a home 
at an affordable monthly cost. over the next 50 years, many 
families not only enjoyed the security that homeownership 
offered, they also accumulated wealth through the pay down 
of mortgage principal and long-term home price appreciation. 
America’s homes financed millions of college educations, 
retirements, and medical and other necessities. the divide 
between those families with significant net wealth and those 
without was marked most clearly by whether or not a family 
owned a home of its own. Unfortunately, not all Americans 
shared in this prosperity, as homeownership rates for minority 
families have consistently lagged behind those of white 
households. 
During the same period, national policy focused on 
eliminating slums and blight and constructing in their place 
new, affordable rental homes. over time, our success at 
removing blight and slums outpaced our ability to replace 
the lost housing, and market forces that drove up the cost 
of rental housing accelerated the loss of affordable rental 
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recognizing the need for action and a new vision to 
guide federal housing policy, BPc launched the Housing 
commission in october 2011 to examine the many 
challenges in housing today and to advance a coherent 
national strategy in response. As a result of this effort, we 
are more convinced than ever that housing must assume 
a more prominent place on the national policy agenda. A 
nation that can offer a broad range of affordable housing 
options to its citizens will be stronger and better poised to 
compete on the global economic stage. A stable housing 
finance system will support housing consumption and 
investment, which in turn will be a vital source of new 
jobs, economic activity, and tax revenue for all levels of 
government. in short, restoring our nation’s housing sector 
is a necessary precondition for America’s full economic 
recovery and future growth.
At the same time, the demographics of the United states 
are changing in transformative ways. As a society, we 
are becoming older, more likely to delay marriage and 
childbearing, and more racially and ethnically diverse. 
members of the echo Boom generation (those 62 million 
Americans born between 1981 and 1995) are also 
beginning to strike out on their own, many leaving the 
homes of their parents for the first time to form their own 
households. these changes will profoundly impact housing 
demand and the types of housing that Americans will need 
and want in the coming decade. Developing an effective 
response to these demographic changes will be a great 
challenge for policy makers and housing practitioners, and 
a valuable opportunity for a fundamental rethinking of our 
nation’s housing system.
The commission 
developed the following 
five principles as 
the foundation for 
its deliberations and 
recommendations:
A healthy, stable housing market is 
essential for a strong economy and a 
competitive America.
the economy will not reach its full 
potential without a robust housing 
sector that is supported by a strong 
and stable system of housing 
finance. in the post–world war ii 
era, the United states has suffered 
through 11 recessions,2 and new 
homebuilding and housing-related 
construction have often led the way 
to economic revitalization.3 likewise, 
the recent housing and mortgage 
crisis demonstrated that an unstable 
housing finance system can hurt 
not only housing, but, through our 
increasingly integrated banking and 
finance system, the entire global 
economy. A good quality of life for the 
nation’s workforce and population, 
based on safe and secure homes and 
communities of opportunity, is critical 
to the global competitiveness of our 
national and regional economies. 
The nation’s housing finance system 
should promote the uninterrupted 
availability of affordable housing credit 
and investment capital while protecting 
American taxpayers.
tens of millions of American families 
have benefited from the stability 
and affordability provided by the 
U.s. housing finance system and 
its traditional support of a variety of 
mortgages, including sustainable, 
long-term home financing. the 
commission received a wealth of 
testimony calling into question the 
availability of certain consumer-friendly 
products, including the long-term 
prepayable fixed-rate mortgage, absent 
some level of government intervention. 
the commission believes that the 
government role in the housing finance 
system can be structured in a way that 
narrowly circumscribes taxpayer risk 
of loss, while promoting the goals of 
stability and affordability.
Housing Commission Principles
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Against this backdrop of population growth, three important 
demographic trends will help shape the housing landscape: 
the aging of the Baby Boom population, the formation of 
new households by members of the echo Boom generation, 
and the increasing diversity of the general population as 
members of minority groups (particularly Hispanics) make 
up a greater percentage of total households.7 
The Baby Boom Generation
we live in a time when medical and other technological 
advances make it possible for more Americans to enjoy 
longer, more productive lives. this development, while 
certainly welcome, challenges our country to ensure that our 
existing and future housing stock can support healthy living 
by older Americans. this challenge will only grow as the 
Baby Boom generation matures.
The Changing Demographics of 
America
the United states is fortunate to have a growing population 
fueled by both natural increase (net births over deaths) 
and immigration. According to projections of the U.s. 
census Bureau, the national population will likely increase 
from 310 million in 2010 to nearly 334 million in 2020.5 
By mid-century, the census Bureau projects that the U.s. 
population will exceed 400 million.6 As the population 
grows, the demand for new and upgraded housing will grow 
as well. the production of new housing units as well as the 
preservation and renovation of existing units, both owner-
occupied and rental, should be a major dynamic force in 
the overall national economy.
The United States should reaffirm a 
commitment to providing a decent home 
and a suitable living environment for 
every American family.
this commitment, first articulated in 
the Housing Act of 1949 and repeated 
in subsequent federal legislation, 
should be embraced as an essential 
aspiration of an economically dynamic 
and just society. Housing policy 
should recognize the importance 
of community, economically 
diverse neighborhoods, and access 
to education, nutritious food, 
transportation, and other services, as 
well as aim to break up concentrations 
of poverty. Despite our current 
economic problems, the United states 
remains one of the wealthiest countries 
in the world and should have a housing 
system commensurate with this status.
The primary focus of federal housing 
policy should be to help those most in 
need.
As our nation’s leaders continue their 
efforts to restrain federal spending and 
reduce our national debt, it is clear 
that federal resources for housing will 
be significantly constrained for the 
foreseeable future. these limited funds 
should be deployed in a more targeted 
and efficient manner to first help the 
most vulnerable households, including 
the more than 600,000 people 
sleeping on the streets, in shelters, 
or in their cars because they cannot 
afford a home.4 
Federal policy should strike an 
appropriate balance between 
homeownership and rental subsidies.
owner-occupied housing and rental 
housing are complementary—not 
competing—components of a housing 
system that serves individuals and 
families at all stages of life. the 
support the federal government 
devotes to housing through direct 
outlays and tax subsidies should be 
allocated in a manner that reflects 
differences in the circumstances, 
needs, and preferences of households 
throughout the life cycle. 
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expected to grow, from 4.2 million in 2000 to more than 9 
million in 2030.9
Health challenges often become more complex with age. 
more than half of Americans aged 75 or older have some 
difficulty with vision, hearing, mobility, or activities related 
to personal care and independent living.10 Yet many older 
Americans have a strong desire to remain in their current 
homes and communities as they age, even though their 
existing homes may not be fully equipped with the features 
necessary for independent living and access to supportive 
services may be limited. this desire to “age in place” 
will challenge seniors and their children to renovate and 
remodel existing homes in response to health care and 
Between 1946 and 1965, the Baby Boom added 
approximately 78 million individuals to the U.s. population, 
making Baby Boomers one of the largest demographic 
cohorts in U.s. history.8 the oldest members of this group, 
those born in 1946, first joined the senior population (those 
aged 65 or older) in 2011 and are the vanguard of what is 
likely to be an explosion in the number of older Americans.
According to census Bureau projections, the aging of the 
Baby Boom generation will cause the number of seniors 
to grow by 30 million over the next 20 years to 72-million 
strong, accounting for approximately 20 percent of the 
national population, up from 13 percent today. Among 
seniors, the number of people aged 85 or over is also 
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The Echo Boomers
the echo Boom generation, a cohort of approximately 62 
million individuals born between 1981 and 1995, will be the 
major force fueling demand for rental housing in this decade 
(2010 to 2020), particularly in expensive urban housing 
markets where the cost of homeownership is already 
high. According to projections prepared by the Urban 
institute, between five million and six million new renter 
households will form through 2020, with almost all of that 
increase reflecting new household formations among echo 
Boomers.14 
echo Boomers are more racially and ethnically diverse 
than the Baby Boomers. they are also largely single and 
childless. As of 2009, only 21 percent of echo Boomers 
were married, compared with approximately 50 percent of 
Baby Boomers at the same stage of life. in addition, only 
20 percent of echo Boomers have children in their homes 
compared with 30 percent of Baby Boomers when they 
were the same age.15
echo Boomers have attained higher levels of education 
than members of previous generations, with more than 
half (54 percent) having completed at least some college 
education.16 in particular, female echo Boomers have 
reached levels of educational achievement that far exceed 
the levels attained by the women of previous generations.17 
these educational experiences should enhance the long-
term financial position of the echo Boomers while raising 
earnings expectations. 
the great recession’s impact on echo Boomers has been 
significant. Despite higher educational attainment, young 
households are struggling with high unemployment. many 
young adults also carry high levels of credit card and 
student loan debt that may delay the decision to form new 
households and may affect, at least in the short term, the 
type of housing they seek. Not surprisingly, during the latter 
safety needs or seek out affordable rental options within 
their communities to accommodate a desire to downsize. 
Housing affordability is also a serious problem for many 
seniors. most older Americans own their homes. those 
with fixed incomes or limited resources may struggle to 
cover the sometimes unpredictable costs associated with 
homeownership such as utility bills, property taxes, and 
expenses related to home repair and upkeep.11 Among 
senior renters, 70 percent spend at least 30 percent of 
their income covering housing costs.12 Paying too much 
for housing leaves seniors with inadequate income to pay 
for medications, healthy food, and other necessities. this 
trade-off in turn jeopardizes their health, potentially leading 
to increased health care costs, hospitalization, and nursing-
home placement. Federally assisted housing is an important 
resource for the low-income senior population. more than 
one-third of the five million HUD-assisted households are 
headed by an individual who is at least 62 years of age.13 
today, however, the number of low-income seniors in need 
of such assistance greatly exceeds the available subsidies. 
See Chapter 6, Aging in Place: A New Frontier in Housing.
the large share of elderly households that receives HUD 
assistance also illustrates another hard truth about the U.s. 
housing subsidy landscape: while the non-elderly (and non-
disabled) tenants that HUD assists are in a position to use 
their stable housing as a platform to improve their incomes 
and eventually exit the program, these elderly tenants will 
continue to need subsidies as their incomes are relatively 
fixed and unlikely to go up over time. As their numbers 
grow, it will become even more important to think creatively 
about the use of scarce housing assistance in ways that 
maximize impact for all households.
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Despite the disproportionate impact of the recent 
housing crisis on minority homeownership and wealth, 
many members of the African American and Hispanic 
communities continue to aspire to homeownership, with 
Hispanics accounting for a significant share of new-
owner households.22 As the Hispanic share of the overall 
population grows, there may be a greater need for structural 
accommodations to the housing stock in light of the large 
families and multigenerational households common in the 
Hispanic community.23 
the recession substantially slowed the pace of immigration 
to the United states. For the first time in recent memory, 
growth in the foreign-born population slowed in the 2000s, 
and growth in the number of foreign-born households 
appeared to stall as the recession unfolded. these 
developments contributed significantly to the overall decline 
in new household formations. As the economy improves, 
immigration will likely have a significant impact on the 
housing market, especially in gateway cities like New York, 
los Angeles, miami, and Houston. Households headed 
by foreign-born individuals are more likely to live in high-
density areas and multifamily rental housing, especially 
soon after arrival, and to settle in communities where others 
from their home countries already reside.24 in addition, 
many medium- and smaller-sized cities find their immigrant 
communities growing in response to federal resettlement 
programs as well as work opportunities and family 
connections in those cities. 
half of the last decade, many young adults delayed forming 
their own households. instead, some decided to live with 
parents or share housing with roommates. As a result, 
growth in the number of new households declined from an 
average of 1.2 million annually from 2000 to 2007 to an 
average of only 568,000 annually from 2007 to 2011.18 As 
the job market improves, new household formation by the 
echo Boomers will likely increase as this pent-up demand is 
released.
while the echo Boomers will fuel rental demand in the 
near- to mid-term, during the decade that follows 2020, 
large numbers of echo Boomers will likely transition from 
rental housing to homeownership. in many communities, 
echo Boomers will play a leading role in absorbing owner-
occupied single-family housing that has been released into 
the market by Baby Boomers who have either downsized 
to more suitable housing, moved in with their children, 
transitioned into nursing homes and assisted-living facilities, 
or passed away. this process of housing absorption by the 
echo Boomers will be critical to the ongoing vitality and 
stability of local housing markets, particularly those with 
large numbers of Baby Boomer households.19 
The Increasing Diversity of the American Public 
According to Harvard’s Joint center for Housing studies, 
about 70 percent of the 11.8 million net new households 
that form in the United states between 2010 and 2020 will 
be headed by members of minority groups, with much of 
this growth attributable to Hispanic households.20 By 2020, 
minority households are projected to constitute one-third 
of all U.s. households and a growing share of the younger 
renter population.21 
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American people will continue to view homeownership as an 
effective way to build household wealth remains to be seen. 
what is clear is that our country’s economic situation would 
be vastly improved with the re-establishment of a housing 
market in which home prices remain stable and gradually 
appreciate over time and a resolution of those local markets 
where large numbers of homeowners are underwater on 
their mortgages, owing more than their homes are currently 
worth.
in recent months, we have witnessed a welcome pick-
up in sales of new and existing homes after these sales 
dropped to historic lows. Nevertheless, for the immediate 
future, it is likely that the market for single-family homes 
will continue to be troubled, as the backlog of foreclosures 
and the nearly 11 million households who are underwater 
on their mortgages have a strong dampening effect on 
market values.30 this dampening effect will likely be most 
pronounced in those states where the housing market took 
the biggest climbs during the boom years and the steepest 
drops after the market’s collapse.
in addition, even though mortgage rates are at historic lows 
and home prices have dropped by as much as 30 percent 
in some markets, the credit needed to purchase a home is 
scarce and hard to attain. this credit scarcity particularly 
affects low-wealth households who are more likely to be 
African American and Hispanic. 
Housing and the Economy: The 
Challenge and the Opportunity
Historically, housing has been a key driver of the U.s. 
economy. Housing contributes to our nation’s gross 
domestic product (gDP) through investment in residential 
properties (both single-family homes and multifamily 
buildings) and through private consumption of home-
related goods and services, such as new appliances 
and furniture, landscaping, and home repair. According 
to one estimate, the construction of a typical 100-unit 
multifamily development creates 80 jobs directly (through 
construction) or indirectly (through the supply chain), plus 
another 42 jobs in a range of local occupations as a result 
of construction workers spending their wages.25 similar 
economic benefits apply to single-family construction as 
well as renovation activity.26 construction and renovation 
also generate tax revenue for states and localities, helping to 
support the provision of essential public services.
During the past four decades, the contribution of housing 
to national gDP through both residential fixed investment 
and consumption of services has averaged between 17 
to 19 percent.27 today, housing’s contribution stands 
at slightly more than 15 percent,28 largely because of a 
significant decline in fixed investment in home construction 
and remodeling. this decline is a major reason why the 
recession and its damaging effects have lingered for so long. 
According to some estimates, if residential fixed investment 
reflected its historical average, the current rate of economic 
growth could double.29
in the decades preceding the housing market’s collapse, 
homeownership was also the dominant means by which 
millions of American families accumulated household 
wealth. through the “forced savings” of a monthly mortgage 
payment, families were generally able to build up equity 
slowly over time, ultimately transforming their homes into 
their most important and valuable asset. whether the 
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Boomers. the production of new affordable multifamily 
rentals, which dropped dramatically following the collapse of 
the housing market, will need to keep pace with this growth 
in demand.
the United states cannot respond effectively to these 
challenges unless and until it has a world-class system of 
housing finance that supports both the single-family and 
multifamily sectors and a coherent and balanced federal 
approach to assuring decent, affordable homes for the 
most vulnerable households. meeting our nation’s future 
housing needs will depend upon a steady and sufficient 
supply of capital to support a wide variety of participants in 
the housing market—first-time homebuyers, those seeking 
to refinance their mortgages, private mortgage originators, 
while the homeownership market faces some difficult 
challenges at least for the foreseeable future, the rental 
housing market has picked up steam in many urban areas 
throughout the United states. in these markets, rental 
vacancy rates are declining and rental costs are increasing. 
Yet today, an astonishing one in two rental households 
is already cost-burdened, paying more than 30 percent 
of household income on rent and utilities. in fact, more 
than one-quarter of all renters bear severe cost burdens, 
allocating 50 percent or more of their incomes to rent.31 
Unless action is taken, rising rents will put additional 
affordability pressures on these households as they struggle 
to make ends meet. in the coming decade, demand for 
rental housing is likely to be strong and sustained, fueled 
in large part by new household formation among echo 
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Housing is shelter, and more. 
like food and clothing, it is a necessity of life. But a 
burgeoning body of research is also showing us that housing 
that is stable, affordable, of good quality, and located in 
neighborhoods that provide opportunities and services is the 
foundation for many other benefits that accrue to both the 
individual and the broader community.
Access to stable, affordable, and well-located 
housing can improve educational outcomes.
stable, affordable housing can be a platform for better 
educational outcomes. when children move frequently 
from one school to another, they tend to do less well in 
school and disrupt the educational environment for others.34 
stable, affordable housing can help to improve educational 
achievement by reducing the frequency of unwanted 
moves. Affordable housing strategies that help low-income 
families access low-poverty neighborhoods or communities 
with high-performing schools can also contribute to positive 
educational outcomes.35 Better educational performance, in 
turn, may lead to greater employment opportunities, higher 
incomes, and a boost to national wealth and productivity. 
Quality, affordable housing helps improve the health 
of children, older adults, and others and can be a 
platform for more effective delivery of health care 
services. 
Housing that combines the attributes of stability and good 
quality promotes positive physical and mental health 
outcomes for children and adults alike.36 well-constructed 
and maintained housing can substantially reduce children’s 
risk of lead poisoning and respiratory ailments, like asthma, 
as well as exposure to toxic substances, such as pesticides, 
radon, and carbon monoxide.37 well-equipped housing, 
with working smoke detectors and window guards, can also 
reduce the risk of injury or death. 
seniors who wish to stay in their homes and age in place, 
low-income renters, the owners and developers of large 
multifamily rental projects, and the mom-and-pop owners 
and managers of small rental properties. 
Housing and Environmental Sustainability 
efforts to restore housing’s traditional role in the U.s. 
economy must be accompanied by a commitment to reducing 
household energy costs and advancing national energy goals. 
energy use associated with residential buildings accounts 
for some 21 percent of the nation’s overall energy use, and 
the greenhouse gas emissions of a typical home are double 
that of the average vehicle.32 Accordingly, efforts to improve 
the energy efficiency of both existing and newly constructed 
homes can contribute significantly to the national goals of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving energy 
security. given the additional energy and greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with long car trips, these goals can 
further be advanced by increasing the share of homes 
developed in walkable neighborhoods near public-transit 
stations and in other areas where households can meet more 
of their transportation needs through walking, biking, public 
transit, or shorter car trips. these approaches are additive33 
and together can help reduce household expenditures 
for transportation and utilities, which already consume a 
significant share of the budgets of low- and moderate-income 
households.
Why Housing Is Important: It’s All 
About People
of course, the economics of housing tells only part of the 
story. Housing is important because it is first and foremost 
about meeting the basic needs of people. 
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food, pay for prescription medication, and access regular 
medical care. 
The New Fiscal Reality
to complement our housing finance system, the federal 
government deploys substantial fiscal resources to support 
housing through an array of direct spending, tax subsidies, 
and credit-enhancement programs. For example, the 
section 8 Housing choice Voucher and Project-Based 
rental Assistance programs provide a subsidy to assist 
some 3.4 million low-income households44 in covering their 
rental housing costs, and through them support the property 
owners and investors whose capital is critical to maintaining 
this housing stock. the federal tax code encourages 
private investment in the construction, preservation, and 
rehabilitation of affordable rental housing through the low 
income Housing tax credit program, while the mortgage 
interest deduction and the deduction for state and local 
property taxes aim to promote homeownership. And the 
insurance and guarantee programs of the FHA, the U.s. 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the rural Housing 
service of the U.s. Department of Agriculture have helped 
millions of American families gain access to affordable 
mortgages over the past decades. together, the federal 
government devotes more than $180 billion annually 
through these and other initiatives to help meet the diverse 
housing needs of the American people. 
the commission recognizes that our nation’s unsustainable 
debt burden is the dominant, overarching issue in 
washington today. this new fiscal reality has the following 
implications for federal housing policy: 
•	 First,	every	federal	housing	program	must	be	evaluated	
on a forward-looking basis, with attention to how 
effectively it responds to the housing needs of today and 
tomorrow rather than those of the past.
stable housing also enhances the impact of a variety of 
health and treatment services, improving outcomes and 
saving public funds. As we age, for example, housing 
can serve as a platform to support the more effective 
delivery of services, particularly for seniors who need these 
services to live independently. Housing that is co-located 
with or near service providers can yield significant savings 
and efficiencies by allowing older adults to age in place, 
thereby delaying or avoiding the need for much more 
costly institutional care that can draw heavily upon limited 
state and federal resources.38 while additional research is 
needed, it is increasingly clear that modest interventions 
and services delivered through seniors’ housing can reduce 
emergency-room visits and the severity of illnesses, which 
translates to lower health care costs for seniors and public 
and private insurers.39 
stable housing also improves the ability of individuals with 
chronic illnesses to maintain a consistent treatment regime40 
and provides a context within which health care services 
may be more effectively delivered. For example, permanent 
supportive housing—i.e., stable subsidized housing linked 
with treatment and other services—has been shown to be 
effective in improving the impact of services and in ending 
homelessness.41 rigorous studies of homeless people 
with HiV-AiDs, mental illness, and chronic alcoholism 
have shown that, when people lack housing, services are 
not effective and have to be frequently repeated, whereas 
outcomes are significantly better for similar groups placed 
in permanent supportive housing.42 Further, for such 
high-need populations, cost savings may accrue, both 
from the reduction in service utilization and improvement 
in effectiveness, as well as from the reduced use of acute-
care services, such as shelter, transitional housing, hospital 
emergency rooms, and jails.43
Housing affordability is also a critical part of this equation: 
if household budgets are consumed by mortgage or rental 
costs, then fewer resources remain to secure nutritious 
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an affordable rental as she enters the workforce, the newly 
married couple in the market for a starter home, the single 
mother seeking a house with more space for her two active 
teenagers, and the retired widower who cannot imagine 
living anywhere but in the same “cape cod” and in the 
same community he has called home for more than 40 
years. 
we live in times of great turmoil and uncertainty for millions 
of Americans, particularly for those at the lower end of the 
income scale. so, it is our view, too, that a housing system 
earns the mantle of success only if it adequately meets the 
changing needs of the nation.
 
•	 Second,	federal	housing	programs	must	operate	on	
a more efficient basis and deliver services in a more 
effective manner, leveraging to the maximum extent 
possible the resources of the private and nonprofit sectors 
as well as state and local governments. 
•	 Finally,	the	commission	recognizes	that	any	proposals	for	
increased spending must be offset either by reductions 
in federal outlays, savings from systems’ reforms, and/or 
through the adoption of new revenue sources.
the hallmark of a successful housing system is whether it 
offers affordable and secure housing options to Americans 
at all stages in their lives—the young graduate looking for 
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respects, these policies helped to build a resilient and 
broad middle class in which assets were shared across 
generations, contributing to financial stability and social 
mobility as well as stronger communities.
As outlined in Figure 4-2 on page 107, the federal 
government has also historically supported homeownership 
through specific tax subsidies. in 1986, for example, 
congress protected mortgage borrowers by retaining their 
ability to deduct interest payments on mortgages while 
eliminating such deductions for all other forms of consumer 
debt. these tax subsidies remain the most significant form 
of financial support for housing in the federal budget. 
the collapse of the housing market in 2007, however, has 
led many to question the elevated status of homeownership 
in American society. this reassessment is understandable 
in light of the hundreds of thousands of families who have 
lost their homes to foreclosure and is essential if we are 
to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. As part of this 
reassessment, the commission recommends the adoption of 
policies that can accommodate the changing demographic 
profile of new households described earlier in this report, 
striking a balance between support for homeownership and 
renting, and prioritizing such support to help those with the 
greatest needs in both sectors.
Learning from Past Mistakes
the housing boom and bust generated an economic 
downturn from which the nation has yet to recover. some 
analyses have attributed the root cause of the downturn to 
the push for homeownership and fix the blame principally 
on policies to support homeownership. A complete and 
correct analysis would recognize that overly exuberant home 
buying provided an important stimulant, but would place it 
in the context of a wide range of factors that converged to 
create a global crisis. these factors include: 
For generations, millions of American families have aspired 
to purchase and live in a home they can call their own. 
this aspiration is so tightly woven into our nation’s cultural 
fabric that owning a home has become synonymous with 
achieving the American Dream and joining the nation’s 
middle class. 
research shows that homeownership has positive 
impacts on the stability of communities as families 
support and nurture their homes and surrounding 
neighborhoods.45 Homeownership has also been linked 
with increased civic engagement, higher voter turnout, 
enhanced home maintenance, and reduced crime rates.46 
moreover, homeownership, and the stability afforded by 
homeownership, has been linked with positive behavioral 
outcomes and educational achievement among children.47 
For many families, purchasing a home is also the most 
critical investment decision they ever make. through the 
forced savings of a monthly mortgage payment and as a 
result of house price appreciation, homeownership has 
enabled millions of families to build up equity over time, 
which has usually translated into greater household wealth 
and more financial security. For many households, a home 
is their primary asset and homeownership represents their 
single greatest wealth-building opportunity. over the years, 
millions of homeowners have sensibly leveraged the equity 
in their homes to send their children to college, start a new 
business, pay for health care and other emergency costs, 
and meet their retirement needs. 
Dating back to the Homestead Acts of the 1860s, the 
federal government has promoted land ownership 
and homeownership as ways to spur personal and 
community investment. subsequent policies—such as the 
establishment of the Federal Home loan Bank system, the 
creation of the FHA and VA mortgage insurance programs, 
and the establishment of Fannie mae and Freddie mac—
were designed with this same goal in mind. in many 
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to the expansion of homeownership during a period of 
economic growth, and as a result, to unduly curtail support 
of homeownership for households that can responsibly 
assume the obligations of a mortgage.48
of course, at the end of the day, prudent underwriting 
is the essential ingredient of a system of responsible, 
sustainable homeownership. During the housing boom, a 
major factor contributing to the abandonment of prudent 
underwriting was the mistaken belief shared by actors 
across the mortgage chain—lenders, borrowers, regulators, 
and investors—that home prices were inalterably heading 
upward. many borrowers took out short-term mortgages that 
were structured with large payment shocks at the end of 
the term, believing that ever-increasing home prices would 
allow them to refinance before rates reset. when house 
prices declined, however, refinancing was no longer an 
option for many households, who found themselves locked 
into mortgages they could no longer sustain. in addition, 
as the housing bubble expanded, far too much emphasis 
was placed on owning a home as an investment asset and 
as a fast track to acquiring wealth, leading some to assume 
unsustainable levels of debt in the hopes of making a quick 
gain or out of fear they would be left behind if they did not 
act. contributing to an already unsustainable situation, 
many homeowners took out Home equity lines of credit to 
cover other expenses, leaving them with little to no home 
equity when home prices dropped. 
At the same time, practices like “reverse redlining” and 
steering families into riskier mortgage products (such as 
adjustable-rate mortgages and loans with high prepayment 
penalties) led to higher default rates, especially within the 
Hispanic and African American communities. research 
shows that many of the families who did default on these 
loans had good credit, a decent income, and everything 
else necessary to qualify for a traditional long-term, fixed-
rate loan, but instead were steered into exotic and costly 
mortgages they did not fully understand and could not 
•	 A	credit	bubble	formed	as	a	result	of	excess	capital	
surpluses built up by china and the large oil-producing 
nations. 
•	 New	Wall	Street	securitization	instruments	that	used	
complex hedging strategies and generated massive global 
demand both for mortgage-backed securities and for 
subprime mortgages to go into these securities, and the 
decisions by credit-rating agencies to grant top ratings to 
tranches of subprime mortgages.
•	 The	emergence	of	abusive	and	predatory	mortgage	
products that required no documentation and no 
down payments, as well as the activities of unqualified 
borrowers who exploited opportunities and submitted 
false or inadequate credit information.
•	 The	relaxation	of	underwriting	standards	by	major	banks	
and mortgage lenders in order to compete for market 
share with new subprime products.
•	 Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac’s	drive	to	recapture	
market share lost to securitization of subprime and 
other nonprime mortgages, which led them to relax 
underwriting standards and take on risk for which they 
were not prepared.
•	 Regulatory	failure	caused	in	part	by	a	maze	of	
government oversight agencies with overlapping 
jurisdictions and, in some instances, no regulatory 
authority.
Because of the scale and importance of the nation’s 
housing market, these factors and others converged to 
create a boom of massive proportions and a bust of historic 
impact. the point of this litany of convergent forces is not 
to assess blame or to oversimplify complex interactions 
but to encourage a complete diagnosis so that policy 
recommendations and corrective measures address the 
problems effectively. it would be erroneous and damaging 
to misread the origins of the crisis, to attribute it solely 
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of proper regulation, adequate liquidity, and the right 
incentives in the private market can help ensure that 
homeownership remains a vital housing and wealth-building 
option. See Text Box, Developing Sound Principles of 
Regulation, page 53.
Getting Homeownership Right
in a study of 46,000 low-income homeowners, researchers 
at the University of North carolina’s center for community 
capital found that more than 95 percent of these 
homeowners—who received traditional 30-year, fixed-rate 
mortgages between 1999 and 2009 through self Help credit 
Union’s community Advantage Program—were continuing 
to make mortgage payments at the end of the decade, 
despite the collapse of the housing market. the default 
rate for these loans—made to households with a median 
income of $30,000 who often put down less than 5 percent 
on their home purchase—was less than one-quarter the 
default rate of the subprime loans that they might otherwise 
have received (although higher than rates for prime loans 
without the program’s features). the researchers found that 
mortgages to low-income households that are well-serviced 
and correctly structured and avoid risky features—such 
as no documentation of income or assets, high upfront 
fees, prepayment penalties, teaser rates, and balloon 
payments—perform quite well and lead to both sustainable 
homeownership and sound business opportunities for 
lenders.50 
in addition, homeownership remains a strong aspiration 
for millions of Americans. surveys indicate that an 
overwhelming majority of echo Boomers hope to purchase 
a home someday.51 other research shows that Americans 
continue to see homeownership as a critical cornerstone of 
the American Dream with benefits well beyond the financial 
investment. this sentiment is especially strong within the 
rapidly growing Hispanic community.52
afford.49 the regulatory system failed to properly monitor 
and regulate these practices. Uneven regulation left 
mainstream banks heavily supervised while mortgage 
finance companies and subprime lenders acted in a largely 
unaccountable manner. even regulated institutions acquired 
subprime and other nonprime businesses in an attempt to 
share in the market’s seemingly endless growth.
Homeownership Remains the 
Preferred Housing Choice of Most 
Americans 
Despite these experiences, the commission strongly 
believes that homeownership can produce powerful 
economic, social, and civic benefits that serve the individual 
homeowner, the larger community, and the nation. the 
key is to ensure that mortgage borrowers understand their 
obligations and are well-positioned to fulfill them and that 
lenders underwrite loans based on the borrowers’ ability 
to repay. when coupled with reasonable down payments, 
solidly underwritten fixed-rate mortgages—as well as 
straightforward adjustable-rate mortgages with clear terms 
and limits on adjustable and maximum payments—can 
open the door to homeownership and its benefits for 
individuals with modest wealth and incomes. 
lenders and investors have tightened their credit standards 
significantly since the collapse of the housing market. 
the consumer Financial Protection Bureau (cFPB) and 
a collection of other federal agencies are considering a 
number of regulations called for in the Dodd-Frank Act 
to create and regulate effective underwriting practices. 
However, the pendulum has swung too far from the 
excesses of the pre-bust era, and today’s credit box is 
tighter and more restrictive than underwriting practice 
and experience justify. the commission cautions against 
well-meaning regulations that may go too far and end up 
reducing credit to consumers. going forward, a combination 
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Closing the Homeownership Gap
As we look to the future, we must ensure that the 
opportunities and substantial benefits of homeownership 
are available to all members of our society who are 
prepared to assume the responsibilities of being a 
homeowner. Homeownership rates today continue to be 
dramatically dissimilar across racial and ethnic groups 
and income bands (see charts 2-2 and 2-3). in 2011, the 
homeownership rates for Hispanics and African Americans 
were considerably lower than the homeownership rate 
for the overall population. this gap hampers economic 
prosperity and the growth of a stable and secure middle 
class. As our country grows more diverse, with members 
of today’s minority groups accounting for an increasingly 
larger share of the national population, ensuring that the 
opportunity for homeownership is open to all creditworthy 
households is more important than ever.
since the collapse of the housing market, the 
homeownership rate has fallen from 67.3 percent in 2005 
to 64.6 percent in 2011.53 Yet, according to research 
performed by the Urban institute that assesses a number 
of projected demographic scenarios, the overall national 
homeownership rate is unlikely to fall below 60 percent at 
any time before 2030 and is more likely to be higher than 
60 percent.54 A homeownership rate in excess of 60 percent 
is generally consistent with the rate that existed over the 
past 50 years (see chart 2-1). For the foreseeable future, 
homeownership will continue to be the preferred housing 
choice of a majority of American households.
Chart 2-1: National Homeownership Rate, 1960 to 2010 
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Chart 2-3: National Homeownership Rate by Income, 2011
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over the years, the federal government has made significant 
efforts to ensure that access to credit is available without 
regard to one’s racial or ethnic background. the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968 and the equal credit opportunity Act of 1970 
prohibited discrimination in housing and lending. the 
Home mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 gave the public an 
opportunity to monitor the activities of regulated lenders in 
Chart 2-2: National Homeownership Rate by Race and Ethnicity, 2011
source: U.s. census Bureau, “B25003.  tenure,” American Community Survey (washington, D.c.: 2012).
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the home mortgage market. in 1977, congress passed the 
community reinvestment Act requiring financial institutions 
to meet the credit needs of consumers in the communities 
where they are chartered, consistent with safe and sound 
financial practices. Homeownership rates were also a central 
focus of the presidencies of Bill clinton and george w. 
Bush. Both challenged the markets to better serve minority 
homebuyers. 
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•	 Fourth,	mortgage	lending,	zoning,	and	land-use	policies	
should support new forms of homeownership that can 
lower costs and preserve affordable homeownership 
opportunities over time.
the commission also supports the continuation of tax 
incentives for homeownership, but recognizes that, in the 
ongoing debate over tax reform and budget priorities, all 
revenue options will be evaluated. see page 104 for further 
discussion of the commission’s views on federal support for 
housing.
the remainder of this chapter sets forth the case for an 
enhanced national capacity for housing counseling and 
identifies emerging approaches to homeownership that 
merit further study and support. chapter 3 outlines a 
redesigned housing finance system that can support new 
housing production and meet the mortgage credit needs of 
the American people.
The Power of Housing Education and 
Counseling 
the Housing counseling Assistance Program administered 
by HUD was established in 1968 and has traditionally 
enjoyed bipartisan support. over time, funding has 
steadily increased, and the scope of the program has 
broadened to focus on providing education and advice to 
first-time homebuyers, renters, seniors, and homeowners 
facing foreclosure. Financial institutions and counseling 
organizations have developed partnerships as a result of the 
program, and policy makers are incorporating counseling 
in their rules and regulations. over the last decade, the 
Housing counseling Assistance Program has adapted to 
a dynamic housing market by increasing its capacity and 
sophistication. today, housing counselors have experience 
in mortgage origination, loss mitigation, reverse mortgages, 
homeless counseling, and tenant rights, and they have 
The Potential for Homeownership Growth in 
Majority-Minority Jurisdictions55 
the Joint center for Housing studies of Harvard University 
projects that “minorities will account for more than 70 percent 
of net household growth in 2010–20.” By 2011, there were 
already five majority-minority jurisdictions in the country: 
Hawaii (77.1 percent minority), the District of columbia 
(64.7 percent), california (60.3 percent), New mexico (59.8 
percent) and texas (55.2 percent). in estimates released in 
the summer of 2012 by the U.s. census Bureau, the data 
showed that just over half (50.4 percent) of the nation’s 
population under age one are minorities. while much growth 
is occurring in the American south and west, parts of the 
Pacific Northwest are also seeing significant changes. the 
potential for growth in homeownership in each of these 
communities is largely untapped, considering the currently 
low homeownership levels among these populations. 
As the nation seeks to expand homeownership opportunities, 
certain principles should guide our policies:
•	 First,	a	new	and	reinvigorated	commitment	to	
homeownership requires a strong vibrant housing finance 
system where creditworthy borrowers can get a mortgage, 
along with responsible lending practices and a stable 
regulatory regime that provides clear rules of the road for 
mortgage lenders and borrowers.
•	 Second,	we	must	support	a	production	system	capable	
of constructing homes that will be affordable and suitable 
for the millions of households who will seek to become 
homeowners for the first time. 
•	 Third,	housing	counseling	and	education	must	
be a central component of any strategy to expand 
homeownership opportunities, particularly as a means 
of preparing first-time homebuyers for the financial and 
other responsibilities of homeownership.
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ability to respond to an increasingly complex marketplace, 
allowing counselors to reach clients in greater numbers than 
ever before and in more remote locations. HUD-approved 
housing counseling agencies can either connect with HUD 
directly or work through a national or regional intermediary. 
National intermediaries provide leadership that strengthens 
the counseling field and improves the quality and 
professionalism of counseling services. For instance, they 
help pool funds, broker partnerships, seed programs, and 
train counselors. the public campaigns that have brought 
record numbers of homeowners to housing counselors 
through the National council of la raza’s independent 
Foreclosure review hotline and the Homeownership 
Preservation Foundation’s Hope hotline are good examples 
of expanded capacity, structure, and coordination provided 
by intermediaries. 
the vast majority of HUD-approved housing counseling 
providers are community-based nonprofits. community-
based organizations located in the neighborhoods they serve 
have established relationships with local leaders and have 
their pulse on community needs. they are often the first point 
of contact for struggling families. many of these organizations 
bring a cultural competency that is critical when reaching 
underserved minority and immigrant populations. 
Standards
HUD supports a network of nearly 2,700 agencies that, 
since 2005, has assisted more than 13.4 million households 
as they make decisions about their future housing.57 the 
HUD Housing counseling Handbook defines and guides 
the services provided by these agencies, all of which report 
activity annually and are subject to performance reviews 
every two years.
intermediaries are responsible for ensuring that the 
organizations they fund comply with HUD standards, 
as laid out in the HUD Handbook. intermediaries work 
a track record of providing objective information and 
guidance. 
current policy recognizes the importance of counseling 
for especially vulnerable borrowers. counseling is already 
required as a condition to obtaining a reverse mortgage 
though the FHA’s Home equity conversion mortgage 
program, and the Dodd-Frank Act requires counseling 
for borrowers seeking to refinance into high-cost loans, 
as defined by the Home ownership and equity Protection 
Act. Dodd-Frank also elevated counseling’s importance by 
creating a new office of Housing counseling within HUD.
the commission believes that housing counseling can 
improve prospective borrowers’ access to affordable, 
prudent mortgage loans, especially for families that 
otherwise might not qualify or who may experience 
other barriers to mainstream lending. there is a wide 
public benefit from investment in housing education 
and counseling programs, and the commission therefore 
supports continued federal appropriations for housing 
counseling, and recommends that stakeholders who 
benefit from a borrower’s access to counseling services 
be expected to contribute to the cost of the service. to 
achieve this vision, four key elements are necessary: (1) a 
strong counseling infrastructure; (2) clear standards; (3) an 
understanding of the proper role for counselors; and (4) the 
adoption of best practices for integrating counseling into the 
mortgage market. 
Counseling Infrastructure 
technology and product development, human capital, 
brand awareness, and support are key aspects of the 
housing counseling network. online technology allows 
counselors to better evaluate the financial circumstances 
of each borrower and homeowner.56 And new technology 
and infrastructure developed in the wake of the housing 
market’s collapse have increased counselors’ efficiency and 
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counselors coach clients to understand how lenders 
make loan decisions and can help prospective buyers or 
renters determine their monthly threshold for housing-
related expenses. Homeowners who receive pre-purchase 
counseling exhibit substantially lower delinquency rates. 
For example, among a group of 40,000 Freddie mac loans, 
the borrowers who received one-on-one or classroom style 
counseling were on average between 20 and 40 percent 
less likely to ever experience a serious delinquency than 
their peers who did not attend counseling sessions.58
counselors can also be an ally in the event of an 
unexpected financial change and can start the conversation 
with a lender about ways to help struggling homeowners. 
For example, borrowers who received counseling under 
the National Foreclosure mitigation counseling program, 
created in the wake of the foreclosure crisis, were twice as 
likely to obtain a loan modification and 67 percent more 
likely to remain current on the mortgage nine months 
later as compared with their counterparts, who received a 
modification without the assistance of a counselor.59
while the HUD Housing counseling Assistance Program is 
best known for its homeownership efforts, its most important 
contribution may be helping prospective buyers understand 
when it is not the right time for them to purchase a 
home. in light of the large number of households exiting 
homeownership, counseling agencies have seen an uptick 
in demand for rental counseling and financial coaching—a 
new line of service that helps households build credit, set 
up bank accounts, and engage in financial planning. People 
experiencing homelessness also utilize housing counseling 
programs as they transition into a viable rental arrangement. 
As the number of renter households increases, there is a 
unique opportunity to capture data on the impact and value 
of this form of counseling. 
closely with their networks to train new staff on proper 
counseling materials, technology, reporting requirements, 
and management techniques. this model not only ensures 
that HUD standards are implemented but also helps 
organizations remain stable over time. should a HUD 
intermediary’s grantee fail an audit, funding for their entire 
network would be jeopardized.
the National counseling and Homebuyer education 
committee, hosted by Neighborworks America, has 
developed additional industry standards for homeownership 
counselors and educational professionals. these standards 
have been endorsed or adopted by more than 700 national 
and local counseling agencies and funders across the 
country and include professional and ethical standards 
beyond those called for in the HUD Handbook. 
Role of Counselors
As independent third parties, counselors offer unbiased 
information and advice to homebuyers, renters, victims 
of predatory lending, and families facing a financial 
emergency. while counselors can facilitate learning in 
groups, increasingly, they are providing one-on-one 
coaching, which has been shown to be a more effective 
way to generate positive outcomes for households in 
underserved communities. this approach allows private 
questions to be answered, and gives the counselor the 
opportunity to evaluate and develop tailored solutions for 
each family’s unique circumstances. 
Housing counselors have three critical roles in supporting 
and advancing homeownership for the underserved: 
•	 Advisor	to	prospective	homebuyers.
•	 Counselor	to	homeowners	struggling	to	make	payments.
•	 Coach	to	those	not	yet	ready	for	homeownership	but	in	
need of advice about affordable rental options or other 
financial counseling.
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received counseling from a federally approved agency 
before making them a “negative amortization” loan in which 
the mortgage principal owed increases over time. 
many observers are concerned about the extent to which 
mortgages will be accessible and affordable to underserved 
market segments in the future. Housing counseling can 
and should play an important role as a credit enhancer, 
mitigating the risk of lending to borrowers on the margins of 
creditworthiness. counseling organizations can also serve 
as a reliable pipeline of households for whom a slow and 
steady approach to homeownership is prudent. thanks 
to the infrastructure created by HUD, the counseling field 
will be able to maintain its depth and capacity. the HUD 
Housing counseling Assistance Program is an excellent 
example of an effective and highly functional public-private 
partnership that should be thought of as a credit enhancer 
and important entry point for underserved communities to 
achieve homeownership. 
Innovations and Opportunities in 
Homeownership 
in the coming decades, millions of Americans will continue 
to find value in homeownership and seek to become 
homeowners for the first time. in recent years, a number of 
innovative ownership models have been introduced to help 
make homeownership more affordable and accessible.
Shared Equity and Land Trusts
growing numbers of “hybrid” homeownership models, 
variously known as “shared-equity” or “limited-equity” 
models, combine lower up-front costs for consumers with 
features that keep home prices affordable for subsequent 
buyers. For example, some shared- or limited-equity 
programs give the lender a right of purchase upon sale 
of the home, at a price determined using a formula that 
provides the seller with modest appreciation while keeping 
Integrating Counseling into Mortgage Delivery
Despite the success of housing counseling and the growing 
sophistication of the industry, its effectiveness is limited 
by its scale and positioning in relation to the rest of the 
mortgage industry. Promising partnerships between the 
counseling field and lenders have emerged, but more could 
be done to build upon these models. lenders, investors, 
and regulators could provide counseling incentives for 
borrowers on the margins of creditworthiness. For example, 
one idea that has been discussed is for FHA to offer 
an insurance discount for those borrowers who receive 
counseling.60 clearly, such programs would have to be 
tested before scaling and priced consistent with risk- and 
capital-management principles. 
lenders and others can require counseling for certain 
products. For example, the Federal Home loan Banks’ 
homeownership set-aside programs include counseling 
as a required condition for eligibility. A study conducted 
by the Federal Home loan Banks on foreclosures within 
its homeownership programs between 2003 and 2008 
found that only 1.7 percent of homebuyers assisted by 
those programs requiring counseling (1,177 of 70,163 
participants) entered the foreclosure process.61 these 
programs are designed to assist lower-income and first-
time homebuyers, yet the foreclosure rates reported by the 
Home loan Banks were notably better than rates reported 
for prime loans through conventional mortgage programs. 
clearly, as indicated by the numbers, homeownership 
counseling works. 
regulators are also seeing the promise of housing 
counseling. the cFPB recently proposed a rule that will 
require all lenders to provide a list of federally approved 
counseling agencies to a consumer who applies for any 
mortgage loan within three business days. A second 
proposed rule, under the truth in lending Act, would 
require a lender to confirm that a first-time borrower 
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sustainable conventional financing for these homes remains 
a serious obstacle for buyers, particularly for manufactured 
homes placed on rented land. 
given the characteristics of those now entering the 
homeownership market for the first time, policy makers 
should give continued attention to ways to increase the 
availability of affordable, long-term mortgage financing for 
manufactured homes and should re-examine those policies 
that may unnecessarily restrict the ability of first-time buyers 
to purchase these homes.
The Formula for Sustainable 
Homeownership
whatever the vehicle may be, the formula for sustainable 
homeownership is clear: the broad availability of prime, 
fixed-rate mortgage financing—as well as straightforward 
adjustable-rate mortgages with clear terms and limits on 
adjustments and maximum payments—combined with 
counseling and financial education for those who may 
need it. Add to this mix a regulatory system that is vigilant 
and sufficiently equipped to address misconduct in the 
marketplace. 
one other ingredient is absolutely essential: a strong, vibrant 
system of housing finance that can ensure a steady flow of 
affordable mortgage funds to prospective homeowners and 
those seeking to refinance. Following the recent housing 
market crash and the ongoing challenges that creditworthy 
prospective homebuyers face in accessing mortgage 
credit, a sound housing finance system will be of primary 
importance to support and sustain homeownership going 
forward.
 
costs affordable to the next buyer. these programs can 
involve community land trusts with nonprofit sponsors who 
own the land under the properties. either through covenants 
on individual deeds for homes, or through continued 
ownership and lease-back of the land by the sponsor, 
these trusts incorporate a long-term affordability goal by 
limiting the sales prices of homes over time. there are also 
well-established models of limited-equity cooperatives in 
multi-unit buildings where the terms of the cooperative limit 
appreciation to a set amount.
land trusts using lease-back provisions can be particularly 
attractive for local governments that have acquired 
abandoned homes or for employer-assisted housing 
programs using land the employer owns. Another advantage 
of land trusts is the continuing participation by the 
sponsoring organization in the ongoing life of the community 
and the transfer of properties. there is recent evidence that 
owners in such trusts were less susceptible to subprime 
and predatory refinancing loans and performed better than 
other, comparable households through the mortgage bust 
and foreclosure crisis.62
these programs serve a succession of buyers over time, 
making effective use of scarce funds and helping to 
maintain homeownership at affordable levels. many have 
demonstrated significant success but have not yet been 
taken to scale. these models deserve further support and 
study as alternatives that could help build effective and 
sustainable homeownership opportunities. 
Manufactured Homes
in many parts of the country, and particularly in rural areas, 
manufactured homes are a significant and often overlooked 
source of affordable housing. Access to affordable, 
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our nation’s housing finance system is complex, varied, 
and global in scope. As Figure 3-1 below demonstrates, 
it consists of banks, thrifts, mortgage brokers, and other 
originators of mortgage loans; organizations that service 
the loans on behalf of the originators; public and private 
institutions that buy the loans and then pool them into 
securities; and institutional and individual investors who 
purchase these securities in the secondary market. 
A key feature of our housing finance system is the critical 
role of securitization. By taking loans off the balance sheets 
of banks and other mortgage originators, the securitization 
process frees up additional capital for mortgage lending. 
it also shifts some of the risks inherent in the mortgages 
to the investors in the mortgage-backed securities who 
are willing to assume these risks in return for a yield that 
may be higher than that of other investments. in this 
way, securitization helps circulate funds from a variety of 
domestic and international sources into the mortgages that 
finance housing for millions of American families.
our housing finance system is the largest in the world, 
with almost $10 trillion in single-family mortgage 
debt outstanding63 and $825 billion in mortgage debt 
outstanding in the multifamily sector.64 to put these figures 
meeting our nation’s diverse housing needs will require a 
strong and stable system of housing finance. this system, 
when functioning at its full potential, can offer millions of 
Americans and their families the opportunity to choose 
the type of housing that best meets their unique needs. 
whether it is the recent graduate entering the workforce, the 
working couple with children seeking to purchase a home 
for the first time, the young single looking for an affordable 
apartment in the central city, or the retired widower hoping 
to downsize from his three-bedroom home, it is the housing 
finance system that helps transform these aspirations into 
concrete realities. A successful housing finance system 
maximizes the range of ownership and rental housing 
choices available to us at all stages of our lives.
in many respects, the housing finance system is also a 
key part of the economy’s plumbing, a complex series of 
financial pipes and drains through which capital flows to 
both the single-family and rental segments of the housing 
market. without the liquidity provided by this system, 
mortgage lending would be scarce and more expensive, 
new homebuilding would stall, the construction of new 
apartment units and preservation of existing units for our 
nation’s burgeoning renter population would slow down, and 
our economy would suffer. 
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Figure 3-1: Simplified View of the Single-Family Housing Finance System
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banks’ books and is held by a diverse array of entities and 
institutions (see chart 3-1). For the foreseeable future, there 
is simply not enough capacity on the balance sheets of 
U.s. banks to allow a reliance on depository institutions as 
the sole source of liquidity for the mortgage market. given 
the size of the market and capital constraints on lenders, 
the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities 
must continue to play a critical role in providing mortgage 
liquidity.
in perspective, the size of the U.s. single-family mortgage 
market exceeds the entire european market and is nearly 
six times larger than that of the United kingdom, which is 
home to the world’s second-largest single-family market. 
the sheer size of the U.s. mortgage market requires that we 
retain diverse sources of mortgage credit. in 2006 and 2007 
the amount of outstanding mortgage debt exceeded the total 
value of all assets held by U.s. banks. today, outstanding 
mortgage debt nearly equals the total value of the assets on 
Chart 3-1: Holders of Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 2012 Third Quarter
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similar in approach to the FHA loan-level insurance 
programs but targeted to helping military veterans and their 
families secure homeownership. in the years following world 
war ii, the homeownership rate rose steadily, from 43.6 
percent in 1940 to 55 percent in 1950 and to 66.2 percent 
in 2000, as measured by the Decennial census.
in addition to ownership housing, the FHA also provides 
credit support for multifamily rental housing through a 
separate reserve fund first established by the National 
Housing Act of 1938. the FHA’s authority to support 
multifamily housing was not widely exercised until the 
1960s when several programs were created to encourage 
the construction and preservation of rental housing for 
moderate-income households.68
in 1934, the government also authorized the FHA to create 
national mortgage associations to provide a secondary 
market to help mortgage lenders gain access to capital 
for FHA-insured loans. only one such association was 
established, when the FHA chartered the Federal National 
mortgage Association in 1937. in 1968, the Federal 
National mortgage Association was partitioned into two 
separate entities—the government National mortgage 
Association, or ginnie mae, which remained in the 
government, and Fannie mae, which became a privately 
owned company charged with the public mission of 
supporting the mortgage market by purchasing conventional 
(i.e., non-government-insured) mortgages. Until the 1980s, 
Fannie mae carried out its mission by issuing debt—first 
as a government agency and after 1968 as a government-
sponsored enterprise (gse)—and using it to buy mortgages 
from their originators. in 1970, the secondary market grew 
with the creation of Freddie mac, which was initially owned 
by the Federal Home loan Banks and, with passage of the 
Financial institutions reform, recovery and enforcement 
Act (FirreA) in 1989, reorganized as a private, for-profit 
corporation with a charter similar to that of Fannie mae.69
Historical Context: The Path to Today’s 
Housing Finance System
the great Depression was a watershed period in the history 
of housing in the United states. Up until the mid-1930s, 
residential mortgages generally had short terms (usually 
three to ten years), variable interest rates, and featured 
“bullet” payments of principal at term. Borrowers would 
normally refinance these loans when they became due or 
pay off the outstanding loan balance. At the time, large 
down payments were common, and mortgages typically had 
very low loan-to-value (ltV) ratios of 60 percent or less.65 
the homeownership rate, however, was significantly lower 
than it is today—around 45 percent, compared with 64.6 
percent—as fewer families had the financial wherewithal 
to enter into mortgages with these more stringent terms. 
Homeownership was generally reserved for the wealthy or, 
in rural areas, for those who lived on and farmed their land.
As the great Depression swept the nation, housing values 
declined by as much as 50 percent. Banks that held the 
mortgages on these homes refused to or were unable 
to refinance when the loans came due. thousands of 
borrowers then defaulted, having neither the cash nor the 
home equity available to repay the loans. the consequence 
was a wave of about 250,000 foreclosures annually between 
1931 and 1935.66
in response to these events, the federal government 
established the Federal Home loan Bank system in 1932 
to increase the supply of mortgage funds available to local 
financial institutions and to serve as a credit reserve. two 
years later, in 1934, the government created the FHA to 
help stabilize the mortgage market through its insurance 
programs. By insuring only mortgages that met certain limits 
on the maximum principal obligation, interest rate, ltV ratio, 
and loan duration, the FHA helped set the foundation for 
the modern standardized single-family mortgage.67 in 1944, 
the government established the VA loan guarantee program, 
Housing America’s Future: New Directions for National Policy 41
mistaken view shared by actors throughout the mortgage 
market that housing prices would continue to rise without 
interruption, encouraged Fannie mae and Freddie mac 
to leverage their businesses to unsustainable levels. with 
insufficient capital buffers, both institutions suffered 
catastrophic losses when the housing market collapsed and 
the credit markets froze, leading to their conservatorship by 
the government in 2008. 
Notably, during the housing crisis, the multifamily 
businesses of Fannie mae and Freddie mac continued to 
generate a profit for both institutions, as the default rates 
on their multifamily loans were substantially lower than 
the loans in their single-family portfolios. it is also worth 
noting that the 12 Federal Home loan Bank cooperatives, 
which were designed to provide countercyclical liquidity for 
U.s. mortgage and housing market participants, remained 
a reliable source of liquidity for their more than 7,700 
member institutions during the crisis. the Home loan 
Banks provide a reliable flow of funds and liquidity to local 
lenders for housing and community development through 
advances funded by debt the banks issue and collateralized 
by mortgages or mortgage bonds exchanged by members in 
return for the advances. in late 2008, while other sources of 
credit froze, Federal Home loan Bank advances increased 
by $400 billion (reaching $1 trillion) as the Home loan 
Banks continued to support their members’ participation in 
the housing market. 
Despite our current difficulties, households in the United 
states have enjoyed a wider range of mortgage financing 
options than those in most other nations of the world. For 
instance, the most common mortgage product in the United 
states—the long-term, fixed-rate mortgage—is relatively 
rare in other countries where shorter-term and variable-
rate mortgages are the norm.70 the long-term, fixed-rate 
mortgage has been a tremendous boon to consumers who 
are provided with cost certainty and protection from the 
risks associated with fluctuating interest rates. the process 
over the years, Fannie mae, Freddie mac, and ginnie mae 
helped bring greater transparency and standardization 
to both the single-family and multifamily housing finance 
system, which has lowered mortgage costs. By setting clear 
benchmarks for loans eligible for securitization, the three 
institutions also helped improve the overall credit quality of 
the system. moreover, by linking local financial institutions 
with global investors in the secondary market, they helped 
expand access to mortgage credit.
However, the companies’ role was a sore point for the 
lending industry almost from the start. Acting as a giant 
thrift, Fannie mae profited from the spread it earned 
between its cost of funds, which was lower than other 
private companies because of its government ties, and 
the interest rates on mortgages. the creation of the first 
mBs by ginnie mae in the 1970s led Fannie mae and 
Freddie mac, and then private wall street firms, to engage 
in securitization. Depositories viewed Fannie mae as a 
competitor for balance-sheet lending, and, after mBs 
became the prevalent funding source, private-sector 
competitors likewise saw the gses as unfairly competing 
with them in the securities markets. Both institutions 
did enjoy a number of benefits because of their unique 
charters, including a line of credit with the U.s. treasury, 
exemptions from certain state and local taxes, which 
provided favorable treatment for their portfolio business, and 
most importantly, an implied government guarantee of their 
securities as well as their own corporate debt. in return, 
the charters restricted Fannie mae and Freddie mac only 
to residential mortgage finance in the United states, and 
the companies were expected to support mortgage markets 
throughout all market cycles, an obligation that did not 
apply to other fully private investors or guarantors.
in the wake of the savings and loan crisis in 1989, 
congress imposed new capital requirements and 
strengthened the gses’ mission requirements. But the 
pressure to deliver returns to shareholders, along with the 
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of securitization has played an instrumental role in setting 
the standards for these mortgages and making them widely 
available on affordable terms for millions of American 
families. By taking individual mortgages—inherently 
illiquid and difficult-to-price assets—and combining them 
with millions of other loans in stable securities based on 
cash flows from a broadly diversified portfolio of assets, 
securitization has opened the residential finance market to 
investors who otherwise could not participate in this market. 
the flow of cash has helped fuel one of the most stable, 
transparent, and efficient capital markets in the world and 
assured American consumers of a steady and reliable 
source of mortgage credit.
Single-Family Housing Finance Trends 
in the wake of the collapse of privately funded and 
nongovernment-insured mortgages, the federal government 
has emerged as a dominant presence in the housing 
finance market, a role it has played before when private 
capital has fled the mortgage market. As charts 3-2 and 
3-3 show, the federal government currently insures and 
guarantees the largest share of mortgage-backed securities 
and assumes the major portion of credit risk in the U.s. 
mortgage market.
in 2011, securities backed by Fannie mae, Freddie mac, 
and ginnie mae (with credit insurance from the FHA and 
the VA) constituted 97 percent of all mBs, with non-agency 
funds less than 3 percent. By comparison, Fannie mae, 
Freddie mac, and ginnie mae accounted for 78 percent 
of the mBs market in 2000, with non-agency funds at 
22 percent. the chart also shows that government and 
gse shares of mBs remained relatively steady through 
the 1990s, a period of strong economic growth and stable 
interest rates. 
The Long-Term, Fixed-Rate Mortgage
over the past several decades, the American people have 
benefited greatly from the wide availability of long-term, 
fixed-rate mortgage financing, most notably in the form of the 
30-year fixed-rate mortgage. the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage 
provides a long amortization period that helps to keep 
monthly payments low and provides certainty to borrowers 
by protecting them against interest rate volatility over the 
life of the loan. while in recent years interest rates have 
fallen to historic lows and have remained low for a sustained 
period, rates will inevitably rise, perhaps significantly, 
making mortgage financing more expensive. A long-term, 
fixed-rate mortgage protects against these fluctuations and 
gives borrowers a clear sense of their monthly repayment 
obligations and the assurance that this obligation will not 
change dramatically over time.
the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage also enhances the stability 
of housing finance for the borrower. long-term, fixed-rate 
mortgages shift interest-rate risk from borrowers to lenders 
and investors in mortgage-backed securities who are generally 
more sophisticated and better equipped to manage this risk 
than the average borrower household.71 the presence of a 
government guarantee in the secondary market ensuring 
that investors will be paid even if borrowers default on their 
loans has eliminated much of the credit risk from these 
investments, thereby making them attractive to investors 
looking for instruments that are sensitive only to interest rate 
risk. in the absence of such a government guarantee, it is 
highly unlikely that private financial institutions would be 
willing to assume both interest rate and credit risk, making 
long-term, fixed-rate financing considerably less available than 
it is today or only available at higher mortgage rates. 
the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage has enabled millions 
of Americans families to achieve their dreams of 
homeownership. the commission endorses product choice 
and strongly believes this type of mortgage product should 
continue to be available to a broad universe of qualified 
borrowers.
Housing America’s Future: New Directions for National Policy 43
only 12 percent of originations (compared with 53 percent 
in 2000 and 44 percent in 1990), while FHA/VA loans and 
Fannie mae and Freddie mac conforming loans constituted 
88 percent of originations (versus 47 percent in 2000 and 
56 percent in 1990).
the same general situation is true for all mortgage 
originations (whether originated to be held in portfolio or 
sold into the mBs market). chart 3-3 shows that, in 2010, 
private-sector-related originations including jumbo loans, 
loans originated for private-label securities, and adjustable-
rate mortgages (Arms) to be held in portfolio constituted 
Chart 3-2: Mortgage-Backed Securities – Market Share, 1990 to 2011
Funds for MBS, share of market by source, selected years
1990 1996 2000 2006 2011
Fannie mae & Freddie mac 65.76 61.22 61.11 39.95 72.14
ginnie mae 24.82 22.91 16.79 4.02 25.52
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large volume of foreclosures, and a prolonged foreclosure 
process in some states continue to stand in the way of a full 
market recovery. 
Further, while in most of the country the cost of buying a 
home has never been more affordable, stringent underwriting 
requirements prevent many would-be borrowers from taking 
while there are nascent signs that we have turned a corner, 
the U.s. system of single-family housing finance continues 
to face serious challenges as significant problems related to 
the great recession persist. sustained high unemployment, 
an unprecedented collapse in house prices—especially in 
certain highly affected states and metropolitan areas—the 
Chart 3-3: Mortgage Originations by Product, 1990 to 2010
Mortgage originations by product share of market by source, selected years
1990 1996 2000 2006 2010
conforming/Fannie mae & Freddie mac 43.4 38.6 37.9 32.2 65.4
FHA/VA 12.7 10.7 8.8 2.6 22.6
Jumbo/private label 23.1 25.4 29.5 48.1 6.7
Arms held in portfolio 20.8 25.4 23.8 17.1 5.3
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Obstacles to Market Recovery
the commission has identified the following obstacles that 
are making it difficult for qualified borrowers to obtain a 
mortgage and are therefore impeding a full market recovery: 
1. Overly strict lending standards. sales of new and existing 
homes remain well below historic levels going back 
several decades. observers attribute the decline in home 
sales, in part, to unnecessarily rigid down payment, 
debt-to-income, and credit score requirements that 
were imposed in the aftermath of the housing market’s 
collapse.72 restoring the appropriately conservative 
underwriting standards in place before the housing 
bubble, with their focus on the overall creditworthiness 
advantage of these conditions. As illustrated in chart 3-4, 
borrowers’ credit scores at origination have increased by 40 
to 50 points since 2001. 
today, a number of obstacles prevent a return to the 
conditions that prevailed in the late 1990s—before lax 
underwriting infiltrated the system and contributed to 
the crisis—and stand in the way of qualified borrowers 
accessing mortgage credit. Unprecedented investor 
demands placed on originators and sellers of mortgages 
have caused lenders to be increasingly cautious when 
considering new mortgage applications, and sales of new 
and existing homes remain well below historic levels going 
back several decades. 
Chart 3-4: Borrower FICO Score at Origination
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some have argued that the 36-month and 60-month 
timeframes are too long, and any delinquencies beyond 
the first year following origination are likely to reflect 
changes in borrower circumstances (rather than the 
borrower’s position at origination). in addition, the 
guidance does not apply to mortgages originated in 
2012 or prior years and thus does little to relieve banks’ 
concerns about exposure from these loans. close 
attention should be paid to lenders’ evolving practices 
and adjustments to these new guidelines. it is critical that 
regulators strike the right balance between giving lenders 
assurance that their liability is limited when selling 
loans into securities and ensuring that credit guarantors 
have the right tools with which to enforce their credit 
standards.
4. Appraisals. the sales price of distressed or foreclosed 
homes—whether disposed of through one-off deals 
or bulk sales—tends to be substantially lower than 
traditional (non-distressed) sales, often as a result of 
the increased time and risk associated with distressed 
sales, differences in the condition of the property, and the 
seller’s interest in completing the transaction. However, 
distressed property sales continue to be recorded and 
used as comps in appraisals of non-distressed (retail) 
properties, a practice that depresses local home values 
and impacts would-be homebuyers’ ability to secure 
financing. in some markets, demand for multiple 
reappraisals, sometimes just days before closing, also 
introduces substantial uncertainty into the home-buying 
process and can derail sales and disrupt the plans of 
homebuyers and sellers. to remedy this situation, Fannie 
mae, Freddie mac, and FHA could refuse to accept 
distressed sales as valid comps, forcing a reassessment 
of non-distressed properties. in markets that do not have 
sufficient sales volume to allow comps to be calculated 
without the inclusion of distressed sales, an alternative 
approach might be to require an addition to the value of a 
distressed sale based on the difference between the local 
market index of distressed sales versus retail sales.
of the borrower, could help to improve the health of the 
housing market. 
2. Lack of access to credit for well-qualified self-employed 
individuals. self-employed borrowers face unique 
obstacles to providing income documentation and 
meeting other criteria required to qualify for a mortgage 
under current underwriting standards. Adjustments 
to these criteria could be made to acknowledge these 
limitations and provide access to credit while ensuring 
that lenders do not take on unnecessary risk.
3. Put-back risk. Fannie mae, Freddie mac, and the FHA 
hold lenders liable for representations and warranties 
associated with loans purchased by the agencies for a 
finite amount of time following origination. in the event 
of a default during that period, lenders may be required 
to buy back the delinquent loan. this retained risk is an 
important tool for ensuring that loan originators comply 
with the credit terms promulgated by the three agencies. 
But, uncertainty surrounding the circumstances around 
which this “put-back” option will be exercised has 
dampened lending and caused some lenders to impose 
additional requirements, or lender overlays, to existing 
agency underwriting criteria in order to further insulate 
themselves from potential liabilities. 
guidance issued by the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) effective January 2013 helps to address some 
of these concerns by clarifying “lenders’ repurchase 
exposure and liability,” including promising earlier review 
of loans and providing relief from representations and 
warranties following 36 months of consecutive on-
time payments.73 while this guidance is an important 
start, and provides partial relief, several factors limit its 
effectiveness in stimulating new lending. For example, 
when determining lender eligibility for relief from put-back 
risk, the new framework takes into consideration borrower 
performance over a period of up to 60 months following 
acquisition of the loan by Fannie mae and Freddie mac. 
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as well as how the various regulatory initiatives now under 
consideration interact with each other. 
in light of the seriousness of the current situation, 
the commission suggests that the President of the 
United states direct the Department of the treasury, in 
coordination with the various federal banking agencies, 
to inventory these regulatory initiatives and assess their 
current and likely future impact on the affordability and 
accessibility of mortgage credit. the treasury Department 
should report back to the President without delay not 
only with this assessment, but also with a plan to align 
these requirements as much as possible to help get 
mortgage credit flowing again. A top official within the 
treasury Department or in the white House should be 
tasked with day-to-day responsibility for coordinating the 
implementation of this plan. 
over the longer term, the future of the primary and 
secondary mortgage markets is even more uncertain. many 
proposals put forth to date have laid out detailed plans 
for reform, but have failed to consider the fundamental 
underlying question: “what kind of housing system do we 
want?” in the following section, we set forth a longer-term 
vision and structure for a redesigned system of housing 
finance in which the federal government remains an active 
participant, but the private sector plays a far greater role in 
bearing credit risk. 
5. Application of FHA compare ratios. An FHA “compare 
ratio” provides an indication of a lender’s loan 
performance relative to other FHA lenders in a particular 
market. For example, if a lender has a compare ratio of 
50, its default rate on FHA loans is only half the default 
rate for all lenders in that area. on the other hand, a 
ratio of 150 would mean that the default rate is one-
and-a-half times that of other FHA lenders in the area. A 
high compare ratio may result in an enforcement action 
against a lender with the lender losing the ability to close 
FHA loans. lenders with relatively high compare ratios 
typically attempt to lower the ratio by imposing tighter 
underwriting standards, which in turn has a cascading 
effect on other lenders in the area who must resort to 
similarly restrictive lending practices in order to maintain 
their relative position. while compare ratios serve as a 
useful analytical tool, the current application of the ratios 
may have the effect of tightening credit by FHA lenders to 
creditworthy borrowers. FHA should reconsider the way 
in which compare ratios are applied to ensure they do not 
unduly restrain credit and provide an accurate reflection 
of lender performance—both in originations and in 
servicing practices—in the current market. 
6. Uncertainty related to pending regulations and 
implementation of new rules. in the past few months, 
several important federal rulemakings related to the 
U.s. mortgage market have been finalized while other 
proposed rules are still pending. these new and 
pending rules have the potential to significantly affect 
home finance in the United states. lenders report that 
uncertainty as to their impact has led them to exercise 
caution and pull back on new mortgage originations for 
all but the lowest-risk borrowers. in addition, the potential 
impact of Basel iii on the housing finance market is 
significant and not fully understood or appreciated. Policy 
makers deserve a much fuller understanding of how the 
current regulatory environment impacts mortgage lending 
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see chart 3-5 for an illustration of the relatively low default rate 
over time for loans originated in 2000. 
Home purchase education and counseling must become a 
central component of the mortgage process. As the housing 
bubble expanded, too many families believed they were entering 
into affordable mortgages when, in fact, these mortgages were 
unsustainable by any reasonable measure. Financial education 
and counseling, particularly for first-time homebuyers, may have 
helped some of these families avoid this mistake. 
Government oversight of the housing finance system is essential 
to ensuring continued stability in the housing market. in the 
years leading up to the housing crisis, some private lenders made 
the system less stable by transferring risk to borrowers through 
mortgage products with shorter durations, adjustable rates, higher 
costs, and less-than-transparent terms. to prevent a recurrence 
of this behavior, the government has an important role to play 
in monitoring developments in the market on a real-time basis; 
ensuring transparency; establishing clear rules of the road, so 
lenders understand the standards they need to meet and the 
penalties for failing to do so; and protecting consumers, investors, 
and the market’s ongoing stability.
Any government support for the housing finance system should 
be explicit and appropriately priced to reflect actual risk. looking 
ahead, the government’s support for the housing finance system—
whether through insurance at the loan level or guarantees in the 
secondary market for mortgage-backed securities—should be 
designed with taxpayer protection as a critical goal. 
Our housing finance system must be resilient enough to weather 
the inevitable periods when the housing market takes a downward 
turn. As the housing bubble expanded, many lenders, borrowers, 
and investors made the fatal error of convincing themselves that 
the market was heading in only one direction: up. of course, 
this view ignored the cyclical nature of the housing market in 
which home prices have historically gone both up and down. A 
the recent crisis exposed major deficiencies in our system of 
housing finance. At the height of the bubble, excess liquidity 
overwhelmed the system as traditional underwriting standards 
were abandoned and mortgage credit became widely available to 
large numbers of borrowers who were ill-prepared to assume these 
obligations. in some instances, the obligations were not disclosed 
to borrowers in a fully transparent manner that would have allowed 
for an assessment of a mortgage’s true cost. 
At the same time, private lenders substantially underpriced the 
risk of mortgage credit, while government regulators failed to keep 
pace with and adequately monitor new private-sector lending, 
securitization, and hedging practices. this regulatory failure 
extended to the operations of Fannie mae and Freddie mac, the 
two giant institutions now under government conservatorship. Both 
institutions also significantly underpriced mortgage credit risk and 
used the implied guarantee of government support to increase 
their leverage to unsustainable levels. 
As we design a housing finance system for the future, we should 
be mindful of the lessons learned over the past decade. these 
lessons include:
Prudent mortgage loan underwriting is the foundation of a sound 
system of housing finance. Prudent underwriting is the single most 
effective way to mitigate risk in the system, while ensuring that 
mortgage credit flows easily to those who can afford it. in making 
decisions to extend credit, lenders should assess a borrower’s 
ability to repay a mortgage loan based on such traditional factors 
as income, assets, current debt, and credit history. the interests 
of lenders, borrowers, and investors should be aligned to assure 
that all parties are at risk when underwriting is not based on 
prudent factors. But while underwriting standards became too 
lax in the years leading up to the foreclosure crisis, the pendulum 
has now swung too far in the opposite direction. returning to the 
underwriting standards that prevailed in the marketplace before 
the housing bubble started, and then maintaining those careful but 
reasonable standards, would help restore balance to the system. 
Taking Stock – Lessons Learned from the Housing Crisis
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redesigned system of housing finance must contain safeguards 
that will allow the market to remain stable and continue as a 
source of mortgage liquidity, even when these counter-cyclical 
periods occur.
A redesigned housing finance system should also adhere to sound 
principles of regulation. See Text Box, Developing Sound Principles 
of Regulation, page 53.
Chart 3-5: Fannie Mae Cumulative Default Rates of Single-Family Loans by Origination Year
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Note: Fannie mae and Freddie mac use different approaches to track loan performance: Freddie mac calculates the cumulative rate of loans from a given book year 
that have proceeded to foreclosure, transfer, or short sale and resulted in a credit loss; whereas Fannie mae includes in its cumulative default rates loans that have 
been liquidated through channels other than voluntary pay-off or repurchase by lenders, including foreclosures, pre-foreclosure sales, sales to third parties, and 
deeds in lieu of foreclosure. Despite these differences in methodology, performance data by book year is similar across both entities, with loans originated in 2000 
and acquired by Fannie mae having a 1.36 percent cumulative default rate, compared with a 1.10 percent foreclosure transfer and short-sale rate at Freddie mac.
source: Fannie mae
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institutions. As noted above, private credit enhancers of 
mBs would bear the predominant loss risk in the event of a 
market downturn, while the Public guarantor would provide 
a wrap for the timely payment of principal and interest 
by the servicers of the mBs (similar to the wrap presently 
provided by ginnie mae) and bear the catastrophic risk in 
the event of borrower default and the failure of the private-
sector credit-risk bearers. servicers would look first to the 
private credit enhancers for reimbursement of advances on 
defaulted mortgages. only upon failure of a private credit 
enhancer would the government guarantee be triggered. 
the commission’s proposed model includes a continued, 
but limited, role for the federal government to guarantee 
mBs to ensure mortgage market liquidity and stability, with 
a large role for private capital to assume credit risk and 
shield taxpayers from exposure to credit losses. the overall 
structure of the new model is intended to avoid the re-
creation of a small number of entities viewed as “too big to 
fail” or as enjoying an “implied guarantee.” our new model 
clearly delineates the respective roles of the government 
and the private sector, and establishes a clear expectation 
that private firms suffer the consequences of poor business 
decisions by losing their capital, with no bailout for private 
shareholders or bondholders. the government would 
cover losses from an account pre-funded by payments 
of a separate catastrophic guarantee fee, but only after 
private credit enhancers have exhausted their own capital 
and reserves. the Public guarantor must play a strong 
role as regulator of the new system, including establishing 
sound prudential standards for private-sector entities and 
structures that are permitted to participate in this system as 
originators, servicers, or credit risk bearers. 
the following sections provide more detail on the policy 
objectives underlying this proposal, outline the key functions 
for this new structure for single-family housing finance, 
illustrate how the various elements of the system work 
together, and discuss the importance of a dynamic flexible 
Recommendations for the Single-
Family Housing Finance System
the current structure of the single-family housing finance 
system was largely patched together to keep mortgage 
credit flowing during the crisis. Almost all of the credit risk 
in the system is currently borne by the federal government, 
and a large portion of this government support is delivered 
through the conservatorship of Fannie mae and Freddie 
mac. Dynamic and flexible reform is needed, over a 
multiyear period, with a smooth transition to this new system 
in which private capital takes on a larger share of the credit 
risk. 
the increase in the role for private capital would be 
accomplished in two ways. First, a gradual reduction of the 
loan limits for government-guaranteed mortgages would 
help to rebalance the distribution of mortgages held in the 
purely private market and those covered by a government 
guarantee. Ultimately, we anticipate that fewer loans 
will be eligible for a government guarantee. second, the 
commission’s recommendations call for the elimination of 
the Fannie mae and Freddie mac model over an appropriate 
phase-out period—replacing them with a new government 
entity, the “Public guarantor,” which would provide a limited 
and explicit government guarantee for catastrophic risk for 
certain mortgage-backed securities. Adequately capitalized 
private credit enhancers would bear all losses ahead of the 
government guarantee.
similar to the model currently employed by ginnie mae, 
lenders approved by the Public guarantor would issue 
mortgage-backed securities that would be placed into 
designated monthly pools for which the Public guarantor 
would provide a common framework, or shelf.74 Private 
issuers would decide whether to retain or sell off the 
servicing rights associated with loans backing the mBs 
and choose how to cover the credit risk, including through 
arrangements with well-capitalized private credit-enhancing 
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while lenders should be able to originate and hold 
adjustable-rate and fixed-rate mortgage loans in portfolio, 
backed by appropriate capital, a strong private secondary 
market is essential to an adequately liquid housing finance 
system. in recent years, the amount of outstanding 
mortgage debt has equaled or exceeded the total value of 
assets held by U.s. banks. Funds available through the 
banking system must be supplemented with additional 
sources of capital (e.g., securitization) to create the capacity 
to meet the demand for mortgage credit. 
A continued but limited role for government-
guaranteed MBS. 
while private capital must play a greater role in the single-
family housing finance system, including in the market 
currently dominated by government-guaranteed mBs, a 
government-guaranteed secondary market is essential to 
ensuring adequate liquidity. even in 2006, when private-label 
securitization was at its peak, non-agency funds (many of 
which were backed by unsustainable mortgages) constituted 
only 56 percent of the market. moreover, absent government 
involvement, the to-Be-Announced (tBA) market—which 
provides a forward commitment market for consumers, 
lenders, and investors—might be unable to function, and 
many of the benefits associated with the standardization of 
mortgage products would be lost. See Text Box, The To-Be-
Announced (TBA) Market, page 52.
moving forward, however, the government guarantee that 
wraps or covers mBs must be fully funded and its scope 
limited to protect taxpayers. key characteristics of this new 
government guarantee include: 
•	 Applies only to catastrophic risk. the government 
guarantee is triggered only after private-sector entities 
in the predominant loss position have fully exhausted 
their own equity capital to make timely payment to 
compensate mBs issuers for credit losses. 
transition and some type of countercyclical buffer. the goal 
is to create a redesigned housing finance system that will 
continue to support the opportunity for homeownership 
and access to mortgage credit for creditworthy borrowers 
in all communities across the country. these proposals 
for single-family housing finance, taken together, set forth 
the commission’s primary recommendations related to 
continuing homeownership as an ongoing, viable choice for 
the nation’s housing consumers. 
Policy Objectives
in order to meet the nation’s housing finance needs and to 
provide access to mortgage credit for qualified borrowers, 
the future system of single-family housing finance should 
have five primary policy objectives:
The elimination, phased out over an appropriate period 
of time, of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
the model of a private company with publicly traded stock 
and an implicit government guarantee did not work. Fannie 
mae and Freddie mac should be phased out and replaced 
with a new Public guarantor, described below. 
A far greater role for the private sector. 
the private sources of capital that are available today would 
continue in this new redesigned housing finance system. 
these sources of capital include a private secondary market 
for mortgages (private-label mBs without any government 
guarantee), jumbo loans originated and held in portfolio or 
sold by private lenders, adjustable-rate mortgages originated 
and held in portfolio by private lenders or sold into the 
secondary market, and other product offerings outside of 
the government guarantee. competition among banks of 
all sizes and a regulatory environment that encourages 
community banks, credit unions, and smaller financial 
institutions to originate and hold loans and participate in the 
secondary market, are all essential elements in this system.
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the housing finance system should be designed to support 
liquidity for a wide range of safe and sustainable mortgages 
to low- and moderate-income households without regard 
to race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status, 
or disability, consistent with sound underwriting and risk 
management. to help achieve this objective, all participants 
in the housing market should support and reaffirm the 
principles of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended. 
See Text Box, Principles for Access to Credit, page 66.
A continued but more targeted role for the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA).75
the FHA has traditionally been an important provider of 
mortgage liquidity to first-time homebuyers and borrowers 
with limited savings for down payments. As we have 
seen over the past few years, it also plays a critical role 
in ensuring the continued flow of credit during periods of 
economic crisis. while its expansion was appropriate to 
keep credit flowing during the recent downturn, the role 
of the FHA in the single-family mortgage market should 
contract as the market recovers. tools for achieving 
such contraction and returning FHA to its traditional role 
could include lower loan limits and increased insurance 
premiums. 
these five policy objectives provide the framework for the 
more detailed recommendations that follow. However, before 
outlining the specific elements of our recommendations, the 
commission wishes to stress the importance of the broad 
policy objectives. Details are obviously very important, but 
we do not want to get lost in them. the first essential step to 
reforming our nation’s housing finance system is achieving 
bipartisan consensus on the fundamental objectives we are 
trying to achieve. the commission recognizes there may 
be sound alternative approaches to achieving the same 
objectives.
•	 Is explicit and actuarially sound. the government 
guarantee is fully funded and premium collections exceed 
expected claims (with a safe reserve cushion). 
•	 Applies only to mortgage-backed securities. the 
government guarantee would not cover the equity or debt 
of the entities that issue or insure mBs.
The To-Be-Announced (TBA) Market
the tBA market was established in the 1970s with the 
creation of pass-through securities at ginnie mae. it facilitates 
the forward trading of mBs issued by ginnie mae, Fannie 
mae, and Freddie mac by creating parameters under which 
mortgage pools can be considered fungible. on the trade 
date, only six criteria are agreed upon for the security or 
securities that are to be delivered: issuer, maturity, coupon, 
face value, price, and the settlement date. investors can 
commit to buy mBs in advance because they know the 
general parameters of the mortgage pool, allowing lenders to 
sell their loan production on a forward basis, hedge interest 
rate risk inherent in mortgage lending, and lock in rates for 
borrowers. 
the tBA market is a benchmark for all mortgage markets—
it is the reference by which other mortgage markets 
and products are priced. it is also the most liquid, and 
consequently the most important, secondary market for 
mortgage loans, enabling buyers and sellers to trade large 
blocks of securities in a short time period. the liquidity 
comes through homogeneity and fungibility, and through the 
government guarantee of Fannie mae, Freddie mac, and 
ginnie mae.
Access to safe and affordable mortgages for borrowers 
in all geographic markets through complete economic 
cycles, without discrimination, bias, or limitations not 
based on sound underwriting and risk management. 
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2. Servicing. the mortgage servicer is the company to 
which the borrower sends the mortgage payment. 
Besides collecting mortgage payments from borrowers 
and making the timely payment of principal and interest 
to mBs investors, the servicer is responsible for working 
with the borrower in case of a delinquency or default, 
negotiating the workouts or modifications of mortgages, 
and conducting or supervising the foreclosure process 
when necessary.
3. Credit enhancement. one of the most important elements 
of any new system is to ensure that private capital takes 
the predominant loss credit risk, and truly stands ahead 
of a government guarantee, and to carefully design and 
Key Functions
in this redesigned system of single-family housing finance, 
at least four key functions must be performed after 
the origination of a mortgage. these functions are (1) 
securitization; (2) servicing; (3) credit enhancement; and 
(4) government guarantee for catastrophic risk. 
1. Securitization. the process of securitization requires 
some entity or entities to issue the mortgage-backed 
securities. the issuers of securities can either be 
the lenders who originate the loans or other private 
institutions that buy loans from lenders and issue 
securities backed by these loans. 
the following principles are fundamental to an appropriately 
regulated system of single-family housing finance. 
All stages of the process should reinforce the obligation of 
the mortgage borrower to pay back the mortgage debt and 
the consequences of failing to do so, and the responsibility of 
lenders to underwrite loans based on the ability of the borrower 
to repay them. A fundamental principle of the residential 
mortgage finance system is that borrowers have a legal and 
moral obligation to repay the debt and that the lender has the 
right to take possession of its collateral if the loan is not repaid. 
the obligation to repay does not diminish when the value of the 
underlying collateral goes down. 
Credit standards should be prudent and based on sound 
performance-based underwriting. this principle attempts to strike 
a balance between prudent underwriting and current market 
conditions in which many quality borrowers do not have access 
to affordable mortgage credit. Household formation in the next 
decade will be dominated by households whose members are 
more likely to be racial or ethnic minorities, have lower income, 
lack family wealth for down payments, and have less family 
experience with homeownership. the mortgage system needs to 
assess credit risk with appropriate attention to compensating risk 
factors, historical performance of standard loans, and a greater 
understanding of nontraditional employment, credit, and family 
structures and experiences that are likely to be more prevalent 
with the rising population of new households. with appropriate 
disclosure, lenders should be able to use risk-based pricing to 
serve borrowers who have a blemished credit record in some 
areas and otherwise might not qualify for a loan. 
National standards for mortgage origination and servicing for all 
mortgage assets intended for securitization are essential. since 
mortgage-backed securities are sold into and traded in national 
markets, the assets that make up those securities should be 
subject to rigorous national standards. 
All participants in the housing finance system should have 
a financial stake in the performance of mortgages and/or 
mortgage-backed securities for an appropriate period of time. All 
participants in the mortgage process (from sales to origination to 
servicing to securitization) share a financial stake in the loan and 
its performance. 
Lenders, investors, and regulators should have access to 
sufficient mortgage data in order to assess and price risk, and 
mortgage consumers should be provided with clear disclosures 
and certainty in mortgage terms. Disclosure alone will not 
fully protect consumers from abuses. the average mortgage 
consumer can sometimes be overwhelmed with information and 
disclosures, often at the last stage of seeking a loan, which can 
impede a proper understanding of mortgage terms. in addition, 
in some cases, the availability of only a limited number of 
mortgage variables at the outset of a trade can actually serve to 
enhance liquidity without significantly detracting from investors’ 
ability to understand and price risk. Despite these qualifications, 
access to data on the pricing, sales, and ownership of securities 
and transparency in markets is critical to sound oversight and 
public accountability.
Developing Sound Principles of Regulation 
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Securitization—Approved Issuers
As noted above, the commission recommends a model 
similar to ginnie mae, where approved lenders are the issuers 
of mortgage-backed securities. the functions of an issuer of 
securities include:
•	 Obtain certification from the Public Guarantor that it is 
qualified to issue mBs based on such factors as (a) ability 
to meet credit and capital standards and cover all of the 
predominant loss risk through a separate well-capitalized 
credit enhancer, and (b) capacity to effectively pool 
mortgages and compete in the housing market.
• Ensure that the guarantee fee is paid for and collected 
from the borrower along with all other fees (e.g., the cost 
of predominant loss risk protection) and fully disclosed to 
the borrower as a part of originating the mortgage.
•	 Issue the mortgage-backed securities and, where 
appropriate, sell the mBs to investors through the tBA 
market. (the originator of the mortgage can either be 
the issuer, if approved, or can sell the mortgage to 
another approved issuer. the originator can also keep the 
servicing rights, if approved for this function by the Public 
guarantor, or sell the servicing rights to another approved 
institution.) 
•	 Retain responsibility for representations and warranties 
under the terms specified by the Public guarantor. 
in order to achieve “sale treatment,” so the mBs will not 
be reported in the issuer’s financial statements, the issuer 
must engage a third-party private credit enhancer. (in the 
context of a securitization transaction, “sale treatment” is an 
accounting term used to indicate that the seller of the now-
securitized loans no longer reports the loans on its balance 
sheet.) this determination will require a judgment by the 
accounting profession that the expected loss in normal 
economic cycles has been transferred to the private credit 
enhancer and the Public guarantor, these counterparties 
set capital and other requirements so that private entities 
are equipped to withstand even a severe downturn in 
the housing market through the use of private credit 
enhancers.76 Private credit enhancers either carry risk 
on their balance sheets, with appropriate offsetting 
capital, or transfer the risk to capital market participants. 
credit-enhancement options include well-capitalized 
mortgage insurance, capital market mechanisms where 
the appropriate amount of capital required to withstand 
severe losses is reserved up front, or a premium-funded 
reserve model, where a premium-funded reserve is 
established. 
4. Government guarantee for catastrophic risk. A government 
guarantee for catastrophic credit risk would cover the 
timely payment of principal and interest on certain mBs 
only in the event that the private sector credit enhancer 
can no longer fund its obligation to reimburse the mBs 
servicer for credit losses on the pool of mortgage loans 
underlying the mBs. As noted above, such a guarantee 
would be explicit and paid for by premiums based on 
sound actuarial analysis. the guarantee would apply 
only to the mBs and would not apply to the equity or 
debt of the private institutions that issue them or to any 
insurers of the loans or credit enhancers. Further, a new 
or existing public entity would be established to maintain 
the standards for the limited government guarantee and 
to collect the premiums for a guarantee reserve fund. 
in this redesigned system, a single entity could fulfill more 
than one of these functions: For example, an issuer of 
securities could choose to retain servicing rights for the 
loans backing the mBs. However, in order to obtain “sale 
treatment” for accounting purposes (discussed below), 
issuers would not provide credit enhancement. instead, they 
would engage separate, well-capitalized private institutions 
to take responsibility for the predominant credit risk 
associated with the loans that collateralize the mBs. 
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Credit Enhancement
the proposed single-family housing finance system 
depends on credible assurance that private institutions 
will bear the predominant credit risk, will be capitalized to 
withstand significant losses, and will provide credit that is 
generally unrestricted with little leverage. As such, private 
credit enhancers will bear the credit risk on the mBs they 
have guaranteed until they go out of business or have met 
their full obligation, as defined by the Public guarantor, to 
stand behind their guarantee. Private credit enhancers will 
generally be single-business, monoline companies and will 
be required to:
•	 Provide regular reports to the Public Guarantor on the 
nature of the credit enhancement, who holds the risk, 
the amount and nature of the capital they hold, and other 
measures of credit strength. these measures would 
include a quarterly stress test to determine that available 
capital is adequate, with a “capital call” to assure 
there are sufficient reserves to protect the government 
guarantee from being tapped except in extreme cases.
•	 Establish underwriting criteria for the mortgages and 
mortgage pools they will be guaranteeing beyond the 
baseline underwriting criteria established by the Public 
guarantor.
•	 Reimburse servicers for their timely payment of principal 
and interest and other costs at the time the amount of the 
loan loss is established. this reimbursement is paid out 
on a loan-by-loan basis until the private credit enhancer 
runs out of capital and goes out of business. 
•	 Establish and enforce servicing standards (in conjunction 
with national servicing standards) in order to assure that 
the interests of the private credit enhancer and servicer 
are fully aligned. if these contractual standards are 
violated, the private credit enhancer will have the power 
to transfer servicing to another servicer. 
have the capacity to handle the credit risk, and the issuer 
and servicer of the security will not be required to set aside 
capital to cover such risk. 
Under the commission’s proposal, an approved issuer 
of mBs (generally the originator of the mortgage loan) 
should be able to “de-recognize” transferred loans from 
its balance sheet — that is, achieve sale accounting under 
U.s. generally accepted accounting principles.  in addition, 
servicers operating as they do today should not have any 
duty to “consolidate” the loans that they service and the 
private credit enhancers should be able to manage any 
consolidation requirement without any detriment to the 
economics of the structure.
Servicing
servicers will need to be qualified by the Public guarantor. 
responsibilities of a servicer include:
•	 Make timely payment of principal and interest should the 
borrower be unable to do so. the servicer will advance 
the timely payment of principal and interest out of its own 
corporate funds and will be reimbursed by the private 
credit enhancer at the time the amount of the loan loss is 
established.77
•	 Work with the borrower on issues related to delinquency, 
default, and foreclosure and advance all funds required 
to properly service the loan.
if the original issuer sells the servicing rights to another 
institution, all obligations move with the servicing to the 
new servicer, except the obligation for representations and 
warranties. in the event that a servicer fails, its servicing 
obligations will be transferred to a new servicer by the 
Public guarantor. losses due to default will continue to be 
covered by the private credit enhancer.
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essential question will be where to draw the line between 
predominant loss and catastrophic loss—often referred 
to as the attachment point. the Public guarantor will 
determine this attachment point and establish the minimum 
capital levels required to survive a major drop in house 
values resulting in significant mortgage losses. the Public 
guarantor will require any private credit enhancer to have 
sufficient capital to survive a stress test no less severe than 
the recent downturn (e.g., a home price decline of 30 to 35 
percent, which would correspond to aggregate credit losses 
of 4 to 5 percent on prime loans). 
Government Guarantee for Catastrophic Risk
Under this proposal, the Public guarantor would guarantee 
the timely payment of principal and interest on the 
mBs, but this guarantee would be triggered only after all 
private capital has been expended. like ginnie mae, the 
government would be in the fourth loss position behind 
(1) borrowers and their home equity; (2) private credit 
enhancers; and (3) corporate resources of the issuers and 
servicers.b the government guarantee would be explicit, 
fully funded, and actuarially sound, and the risk would 
apply only to the securities and not to the equity and debt 
of the entity or entities that issue and/or insure them. the 
functions of the Public guarantor would include:
•	 Guarantee investors the timely payment of principal and 
interest on mBs.
•	 Establish the level of capital necessary to ensure that 
private-sector participants in the housing finance system 
(issuers, servicers, and private credit enhancers) are all 
properly capitalized.
•	 Provide credit enhancement with standard, transparent, 
and consistent pricing to issuers of all types and sizes, 
including community banks, independent mortgage 
bankers, housing finance agencies, credit unions, and 
community development financial institutions.
•	 Meet credit enhancement requirements through one or a 
combination of the following options: (1) well-capitalized 
private mortgage insurance at the loan level for any 
portion of the loan where specific capital requirements 
are established and the servicer and/or Public guarantor 
has the ability to demand margins if there is an adverse 
move in house prices; (2) capital market mechanisms 
where the amount of capital required to withstand 
severe losses is reserved up front, either through a 
senior/subordinated debt model with the subordinated 
piece sized to cover the predominant risk or approved 
derivatives models using either margined credit Default 
swaps or fully funded credit linked Notes;a and (3) 
an approved premium-funded reserve model, where 
a premium-funded reserve is established, either fully 
capitalized at the outset or where the reserve builds over 
time. in all cases, the Public guarantor will carefully 
monitor capital requirements to avoid arbitrage, ensure 
that real capital is set aside up-front, and maintain the 
alignment of interests among all participants (issuers, 
servicers, and private credit enhancers) with the new 
limited government guarantee.
these approaches to meet capital requirements are 
designed to ensure that private capital will stand ahead 
of any government guarantee for catastrophic risk.78 the 
a. A “credit default swap” is a transaction designed to transfer the credit exposure 
of fixed income products between parties. in a credit default swap, the purchaser 
of the swap makes payments to the seller up until the maturity date of a contract. 
in return, the seller agrees to pay off a third party debt if this party defaults on 
the loan. in this way, the purchaser of the swap receives credit protection, while 
the seller guarantees the creditworthiness of the debt. A “credit linked note” is 
a security with an embedded credit default swap that allows the issuer of the 
security to transfer a specific credit risk to investors. source: investopedia.
b. to be clear, the issuer and the servicer do not bear direct credit risk. that risk is 
borne by the private credit enhancer. However, the issuer and the servicer do bear 
other risks that help to shield the government from loss. the issuer is responsible 
for representations and warranties, and the servicer is responsible for the timely 
payment of principal and interest to investors out of corporate resources (as is 
currently the case with ginnie mae), although the servicer should eventually be 
reimbursed for this payment by the private credit enhancer.
Housing America’s Future: New Directions for National Policy 57
servicer failure. A reserve fund would be established for 
catastrophic risk that will build over time. (other fees paid 
by the borrower would go to the issuer and the private 
credit enhancers to compensate them for issuing the 
securities and covering the predominant loss. these fees 
would be set by the private sector, but monitored by the 
Public guarantor.)
•	 Ensure access to the government-guaranteed secondary 
market on full and equal terms to lenders of all types, 
including community banks, independent mortgage 
bankers, housing finance agencies, credit unions, and 
community development financial institutions. the 
Public guarantor must ensure that issuers of securities 
do not create barriers using differential guarantee-fee 
pricing or other means to unfairly restrict or disadvantage 
participation in the government-guaranteed secondary 
market. 
•	 Ensure the actuarial soundness of the fund through careful 
analysis and the use of outside expertise, and report to 
congress regularly regarding the financial condition of the 
fund. 
•	 Qualify private institutions to serve as issuers of securities, 
servicers, and private credit enhancers of mBs. the 
Public guarantor will have the power to transfer servicing 
or credit enhancement to another servicer or credit 
enhancer (without compensation to the original servicer or 
credit enhancer) if it appears the government guarantee 
is put at risk. the Public guarantor will also have the 
power to disqualify an issuer, servicer, or a private credit 
enhancer if it determines that requirements and standards 
are not met. (Although the Public guarantor does not 
stand behind these private institutions nor does it cover 
their debt or equity, it would have resolution authority.) 
ensuring the common alignment of incentives among all 
private entities serving as counterparties to the Public 
guarantor will be essential to protecting taxpayers.
•	 Provide one common shelf for the sale of government-
guaranteed securities to offer greater liquidity for the 
market as well as establish an equal playing field for large 
and small lenders.
•	 Establish a single platform for the issuing, trading, 
and tracking of mBs. with multiple private issuers, 
this platform could provide greater uniformity and 
transparency, and therefore lead to greater liquidity. For 
example, in october 2012, the FHFA laid out a plan to 
build a single securitization platform to serve Fannie 
mae, Freddie mac, and a post-conservatorship market 
with multiple issuers. this single platform could serve 
as the securitization framework for the Public guarantor 
and operate as a public utility, providing an established 
infrastructure for mBs guaranteed by the Public 
guarantor or for private issuers of mBs. Development 
of this platform could build on the extensive intellectual 
and technological assets of Fannie mae and Freddie 
mac as they are phased out, providing taxpayers with a 
long-lasting dividend on the significant funds invested to 
support the gses’ obligations after 2008.
•	 Create and enforce uniform pooling and servicing 
standards governing the distribution of mortgage proceeds 
and losses to investors and ensuring compliance with 
relevant federal tax laws. the Public guarantor could build 
on the work already begun by FHFA to develop a model 
pooling and servicing agreement.
•	 Encourage loan modifications when a modification is 
expected to result in the lowest claims payment on a net 
present value basis. the Public guarantor should require 
participants in the new government-guaranteed system 
to structure and service securities in a way that would 
facilitate such loan modifications.
•	 Establish the guarantee fees (g-fees) to be collected 
from the borrower to cover the operating costs of the 
Public guarantor and to offset catastrophic losses in the 
event of a failure of the private credit enhancer and/or 
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•	 Establish loan limits, under the direction of Congress, so 
that the loans backing the government-guaranteed mBs 
will be limited based on the size of the mortgage and any 
other criteria congress may prescribe. 
•	 Set standards for the mortgages that will be included 
in the mBs, including baseline underwriting criteria, 
permissible uses of risk-based pricing, and clear rules of 
the road related to representations and warranties. 
•	 Specify standards for mortgage data and disclosures.
How Will This New System Work?
A number of parties and institutions will be involved in this 
new housing finance system. they include (1) borrowers; 
(2) lenders/originators; (3) issuers of securities; (4) private 
credit enhancers; (5) mortgage servicers; (6) a Public 
guarantor; (7) the tBA market; and (8) mBs investors. 
Figure 3-2 provides a schematic of the proposal showing 
the flow of mortgages from the borrower to the investor. the 
steps involved in the process are outlined below with the 
text matching the numbers found on Figure 3-2. 
1. Borrower. the borrowers—mr. and mrs. Jones—are 
buying a new house and need a mortgage. they approach a 
local financial institution, XYZ savings Bank.
2. Lender/Originator. XYZ savings Bank meets with mr. and 
mrs. Jones (by phone or in person). After a preliminary 
discussion where they provide basic information, authorize 
a credit check, and discuss and decide on the terms of the 
mortgage, the loan officer provides them with a conditional 
approval and locks in a mortgage rate for a specific period 
of time. (the lender locks in the rate through the tBA 
market where an investor will provide them a forward 
commitment to purchase the mortgage as a part of an 
mBs.) XYZ savings Bank then continues with the borrower 
to underwrite the mortgage, taking into consideration the 
standards established by the private credit enhancer and 
Figure 3-2: Flow of Mortgages
8. MBS Investors
1. Borrower
2. Lender/Originator
3. Issuer of Securities
loans
securities
7. To-Be-Announced (TBA) Market
government guarantee for catastrophic risk
credit enhancement
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For a summary of the 
relationships among the 
participants outlined in the 
proposal, see Figure 3-3.
keY
monthly P&i payments (including advancing timely 
payment of P&i if borrower is unable to do so)
government
Private
reimbursement for timely 
payment of principal and interest 
(P&i) and other costs if the 
borrower is unable to pay
4. Private Credit Enhancer
5. Mortgage Servicer
monthly mortgage payments
loan data6. Public Guarantor
the Public guarantor. the XYZ savings Bank funds the loan 
and puts it on its balance sheet temporarily. in connection 
with the loan’s securitization. the bank will “de-recognize” 
the loan (remove it from its balance sheet). (XYZ savings 
Bank could choose to sell the servicing rights to another 
lender.)
3. Issuer of Securities. XYZ savings Bank has been 
approved by the Public guarantor to be an issuer of 
securities. XYZ savings Bank prepares the loan to be part 
of a security and eventually pools the loan with other loans 
and issues the mBs, selling it to an investor through the 
tBA market. (if it had not been approved as an issuer, XYZ 
savings Bank would have needed to sell the loan to an 
approved issuer who would then pool mr. and mrs. Jones’ 
loan with other mortgage loans.) the issuer is compensated 
for issuing and selling the security. 
4. Private Credit Enhancer. Before the loan is approved 
and closed, XYZ savings Bank (as the issuer) must line up 
a private credit enhancer to cover the predominant loss 
credit risk—in this case, with ABc Private credit enhancer. 
the Public guarantor has approved ABc Private credit 
enhancer based on its experience and ability to meet 
specific capital requirements and other credit standards.
ABc Private credit enhancer can provide for the credit 
enhancement in a variety of ways. multiple parties could 
also provide the credit enhancement as arranged by the 
issuer and approved by the Public guarantor. the private 
credit enhancer will receive an ongoing fee for providing this 
enhancement.
5. Mortgage Servicer. the lender/originator can either keep 
or sell the servicing. in this case, XYZ savings Bank decides 
to sell the servicing of mr. and mrs. Jones’ loan to serV 
servicing, which has already been approved by the Public 
guarantor. when serV servicing purchases the servicing 
from XYZ savings Bank, it assumes all of the obligations of 
XYZ savings Bank (with the exception of the representations 
and warranties under the loans in the mBs pool). As the 
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servicer, serV servicing will work with mr. and mrs. Jones 
to assure the timely payment of principal and interest. 
As long as serV servicing stays in business, it will be 
responsible for working with mr. and mrs. Jones on issues 
related to delinquency, default, and foreclosure. in the event 
of a delinquency or default, it will make the timely payments 
of principal and interest and then look to ABc Private credit 
enhancer for reimbursement. 
6. Public Guarantor. the Public guarantor provides one 
shelf for all securities and issuers of securities, oversees 
the process as the regulator, and qualifies the issuer, the 
servicer, and the private credit enhancer. it has established 
Figure 3-3: Summary of Relationships Among Housing  
Finance System Participants
LENDERS/
ORIGINATORS
MORTGAGE SERVICERS ISSUERS OF SECURITIES PRIVATE CREDIT ENHANCERS PUBLIC GUARANTOR (GUARANTEE FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK)
FUNCTION(S)
originate mortgages 
(includes mortgage 
bankers, large 
and small banks, 
credit unions, and 
other financial 
institutions)
collect mortgage payments 
from borrower
Bear the servicing risk and 
provide timely payment 
of principal and interest if 
borrower is unable to do so 
look to private credit enhancer 
to reimburse those timely 
payments of principal and 
interest and other costs at the 
time of claims submission  
work with borrower on issues 
related to delinquency, default, 
and foreclosure
originate mortgages or 
purchase mortgages from 
other lenders
issue securities backed by 
these mortgages
secure private credit 
enhancement as appropriate 
and obtain sale treatment
Bear predominant loss credit risk 
that applies at the loan level or the 
pool level (and therefore must be well 
capitalized)
reimburse servicer for the timely 
payment of principal and interest and 
other costs if borrower is unable to 
pay
transfer servicing, when needed, to 
another servicer with the coordination 
and approval of the Public guarantor
guarantee catastrophic risk and establish an insurance fund
Assure the actuarial soundness of the fund
establish and approve the guarantee fees (g-fees) to be collected
supervise and approve issuers of securities and private credit 
enhancers to assure they have the capacity to bear the predominant 
loss credit risk 
Qualify servicers
transfer servicing to another servicer or credit enhancement to 
another private credit enhancer, without compensation, if it believes 
the government guarantee is put at risk
PUBLIC/
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
(GOVERNMENT 
ROLE)
Private sector Private sector Private sector Private sector Public sector (new government entity or enhanced ginnie mae) 
FINANCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS
the originator will 
include all fees 
in the cost of the 
mortgage (including 
the g-fee to cover 
servicing risk and 
credit risk, as well 
as the fees to the 
private issuers and 
credit enhancers to 
cover their costs)
the servicer receives fees for 
servicing the loan and bearing 
the servicing risk
the private issuer is 
compensated for issuing 
and selling the security
the private credit enhancers 
will receive fees for bearing the 
predominant loss credit risk
According to some estimates, the total costs of all the fees (g-fee and 
fees to the lenders, issuers, and private credit enhancers) could add 
in the range of 60 to 80 basis points to the cost of a mortgage
a fund to guarantee catastrophic risk and sets and 
collects premiums for the fund—in this case, premiums 
are collected each month through serV servicing. it also 
ensures that the fund is actuarially sound. 
7. To-Be-Announced (TBA) Market. the loan to mr. and mrs. 
Jones is delivered as a part of a security issued by the XYZ 
savings Bank to an investor—in this case, the invest co.—
utilizing the protocol outlined in the tBA market and agreed 
to by the savings bank and the investor. 
8. MBS Investors. the invest co. secures delivery of the 
mBs issued by XYZ savings Bank, protected at three 
levels—the commitment of the servicer to provide timely 
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the originator will 
include all fees 
in the cost of the 
mortgage (including 
the g-fee to cover 
servicing risk and 
credit risk, as well 
as the fees to the 
private issuers and 
credit enhancers to 
cover their costs)
the servicer receives fees for 
servicing the loan and bearing 
the servicing risk
the private issuer is 
compensated for issuing 
and selling the security
the private credit enhancers 
will receive fees for bearing the 
predominant loss credit risk
According to some estimates, the total costs of all the fees (g-fee and 
fees to the lenders, issuers, and private credit enhancers) could add 
in the range of 60 to 80 basis points to the cost of a mortgage
payment of principal and interest, the private-sector 
guarantee provided by the ABc Private credit enhancer, 
and the guarantee for catastrophic risk provided by the 
Public guarantor. Although the invest co. appreciates and 
benefits from the guarantee provided by ABc Private credit 
enhancer, its willingness to buy the mBs is largely based on 
the government wrap and the liquidity that comes from the 
large volume of standardized securities (including the Jones’ 
loan) that are issued on the single mBs platform managed 
by the Public guarantor.
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cover possible losses and a risk adjusted return—assuming 
no mi—estimated to be in the range of 45 to 67 basis 
points; (2) 8 basis points set aside for catastrophic risk to 
cover the limited government guarantee; and (3) 6 basis 
points to pay for the operating costs of the Public guarantor. 
By comparison, g-fees for mortgages currently guaranteed 
by Fannie mae and Freddie mac are in the range of 50 
basis points (including a 10 basis point charge paid to the 
U.s. treasury to pay for the payroll tax deduction), and the 
borrower has to pay for mi if the loan-to-value (ltV) ratio 
is above 80 percent. given the very high quality mortgages 
currently served by the gses, the range of estimates in the 
Davidson & co. study suggests—even accounting for the mi 
expenses—that the current g-fee may not need to rise for 
these high quality loans. However, the study does suggest 
that mortgage rates may need to increase by approximately 
25 basis points if credit is extended to a wider group of 
borrowers than currently served by the gses (which now 
have average Fico scores of 760 and ltV ratios of 68 
percent). Depending on market conditions and the credit 
quality of the mortgage pool, g-fees could be higher or 
lower. Also, increases in g-fees could be partially (or fully) 
offset by the fact that these mBs would have an explicit full 
faith and credit guarantee. this analysis is consistent with 
reviews conducted by others, including the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, which have suggested that housing finance 
reform will entail higher mortgage rates.  
these estimates assume a relatively stable housing market 
with modest growth in house prices as their base case. 
However, during weak economic periods of falling home 
prices or greater market uncertainty, the market price 
for credit guarantees would be higher. in addition, the 
modeling work found that while the g-fees for the private 
sector to set aside capital to cover predominant loss across 
the entire sample pool, including the higher-risk segments, 
appear to be relatively moderate, these estimates mask 
considerable variation across borrowers, depending on 
Mortgage Rates in the New System
while the new housing finance system described above will 
minimize taxpayer risk, this protection will come at the cost 
of higher mortgage rates for borrowers. three factors will 
contribute to the added costs:
1. the new housing finance system calls for a far greater 
role for the private sector in mortgage finance, with 
private capital taking the predominant loss risk and 
standing ahead of a limited government guarantee. 
Private credit enhancers will charge a fee to cover the 
cost of private capital to insure against the predominant 
loss if a mortgage default occurs. 
2. the Public guarantor will charge an unsubsidized fee to 
cover catastrophic risk should a private credit enhancer 
be unable to fulfill its obligations to investors. 
3. the Public guarantor will be structured as an 
independent, self-supporting government corporation that 
finances its activities through an operating fee.
the borrower will indirectly pay for all three of these activities 
through a g-fee that is included in the mortgage rate. 
Analysis by Andrew Davidson & co., inc. using two research 
methods and a pool of nearly 5,000 conforming loans 
originated in 2012 (which has a broader cross section of 
loans than the universe of Freddie mac and Fannie mae 
loans as a whole) provides a range of estimates of the 
possible costs of the commission’s recommendations.c 
Utilizing this pool of loans, Davidson & co. estimates the 
g-fees paid by a borrower with no mortgage insurance (mi) 
will range from 59 to 81 basis points. this includes (1) the 
credit charges for the private sector to set aside capital to 
c. Andrew Davidson & co., inc., has prepared a working paper on this topic that 
provides the details of their analysis. see Modeling the Impact of Housing Finance 
Reform on Mortgage Rates found on the BPc Housing commission website at 
www.bipartisanpolicy.org/housing.
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footprint becomes smaller. A dynamic problem-solving 
approach, where the design of a new housing finance 
system is based on lessons learned during the transition, 
will ensure that policy choices evolve in response to the 
changing realities of the marketplace.
the transition to the new system could be greatly facilitated 
by continued utilization of existing capabilities (e.g., 
process, skilled staffing) within Fannie mae and Freddie 
mac. these scalable, proven platforms for securitization 
have been developed over many years, and the familiarity 
and systems connectivity of mortgage market participants 
to these systems and processes might facilitate an orderly 
transition to the new system. in addition, the tBA market 
(the most liquid fixed-income market in the world) should 
be maintained in a new system to ensure a smooth 
transition and retain liquidity.
risk characteristics such as Fico scores and ltV ratios. 
For example, Davidson & co. found that the credit cost 
for borrowers with Fico scores greater than 750 and ltV 
ratios below 80 percent could be less than 25 basis points 
a year, while the credit costs for borrowers with Fico 
scores below 700 and ltV ratios greater than 90 percent 
could be more than 10 times higher.
Transition
A dynamic, flexible transition is essential to the development 
of a redesigned system for single-family housing finance. 
the intent of the transition, especially at the outset, is 
to move toward a general policy direction rather than an 
absolute goal. After congress has adopted a new model, an 
extended period of time (five to ten years) will be needed 
to unwind the single-family operations of Fannie mae and 
Freddie mac in an orderly fashion and rebalance capital 
flows as the private sector steps in and the government 
Chart 3-6: FHA and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Loan Limits
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regarding Qualified residential mortgages (Qrm), along 
with other outstanding questions related to the Dodd-Frank 
legislation, must be resolved for the private sector to return 
to the mortgage market in a more robust manner. 
subject to lessons learned during the transition period, the 
commission expects that the single-family housing finance 
system of the future will have three distinct segments: 
1. mortgages that are not covered by any government 
guarantee (including loans held in portfolio and private-
label mBs) would comprise a substantial share of the 
overall market.
2. the market share of mortgages insured or guaranteed by 
FHA, VA, and UsDA would return to pre-crisis levels.
3. mortgages covered by the new, limited government 
guarantee provided by the Public guarantor would make 
up the balance.
As noted above, gradually reducing maximum loan limits 
would be the primary policy dial to help achieve this 
eventual distribution. After a suitable transition period, the 
commission recommends that the loan limits for the two 
government-guaranteed markets be established for each 
metropolitan area using a formula that takes into account 
the median house price in that area. Future policy choices 
by the administration and congress will determine the 
actual loan limits, but looking at historical loan limits before 
the crash, for many areas these loan limits might be in the 
range of $150,000 to $175,000 for the share of the market 
served by FHA, VA, and the UsDA, and in the range of 
$250,000 to $275,000 for the share of the market served by 
the Public guarantor (see chart 3-6).
Countercyclical Buffer
During severe economic downturns, the limited government 
guarantee for catastrophic risk should help provide for 
the continued availability of mortgage credit because the 
During this transition period, several mechanisms, or 
policy dials, could be applied to help reduce the size of 
government involvement in the single-family mortgage 
market. A gradual reduction in the maximum loan limits for 
Fannie mae, Freddie mac, FHA, and VA mortgages should 
serve as the primary policy dial to assist in this transition 
and will provide an indication of the private market’s 
appetite for unsupported mortgage credit risk and valuable 
feedback on the development of the new system. A gradual 
approach will minimize market disruptions and safeguard 
against the sudden potential loss of access to mortgage 
credit. chart 3-6 outlines the evolution of these loan limits 
since 1996. 
other policy dials have also been set in motion. the FHFA 
has recently increased the g-fees charged by Fannie mae 
and Freddie mac, in order to help move the government 
pricing structure closer to the level one might expect if 
mortgage credit risk were borne solely by private capital, 
making the private market more competitive. changes to the 
terms of treasury’s treatment of Fannie mae and Freddie 
mac announced in August 2012 accelerate the reduction 
in their portfolios, from the 10 percent annual reduction 
called for in the senior Preferred stock Agreements between 
the FHFA and treasury to 15 percent annually. in addition, 
FHFA has announced its intention to begin experimenting 
with single-family mBs structures to allow a portion of the 
credit risk currently held by Fannie mae and Freddie mac 
to be sold to the private sector.79 Although only first steps, 
experimentation along these lines will enable greater private-
sector involvement and set the stage for the transition to the 
new system. 
Another major action that would encourage a greater role 
for the private sector in the housing finance system would 
be clarifying the rules of the road going forward. Despite the 
promulgation of cFPB’s final rules on Qualified mortgages 
and mortgage servicing, regulatory uncertainty continues 
to hold back private-sector involvement. the pending rule 
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A Final Note about the Federal Housing 
Administration and the Single-Family Housing Market 
since its creation during the great Depression, the Federal 
Housing Administration has periodically been called upon 
to act as a stabilizing force within the single-family housing 
market. when the oil-patch crisis in the mid-1980s roiled 
housing markets in texas, oklahoma, and louisiana, the 
FHA stepped into these markets to provide much-needed 
liquidity.80 when the national housing market collapsed in 
2007, the FHA was a critical stabilizing force, with FHA 
market share of mortgage-purchase originations rising to 
more than 45 percent in 2010. the commission believes 
that, without the FHA’s support for the housing market 
during this period of crisis, our nation’s economic troubles 
would have been significantly worse. the FHA has also 
traditionally been an important source of mortgage credit 
for first-time homebuyers and borrowers with low wealth 
or home equity. over the past decade, the share of FHA 
borrowers who are first-time homebuyers has hovered 
around 80 percent. During the same period, a significant 
percentage of FHA borrowers had incomes below 80 percent 
of area median income; many were minority families. 
looking ahead, the commission envisions an FHA that 
continues to play these two vital roles: serving as an 
important stabilizing force for the market, ready to be 
called upon in the time of crisis, and acting as an important 
gateway to homeownership for those families with more 
limited means.
the most recent independent audit of FHA, however, 
contained troubling news: it estimated that at the time of the 
audit, FHA’s single-family mortgage insurance fund had a 
long-term shortfall of $16.3 billion, yielding a capital reserve 
ratio of negative 1.44 percent, far below the statutorily 
required ratio of 2 percent. (the FHA has $30.4 billion on 
hand to settle insurance claims as they come in. However, 
according to federal budget rules, the agency must hold 
government wrap will assure investors that the mBs will 
be repaid and the government will stand behind the credit 
risk. if credit-risk protection is no longer available through 
private credit enhancers, or if the price for such credit-
risk coverage is too high, then congress could adjust the 
loan levels for the FHA and VA insurance and guarantee 
programs, thus allowing the two institutions to expand their 
activities as they did during the recent crisis. in addition, 
the Public guarantor should be given the authority to price 
and absorb the predominant credit risk for limited periods 
during times of severe economic stress in order to ensure 
the continued flow of mortgage credit. the Public guarantor 
would be required to notify the treasury Department, 
the Federal reserve, and the chairs of the appropriate 
congressional committees before any action is taken to 
absorb predominant credit risk.
Under the model proposed by the commission, neither 
the Public guarantor, FHA, VA, nor ginnie mae would 
have retained portfolios. the absence of these retained 
portfolios raises concerns about the availability and liquidity 
of mortgage credit during downturns when demand for 
mortgage-backed securities or the liquidity with which 
to purchase these securities could fall precipitously, as 
happened in 2008 to 2009. therefore, federal policy 
should be clear on how mortgage liquidity would be 
managed in such circumstances. one alternative is 
through monetary policy and Federal reserve actions in 
the market. During the 45-year history of ginnie mae in 
which it had no retained portfolio, the presence of a “full 
faith and credit” guarantee as well as Federal reserve 
and treasury purchasing authority have preserved ample 
liquidity in ginnie mae bonds through numerous credit 
crises, including the most recent one. such policies should 
be established in advance of any crisis and should be 
understood by all market participants in order to forestall 
any issues that could raise the cost of housing and 
homeownership unnecessarily.
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the mortgage finance system must create a stable, liquid 
market that finances safe and affordable mortgages for 
borrowers in all geographic markets through complete economic 
cycles, without discrimination, bias, or limitations to access that 
are not based on sound underwriting and risk management. to 
achieve these goals, the commission recommends the following 
principles:
1. the government-guaranteed secondary market for mortgage-
backed securities should be designed to support liquidity to 
a wide range of safe and sustainable mortgages to low- and 
moderate-income households without regard to race, color, 
national origin, religion, sex, familial status, or disability.81 to 
help achieve this objective, the business practices of mBs 
issuers benefiting from a government guarantee should be 
fully consistent with the requirements of existing fair lending 
laws, including the Fair Housing Act and the equal credit 
opportunity Act. the Public guarantor should assure that it 
supports liquidity for lending consistent with the community 
reinvestment Act (crA) and that it supports primary lenders’ 
efforts to meet their requirements under the crA or other, 
similar requirements imposed by their regulators. the Public 
guarantor, in consultation with prudential regulators, should 
have the ability to limit or prohibit an issuer’s eligibility to 
access the guarantee.
2. the transparency of the government-guaranteed secondary 
market is critical to ensuring that this market is functioning 
without discrimination or bias. mBs issuers should report 
annually to the Public guarantor on their total production 
guaranteed by the Public guarantor for the previous year 
providing information similar to that required of mortgage 
originators under the Home mortgage Disclosure Act. to the 
greatest extent practicable, mBs issuer data should be made 
available to the public in an accessible form and on a timely 
basis that facilitates independent review and analysis. 
3. the Public guarantor should report annually to congress 
on the composition of its own total insured portfolio and the 
individuals and communities it serves. this report should 
(a) identify communities whose credit needs the Public 
guarantor believes are being underserved, (b) explain what 
factors may be inhibiting access to credit there, and (c) make 
recommendations on how to expand access to credit in a 
prudent manner in these communities. to help ensure there 
is no segmentation of the government-guaranteed secondary 
market for reasons unrelated to sound underwriting and 
risk management, this report should also provide detailed 
demographic and credit-profile comparisons of FHA/VA/UsDA 
borrowers with those borrowers served in the remaining 
portion of the market. 
4. the Public guarantor should have a role to play in 
encouraging responsible innovation and broad market 
participation by facilitating liquidity for private lenders to 
develop and test new mortgage products that adhere to 
prudent, safe standards but have not yet been seasoned or 
adopted broadly enough to allow for securitization. the Public 
guarantor should routinely share information on innovations 
available in the private market with lenders and mBs issuers.
5. Neither the Public guarantor nor mBs issuers should be 
subject to numerical housing goals or quotas. such measures 
could distort the prudent application of the government 
guarantee.
6. Access to the government-guaranteed secondary market 
must be open on full and equal terms to lenders of all types, 
including community banks, housing finance agencies, credit 
unions, and community development financial institutions. 
the Public guarantor should neither create nor permit 
barriers to lenders using differential guarantee-fee pricing or 
other means to unfairly restrict or disadvantage participation 
in the government-guaranteed secondary market.
Principles for Access to Credit
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income spectrum. A strong rental housing finance system 
can help to ameliorate this urgent problem and will be 
critical to meeting our country’s future housing needs. given 
the changing demographics of American households, the 
drop in homeownership following the collapse of the single-
family housing market, and the higher hurdles consumers 
will face in obtaining mortgage credit in the near future, 
supporting policies that enable owners of rental property to 
sustain these homes and renters to afford them has become 
more critical than ever.
Finance is just as vital to rental housing as it is to housing 
occupied by homeowners. rental developers need financing 
to build properties and property owners need it to buy, 
repair, rehabilitate, and preserve rental housing. the 
cost and availability of credit to support the rental sector 
is important to maintaining a supply of rental housing 
adequate to meet the demand for it, and because rental 
markets are competitive, credit costs and availability 
influence the rents that landlords charge. 
The Key Segments of the Rental Market
Despite the popular perception that most renters live in 
large properties with many units, about half of renters in 
2001 (the most recent year for which property-level data is 
available) lived in properties with fewer than five units (chart 
3-7). in fact, four in ten lived in single-unit properties. with 
the recent shift toward renting more single-family homes as 
homeownership rates have fallen, the share of renters living 
in rentals with fewer than five units has likely increased 
modestly. 
enough capital to cover all expected claims over the next 30 
years, which would require an estimated $46.7 billion. that 
leaves a long-term shortfall of $16.3 billion.) According to 
the audit, loans insured prior to 2010 are the prime source 
of stress on the insurance fund, with $70 billion in future 
claims payments attributable to the FY 2007–2009 book 
of business alone. seller-funded down-payment-assisted 
loans, now prohibited by federal law, were responsible for 
the largest share of FHA losses. it is unclear at this time 
whether the FHA will require a drawdown of federal funds 
to subsidize its single-family insurance fund. FHA has 
taken a number of remedial steps, including raising annual 
insurance premiums and other policy changes to increase 
revenue and reduce losses, and congress is considering 
legislation to achieve similar objectives. And according to 
the independent audit, FHA loans insured since 2010 are of 
high quality and profitability.82
the recent developments surrounding FHA only underscore 
the urgency of what the commission has proposed—that far 
more risk-bearing private capital must flow into our nation’s 
housing finance system. A system in which private risk-
bearing capital is plentiful will help reduce the pressure that is 
sometimes placed on the FHA to act as the mortgage-credit 
provider of last resort and allow it to perform its traditional 
missions more effectively and at lower risk to the taxpayer. 
Recommendations for Rental Housing 
Finance Reform
today, about 35 percent of all U.s. households rent. in 
many markets, rental housing offers more affordable 
housing options for low-income and moderate-income 
families. indeed, about nine in ten rental units are generally 
affordable to those households making the median income 
in the areas in which they live. As explained later in this 
report, however, rental housing is becoming increasingly 
unaffordable, particularly for those at the lower end of the 
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the rental housing finance system in place today is 
primarily geared to serve multifamily properties—those 
with five or more units. these account for about half of all 
rentals, and much more is known about the performance 
of loans to these properties. most of the discussion and 
recommendations that follow address this segment of 
the rental housing stock. Following the financial market 
conventions, we will refer to these properties and their 
finance as “multifamily.” 
The Federal Role in Supporting Multifamily Lending
the federal government helps to provide liquidity to 
multifamily rentals in normal times and is a crucial backstop 
in times of stress. when private lenders all but exited the 
market during the financial crisis, the federal role in rental 
housing finance expanded dramatically. with rental markets 
rebounding, private capital is once again increasing its 
exposure to credit risk from multifamily lending. while these 
are promising signs that rental finance is on the mend, 
federal support from Fannie mae, Freddie mac, and FHA 
remains essential to the recovery process and the market’s 
long-term stability.
the mortgage debt outstanding for multifamily rental 
properties currently amounts to an $825 billion market, the 
vast majority of which supports refinancing.83 multifamily 
rental housing has historically been financed by a variety 
of private sources and by Fannie mae, Freddie mac, and 
FHA. Banks, thrifts, and insurance companies have all 
been important participants, using combinations of their 
own balance sheets and securities, along with other private 
sources like pension funds. A multifamily private-label 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (cmBs) market 
emerged in the 1990s and grew through the early 2000s, 
but shut down by 2009 in the wake of the financial crisis. 
Unlike the agency cmBs market supported by the federal 
government, the private-label cmBs market has neither 
explicit nor implicit federal backing. like its single-family 
counterpart, this private-label securities market suffered at 
Chart 3-7: Proportion of Rental Units by Size of 
Property 
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these one- to four-unit properties are treated as single-
family properties by the finance system and are financed 
through the single-family divisions of Fannie mae, 
Freddie mac, and FHA. Bank regulators consider them 
single-family properties when establishing underwriting 
guidelines and setting capital requirements. these smallest 
rental properties pose unique financing challenges. the 
performance of loans to these properties and the reasons 
for differences in performance between single-unit rentals, 
two-unit rentals, and properties with more units is not well 
understood. this is especially true of the large number of 
foreclosed single-family homes that are being converted to 
rentals in the wake of the housing bubble. whether these 
properties will become long-term rental assets or return to 
the for-purchase market when homeownership financing 
becomes more readily available and purchase demand 
increases, is also not known. this uncertainty makes 
designing effective rental financing approaches even more 
challenging.
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Table 3-1: Multifamily Finance Providers of Credit and Terms    
Fannie Mae/ 
Freddie Mac
Banks and thrifts
Life insurance 
companies
FHA CMBS
Financing 
provided
Portfolio/insured – 
securitized
Portfolio Portfolio
insured-
securitized
securitized- 
remic
Loan type(s) Fixed rate/ floating rate
Floating rate/ 
construction, some 
fixed rate
Fixed rate and some 
construction and 
floating rate
Fixed rate/ 
construction
Fixed rate
Recourse or 
non-recourse
Non-recourse recourse (partial) Non-recourse Non-recourse Non-recourse
Typical loan 
term
5, 7, 10 years
3-5 years, recently 
including 5-year 
fixed-rate loans
3-15 years 35-40 years 5, 7, 10 years
Loan-to-value 
ratio
leverage up to  
75-80%
lower leverage (65-
75%)
lowest leverage (55-
75%)
Highest leverage 
(80-85%)
leverage (65-
75%)
Cost to borrower low priced low priced low priced low priced Higher priced
Flexibility to 
adjust loan 
terms
moderately 
flexible
most flexible moderately flexible least flexible least flexible
Availability – 
borrowers and 
neighborhoods
most locations; 
better quality 
borrowers
most locations 
accepted with 
structure; wide 
range of borrowers
institutional/
high quality asset 
locations and 
borrowers
most locations 
and most 
borrowers
conservative 
underwriting in 
flux
source: Prepared by cwcapital. Used with permission.
A wide range of funders currently supplies capital to the rental finance system. in the private sector, banks and thrifts specialize 
mostly in short-term, adjustable-rate mortgages and in construction lending, while life insurance companies engage primarily 
in long-term, fixed-rate financing, largely for prime properties in prime locations. Fannie mae and Freddie mac provide mostly 
long-term (seven-plus years) fixed-rate refinancing, including for some nonprime properties and in nonprime locations, but do 
not backstop any construction lending. FHA provides long-term, fixed-rate financing through refinance loans and construction-to-
permanent loans for new and rehabilitated properties, but only for properties with per-unit costs below a strict statutory cutoff. see 
table 3-1 for more detail on each of these providers of credit.
FHA, Fannie mae, and Freddie mac do not originate loans. except for multifamily loans held in portfolio, Fannie mae and Freddie 
mac also do not service the loans. instead they rely on private, specially licensed firms to perform these functions. this reliance on 
the private sector is a positive aspect of the present system that should be preserved and expanded.
Current participants in the rental housing finance system
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the growth in rental demand, driving vacancy rates down 
and rents up.86 the growing demand for new multifamily 
rental units, fueled in part by demographic changes and 
more restrictive mortgage underwriting standards, lends 
urgency to ensuring credit continues to flow to multifamily 
housing.
Fortunately, strengthening rental markets have attracted 
renewed interest by banks, thrifts, and insurance 
companies. After dropping to historic lows in 2009, their 
participation rates in multifamily originations have started 
to pick up. with this return, the share of multifamily loan 
originations supported by Fannie mae and Freddie mac has 
fallen to 56 percent in 2011. even private-label cmBs came 
back in 2011, though at a very low $2 billion level (far short 
of the 2007 peak of $36 billion).87 though bank balance-
sheet lending especially has been picking up, overall federal 
support for multifamily lending remains high by historical 
standards.88
the height of the boom from overleveraging and declining 
credit quality. many cmBs issues had to be restructured 
and investors’ returns cut as the weakened economy and 
bad lending practices undermined their value. in contrast, 
the gse and ginnie mae cmBs market was stable and 
experienced little loss of value and, as noted earlier, grew 
rapidly as private capital fled. 
in recent years, annual multifamily originations have swung 
widely from a high of $148 billion in 2007 to a low of $52 
billion in 2009. when private capital withdrew from the 
market in 2009, Fannie mae and Freddie mac expanded 
to support 86 percent of multifamily loan originations84 —
nearly triple their average share in the years leading up to 
the crisis. 
After plummeting to record lows, new apartment 
construction has picked up to about 225,000 units in 
2012.85 But new construction has failed to keep pace with 
Table 3-2: Share of Multifamily Loans Financed that were 60+ Days Delinquent as of December 31, 2011
Acquisition or 
origination year
Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Private label CMBS lenders FHA lenders
2005 0.73% 0.20% 5.60% 1.19%
2006 0.66 0.25 13.63 0.66
2007 0.89 0.74 23.94 0.54
2008 1.12 0.09 4.68 2.74
2009 0.05 0.00 N/A* 5.15
2010 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02
*in 2009, cmBs lenders did not originate any multifamily loans.
Note: while not displayed in this table due to differences in the ways in which delinquencies are tracked, life insurance companies generally experienced lower default rates than 
Fannie mae and Freddie mac from 2005–2010.
source: shear, william B., et al. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Multifamily Housing Activities Have Increased. gAo-12-849. (washington, D.c.: U.s. government Accountability 
office, 2012), 58.
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extent that private-sector risk taking can take its place 
at somewhat comparable cost and enable FHA to focus 
on areas and products where private investment is not 
readily available.
•	 Make	special	provisions	to	better	understand	and	support	
the financing needs of one- to four-unit and five- to 49-
unit rentals, including review of the limitations on passive 
losses, consideration of treating properties made up of 
small scattered rentals on multiple sites as multifamily 
housing for finance purposes, and consideration of 
new financing tools for large-scale owner/operators 
of affordable rental properties that will increase their 
efficiency and ability to steward their inventory. 
each of these recommendations is discussed in greater 
detail below.
Gradually wind down the multifamily operations of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
the commission recommends winding down the multifamily 
operations of Fannie mae and Freddie mac through a gradual 
transition process. this process should be undertaken at a 
pace that does not harm the nation’s rental finance system 
and should not be completed until a new system of federal 
catastrophic guarantee support is firmly in place. 
During this transition, the multifamily assets of Fannie mae 
and Freddie mac could be repositioned in a number of ways, 
including through incorporation into a new publicly operated 
securities platform, operation as a legacy asset of the U.s. 
government, or sale to private interests that have no special 
charter or implicit guarantee of their corporate equity or 
debt. these private firms would have to be approved by the 
Public guarantor, pay a fee to help capitalize the government 
catastrophic risk fund, and submit to capital reserve 
requirements. the transition will only be complete when a 
wholly private system, backstopped only by a catastrophic 
government guarantee, replaces the liquidity functions that 
Fannie mae and Freddie mac have provided. 
in sharp contrast to their single-family operations, the multi-
family businesses of Fannie mae and Freddie mac were 
profitable throughout the financial crisis.89 in addition, the 
performance of multifamily loans backed by Fannie mae and 
Freddie mac was dramatically better than that of loans made 
through other financing channels. the worst performance 
was turned in by the private-label cmBs market (see table 
3-2). the underwriting standards and risk-management 
strategies of Fannie mae and Freddie mac, and to a lesser 
extent of FHA, clearly paid off relative to the private-label 
cmBs market.
Building a New Rental Housing Finance System
the commission recommends that the federal government 
take the following four actions with respect to building a new 
system for rental housing finance: 
•	 Gradually	transition	the	multifamily	operations	of	
Fannie mae and Freddie mac to a new system 
similar in design to that for single-family finance. the 
intellectual, technological, and business assets of the 
gses’ multifamily businesses could be transitioned in a 
number of ways, including through incorporation into a 
new publicly operated securities platform, operation as 
a legacy asset of the U.s. government, or sale to private 
interests.
•	 Put	in	place	a	new	catastrophic	guarantee	for	multifamily	
finance predicated on the same principles as proposed 
for single-family finance. this new multifamily backstop 
would provide an explicit guarantee of the mBs issued by 
private issuers in return for (1) paying a fee to the Public 
guarantor; (2) agreeing to assume, or arrange for other 
private parties to assume, predominant losses before the 
catastrophic guarantee is triggered; and (3) submitting 
to the approval, underwriting, monitoring, and capital 
standards established by the Public guarantor.
•	 Retain	but	streamline	FHA’s	multifamily	insurance	
operations, and pare back FHA’s multifamily role to the 
Chapter 3. Reforming Our Nation’s Housing Finance System72
risk-sharing in which the government pays out only for 
catastrophic losses—is rooted in the following findings:
•	 A	government	guarantee	against	catastrophic	risk	is	
essential to a strong and deeply liquid secondary market 
for multifamily loans. the guarantee would completely 
wrap the multifamily cmBs, thereby converting largely 
illiquid multifamily mortgages into liquid multifamily 
securities with a broad investor base. A broad base of 
investors, in turn, helps ensure that interest rates are 
competitive and that capital is sufficient to fund the 
demand for rental housing. 
•	 In	the	absence	of	a	government	backstop,	there	is	a	
serious risk that liquidity will be impaired, particularly 
for long-term, fixed-rate multifamily rental mortgages, 
but also potentially for other types of mortgage products 
as well (e.g., at times Fannie mae and Freddie mac 
have provided important support to the longer-term, 
adjustable-rate market). the financial crisis clearly 
exposed the potential for private capital to exit the 
market during periods of sharp housing corrections 
or disruptions in financial markets. the retreat of 
private capital from exposure to multifamily credit 
risk underscores the importance of some form of a 
government backstop to avoid extended periods when 
credit is unavailable. 
•	 Even	under	normal	economic	conditions,	Fannie	Mae	
and Freddie mac have been important sources of finance 
in nonprime locations and when investment strategies 
have led private investors to shed existing investments or 
restrict new ones.
•	 The	availability	of	a	government	backstop	for	multifamily	
cmBs benefits borrowers by keeping credit flowing. 
Furthermore, having a strong secondary market for 
multifamily mortgages allows banks, thrifts, and credit 
unions—which are funded mostly by short-term 
deposits—to originate longer-term, fixed-rate mortgages of 
Put in place a new catastrophic guarantee for 
multifamily finance predicated on the same principles 
as proposed for single-family finance.
the commission has concluded that a continued—but 
limited—federal presence in rental housing finance is 
needed both to ensure liquidity in normal times and to 
guard against illiquidity during times of severe economic 
distress. As in the new single-family system, the commission 
envisions that: 
•	 The	Public	Guarantor	should	be	charged	with	and	
authorized to provide catastrophic risk insurance for 
multifamily cmBs in return for an explicit and actuarially 
sound premium charged to issuers, which is designed 
to cover losses (after private risk-sharers absorb 
predominant losses) as well as the operating expenses of 
the Public guarantor.
•	 Private	firms	should	be	the	originators,	servicers,	credit	
enhancers, and issuers of multifamily mortgages and 
cmBs with the government backstop of mBs limited to 
an explicit catastrophic guarantee. the issuer/servicers 
and credit enhancers should be monoline entities to 
ensure that the capital they have is protected against 
other uses.
•	 Except	in	the	case	of	FHA-insured	loans,	in	which	the	
difficulty of serving the low-cost rental market justifies 
the government’s assumption of 100 percent of the 
credit risk, the private sector should charge for and 
take a predominant share of potential losses before any 
government catastrophic risk insurance is triggered. 
•	 The	interests	of	the	Public	Guarantor	and	its	private-
sector counterparties should be aligned as much as 
possible.
Why a Government Guarantee is Necessary
the commission’s support for a continued government 
guarantee of multifamily cmBs—built around private 
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commission believes that the demand for financing for new 
construction would be minimal and that a reformed and 
strengthened FHA could keep the supply of construction 
finance flowing to low-cost rental housing just as it did 
during the previous downturn, but more efficiently and at 
greater scale than it managed to do in its pre-reform state. 
Key Differences with the Proposed Single-Family System
the key differences between the proposed systems for 
single-family and rental finance lie not in the basic functions 
of the systems or the structure of the government guarantee 
but in (1) the cutoffs that would be established to ensure 
the Public guarantor serves only a segment of the mortgage 
market and (2) the specific counterparty requirements for 
the two systems. each of these differences is addressed in 
greater detail below.
An affordability requirement
multifamily lending, by virtue of renter demographics and 
rental housing, has predominantly supported housing 
affordable to low- and moderate-income households. 
the commission recommends that the Public guarantor 
establish an affordability requirement or threshold, intended 
to assure that the system continues to primarily support 
housing affordable to these households, while allowing 
access to the guarantee for a modest share of higher-rent 
units. this threshold should be neither overly generous 
nor unduly restrictive, to ensure a broad backstop for 
multifamily housing affordable to Americans with modest 
incomes and to avoid the overuse of the government 
guarantee for high-end rental properties. compliance with 
the affordability requirement should be assessed using the 
rents established at loan origination. compliance would be 
based on the issuer’s portfolio of qualifying securities over a 
rolling two-to three-year period.90 issuers that fail to comply 
could be subject to a variety of actions, including losing 
approval status to do business with the Public guarantor. 
seven to 30 years, which are vitally important to managing 
the operating costs of affordable rental housing. Finally, 
the option to issue government-guaranteed securities with 
private risk-sharing provides lenders with an additional 
tool to manage their capital reserve requirements. 
Mechanics of the New Rental Finance System
the Public guarantor would provide multifamily mortgage 
lenders with the important option of placing loans in 
securities and paying for government catastrophic risk on 
these securities. Private-sector lenders operating without 
this backstop can and will play a role in a reformed housing 
finance system and will be in a position to judge when to 
use this option. Participating lenders or issuers would be 
permitted to either retain the risk of covering predominant 
losses ahead of the government guarantee or arrange for 
a private-sector third party to provide most of the credit 
enhancement. 
the Public guarantor would be limited to backstopping 
permanent finance for leased new properties and 
for existing properties, and expressly prohibited from 
supporting construction lending just as Fannie mae and 
Freddie mac are prohibited from doing so.
Although the Public guarantor would not guarantee 
securities backed by multifamily rental construction loans, 
banks would have the option of rolling over the initial loan 
for newly built rental properties to a longer-term, fixed-rate 
permanent loan that is eligible for secondary market sale or 
securitization, just as they do today with Fannie mae and 
Freddie mac. in this way, the presence of a government-
backstopped secondary market takeout for adjustable-rate 
construction loans would facilitate the flow of credit to new 
construction in normal times as well as times of stress. 
Before the crisis, the private market supplied all the 
construction lending for rental properties—and did so 
mostly without FHA insurance. During any future crisis, the 
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guarantor would also conduct audits of its counterparties to 
ensure compliance.
Capital requirements
the capital that private firms would have to put at risk to 
cover predominant losses would be based on regular stress 
tests of their capital position to ensure that counterparties 
have adequate capital to cover their commitments. capital 
reserve requirements would likely be set at different levels 
for rental mBs than for mBs backed by single-family loans 
because of the different risks they pose. 
Alignment of incentives 
the interests of all private entities serving as counterparties 
to the Public guarantor must be tied to the long-term 
performance of multifamily loans, not just to the volume 
of loan originations and security issuances. these private 
entities include firms originating and servicing multifamily 
loans, issuing government-guaranteed securities with private 
risk-sharing, and sharing credit risk.
this alignment of incentives can be met using one of three 
methods that tie the interest of every entity in the chain 
to the long-term success of every mortgage loan that is 
ultimately backstopped by the Public guarantor. the three 
methods are (1) placing capital at risk, (2) placing the 
franchise’s ability to continue to do business with the Public 
guarantor at risk, and (3) placing mortgage-servicing rights 
(msrs) at risk. 
the new system is designed around the first of these—
putting private capital at risk and assuring one or more 
private entities hold capital sufficient, as determined by 
the Public guarantor, to cover the predominant risk under 
extreme stress testing. while the issuer should be permitted 
to lay off most of this risk (to either a third-party mortgage 
insurer approved by the Public guarantor or through a 
capital markets solution, such as a structured security or 
derivative), it should be expected to retain some portion 
the proposed restriction of the catastrophic government 
guarantee to properties primarily serving low- and moderate-
income residents may result in a relatively higher cost of 
capital for some projects at the higher end of the rental 
market. while the commission has concluded that this is 
an acceptable risk, in the event of an extreme stress to the 
financial system in which it is determined that private capital 
has fled from the market serving higher-income renters by 
a verifiable measure, the Public guarantor should have 
the authority to extend catastrophic insurance to prudently 
written loans for these segments of the market until private 
capital returns.
counterparty standards and requirements for multifamily 
lenders
As on the single-family side, the Public guarantor would 
be charged with developing and periodically reviewing 
underwriting standards; approving the lenders, issuers, 
private credit enhancers, and servicers that participate 
in the government-guaranteed system; and maintaining 
minimum standards for the amount of capital that would 
have to be placed in reserve by private firms to cover 
predominant losses before the government catastrophic 
guarantee would be triggered. the Public guarantor would 
also employ safeguards to ensure the alignment of interests 
of all entities serving as its counterparties. 
Underwriting standards
in a new housing finance system, underwriting standards 
for the single-family and rental sectors would be different, 
just as they are now. For example, borrowers in the rental 
housing finance system are typically required to make 
much larger down payments (of 25 percent or more) than 
borrowers on the single-family side, a practice that would 
continue under the new system.91 the Public guarantor 
would have the flexibility to underwrite loans directly or 
establish process and documentation standards it would 
expect its counterparty originators to follow. the Public 
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Reform, strengthen, and streamline FHA multifamily 
programs. 
like Fannie mae and Freddie mac, FHA ramped up its 
share of loan originations to offset the flight of private 
capital from the housing finance system during the great 
recession. FHA’s multifamily loan performance has held 
up relatively well under the pressure of the economic 
downturn, with delinquencies peaking in December 2011. 
even for loans originated in 2009—by far the worst book of 
multifamily business for FHA—the delinquency rate of 5.15 
percent is substantially below the delinquency rate of nearly 
24 percent for loans originated in 2007 that resulted in the 
worst book of business for private-label cmBs issuers.94
the commission believes FHA should continue to play its 
essential role in facilitating liquidity for the construction 
and refinance of rental properties with long-term, fixed-rate 
financing. the risks involved in this lending are perceived 
to be higher, and steady debt payments are often important 
to attract equity investment. Absent FHA’s 100 percent 
guarantee of credit risk and the option for delivery into 
government-wrapped ginnie mae multifamily cmBs, 
lenders might not otherwise be able to offer these products 
to the owners and developers of rental properties in all parts 
of the country. 
FHA is restricted in its activities by congressionally 
mandated statutory loan limits, which ensure it provides 
support only to properties that would typically be affordable 
to moderate-income households at loan origination. FHA 
plays a unique role in supporting this market with long-term, 
fixed-rate financing for new construction and rehabilitation 
(primarily through the section 221(d)(4) program) and 
refinances of existing properties (primarily through the 
section 223(f) program).95 the combination of insuring 100 
percent of the principal balance on existing, substantially 
rehabilitated, and new multifamily rentals—as well as 
offering long-term, fixed-rate financing without balloon risk, 
of the risk and reserve capital to cover it, consistent with 
having an option to achieve sale treatment. the Public 
guarantor should be authorized to set this amount at a 
level it deems sufficient to make sure the interests of the 
issuer are aligned.92 in addition, issuers put capital at risk 
by retaining responsibility for repurchasing any loans that 
are found to have violated representations and warranties 
for a specified period of time, even if they sell their servicing 
rights. 
it is not sufficient just to stipulate that the private 
counterparties hold a certain amount of capital to cover 
predominant credit losses. the Public guarantor must also 
have the authority and be explicitly charged by congress 
to monitor the capital positions of its counterparties and 
demand that they raise capital if they fall short of mandated 
levels.93
the second method of aligning incentives—placing the 
franchise’s ability to do business at risk—is a powerful tool. 
Businesses with operations that depend on the continued 
ability to do business with the Public guarantor, and the 
secondary market it supports, will avoid taking actions that 
could cause them to lose their status as approved actors 
in the new housing finance system. this is why the Public 
guarantor must have approval and examination authority 
over its counterparties. 
Finally, in cases where the issuer is also the originator of 
the loan, the issuer should be permitted to sell its msrs. 
(it would already be obligated to retain some risk.) in cases 
where the originator sells the loan to an issuer or acts as 
a broker for the issuer, however, the originator should be 
required to retain the msrs. otherwise, it would not have 
an ongoing interest in loan performance that would help 
assure the quality of the loan at origination. Unlike Fannie 
mae, both life insurance companies and Freddie mac do 
not demand risk-sharing by the seller and currently often 
require that msrs remain with the originating lender. 
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•	 Strengthen partnerships between FHA and Housing 
Finance Agencies. FHA should continue to be authorized 
to insure properties that receive low income Housing tax 
credits (liHtc) and should explore options for improving 
coordination with the liHtc and Home investment 
Partnerships programs. it should also continue to 
offer risk-sharing programs with Housing Finance 
Agencies over a range of multifamily products (provided 
developments meet the affordability requirements 
enumerated above). FHA has proven useful in helping 
the Housing Finance Agencies pursue affordable rental 
housing goals, and these agencies typically make 
allocation decisions involving tax credits and subsidies. 
Address the unique financing needs of small 
multifamily rentals.
As noted above, small (one-to 49-unit) properties make up 
about two-thirds of all rental units, with one- to four-unit 
rental properties making up somewhat more than half of all 
rentals. 
while five- to 49-unit properties are served by the 
multifamily finance system, the commission heard 
repeatedly that these smaller properties have historically 
been more difficult to finance with long-term, fixed-rate 
financing and funding from the capital markets than 
have the roughly 30 percent of rentals in 50-plus-unit 
properties.96 For example, in 2001 not only did a smaller 
share of five- to 49-unit properties—compared with 50-plus-
unit properties—have mortgages; less than half of the five- 
to 49-unit properties that did have mortgages had fixed-rate 
payments compared with over 70 percent for 50-plus-unit 
properties. in looking at the share of small properties that 
have a mortgage (and, among those that do, the share that 
have long-term, fixed-rate financing), the commission was 
unable to determine how much of the observed differences 
are a result of the debt preferences of the investors in these 
properties or how much they reflect structural difficulties in 
supplying credit to them. 
on fully amortizing loans with amortization periods as long 
as 40 years and with loan-to-value ratios as high as 85 
percent—has made FHA an important source of liquidity to 
this segment of the market. 
the commission believes the FHA should remain focused 
on providing standardization and liquidity to the markets 
it currently serves, and FHA-insured mortgages should 
continue to be guaranteed by ginnie mae. However, the 
commission also believes the FHA’s multifamily operations 
should be streamlined to avoid lengthy delays often 
associated with doing business with FHA, and its role in 
the market should not extend beyond that which would not 
otherwise be served by private capital. more specifically, the 
commission recommends the following:
•	 Address administrative inefficiencies. Developers and 
lenders have long criticized FHA for being inefficient, 
and causing lengthy delays and uncertainties in loan 
approvals. HUD has recently made great strides to 
improve processing times and review of new applications, 
and these initiatives should be continued. in addition, 
the non-core multifamily programs administered by FHA 
that do not expand liquidity of capital for housing should 
be reviewed, and FHA should provide a rationale for their 
continuation or make a case for their discontinuation to 
congress.
•	 Take steps to avoid the crowd-out of private capital. FHA 
provides a 100 percent loan guarantee and therefore 
risks crowding out private capital that might be willing 
to stand in front of the federal government or assume 
all of the credit risk—even in this more-difficult-to-serve 
market. therefore, FHA should periodically evaluate its 
market share to ensure it is not crowding out private 
insurers and lenders who would serve the market at a 
comparable cost to FHA. FHA should keep in mind that 
one of its public policy objectives is helping to retain 
existing affordable rental properties. 
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mac have experience with multi-site, multifamily finance, 
review of these activities should be undertaken to inform 
development of future financing products. 
•	 Review the impact of passive loss rules for small rental 
properties. the tax reform Act of 1986 disallowed 
the practice of using losses from “passive activities”—
including investment in rental properties—to offset 
“active income” from other, unrelated activities. the 
limitation on passive losses, however, permits taxpayers 
with incomes under $100,000 (phased up to $150,000) 
to deduct up to $25,000 of losses from rental property 
that they actively manage. the limitation was intended 
to restrict the excessive tax benefits that contributed to 
overbuilding in the early 1980s (which contributed to 
supply overhangs into the early 1990s). However, it may 
also have led to declines in investment in small rental 
properties by individual investors—for example, a dentist 
who took a stake in a two-flat rental property to earn extra 
income. Further analysis should be undertaken to review 
the impact of the passive-loss rules, specifically to assess 
the potential to increase the number of affordable rental 
units by attracting greater equity into the investment 
market by exempting rental properties with fewer than 50 
units and by indexing the $25,000 limit to inflation.
•	 Re-assess the appropriate division (or divisions) of the 
Public Guarantor within which to site small multifamily 
rentals. in a redesigned housing finance system, the 
Public guarantor should be granted the authority to 
decide whether it is sensible for one and/or two- to four-
unit properties that contain at least one rental unit to 
fall within the domain of its multifamily division (which 
could be renamed the “rental division”) or its single-
family division. the Public guarantor should also have 
the authority to regulate the activities of its private issuer/
servicers and credit enhancers so that they align with how 
two- to four-unit rental properties are handled. 
However, the commission was persuaded of the need to 
do more to understand the market for mortgage finance 
for one- to 49-unit properties and explore ways to better 
facilitate financing to it. in a reformed system with multiple 
issuers of multifamily securities eligible for a government 
catastrophic guarantee, some of these issuers might try to 
serve this niche market more effectively than past efforts 
by Fannie mae and Freddie mac. the Public guarantor 
should be encouraged to be responsive to private issuers 
who express an interest in a guarantee on small multifamily 
cmBs, while maintaining a policy of requiring catastrophic 
insurance premiums to cover potential losses after private 
credit enhancements are exhausted.
in addition, the commission makes the following 
recommendations:
•	 Explore opportunities to provide financing to small 
scattered-site rentals on a bundled basis. Untapped 
opportunities exist for the bundling of several non-
contiguous properties into a single multi-site, multifamily 
property for the purposes of financing their development 
and acquisition. For example, there are private firms 
interested in purchasing multiple single-family homes 
from Fannie mae and Freddie mac out of their real 
estate–owned (reo) stock and financing the acquisition 
with a single multifamily mortgage. indeed, Fannie mae 
is experimenting with bulk sales of its reo properties 
in a related way. the Public guarantor should have the 
flexibility to explore opportunities to backstop loans to 
properties with five or more non-contiguous, single-
family or two- to four-unit buildings as a single multi-
site, multifamily property for financing purposes and to 
assess possible benefits and unintended consequences 
of this approach.97 these opportunities would include 
purchases to be held in land banks, which are a 
promising mechanism to help distressed communities 
strengthen their property markets.98 to the extent that the 
Federal Home loan Banks or Fannie mae and Freddie 
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strengthening cDFis’ access to debt financing, including by 
promoting their continued membership in, and access to, 
advances through the Federal Home loan Bank system.99
Further, congress should give immediate and serious 
attention to HUD’s proposal to establish an FHA risk-sharing 
program with Housing Finance Agencies around small 
multifamily properties. Furthermore, HUD should build 
evaluation methods into the original program design.
Improve data collection. the federal government should 
improve its data collection and coverage for the multifamily 
housing finance system, including collection of information 
about originations, servicing, and loan performance. Better 
data would allow researchers and market analysts to 
develop a deeper understanding of activity and participants 
in the system, currently and over time.
Structure of the Public Guarantor
the commission envisions the establishment of a single 
Public guarantor with responsibility for both the single-
family and rental housing markets. the Public guarantor 
would consist of two separate divisions each with 
responsibility for administering its own separate catastrophic 
risk fund. each division would also establish its own 
approval standards for lenders, issuers, servicers, and 
private credit enhancers as well as underwriting standards, 
predominant loss coverage requirements, and catastrophic 
guarantee fees. 
the Public guarantor should be established as an 
independent, wholly owned government corporation. As 
a government corporation, the Public guarantor will be 
a self-supporting institution that does not rely on federal 
appropriations but rather finances the two catastrophic 
funds and its own operational expenses through the 
collection of g-fees. the Public guarantor should operate 
independently of any existing federal department and, 
•	 Pursue additional research to enable improved decision-
making and underwriting. the FHFA, in conjunction with 
Fannie mae and Freddie mac, should study the loan 
performance of their two- to four-unit property portfolios 
at different points in time and simulate their performance 
under certain stress tests. the aim of these studies would 
be to identify factors that may have contributed to the 
poorer historical performance of these properties in terms 
of underwriting, valuation methods, product features, 
location, number of units, residence of owners, and 
other factors that may have contributed to higher serious 
delinquency rates and loss severities. 
in conjunction with Fannie mae and Freddie mac, the FHFA 
should also conduct a thorough review of the experience 
of the two gses in purchasing and guaranteeing small 
(five- to 49-unit) multifamily rental properties in order to 
make recommendations about whether a future government 
guarantor of catastrophic risk could help facilitate a stronger 
secondary market for these properties and organize itself 
better to properly underwrite and price the risk of this 
lending.
Additional Recommendations
the commission examined other ways that the financing of 
rental housing could be improved and offers the following 
additional recommendations:
Facilitate partnerships with mission-driven lenders. A new 
system of rental housing finance should support and 
enhance the role of community Development Financial 
institutions (cDFis) and other mission-driven lenders. while 
cDFis typically provide pre-development and construction 
financing, access to long-term permanent financing—
through direct issuance of securities or sale to an 
aggregator—would enable them to better support affordable 
rental housing of all sizes, including small properties. 
As part of these efforts, emphasis should be placed on 
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the Public guarantor should be led by a single 
individual, appointed by the President of the United 
states and confirmed by the U.s. senate, who would 
serve as director. Vesting ultimate leadership authority 
for the Public guarantor in a single individual should 
promote accountability and ease of decision-making. 
this individual should have a demonstrated expertise in 
financial management and oversight, as well as a deep 
understanding of the capital markets, particularly the 
mortgage securities markets and housing finance.
An Advisory council to the Public guarantor should be 
established, consisting of the chairman of the Board of 
governors of the Federal reserve system as chairman of 
the council, along with the director of the Public guarantor, 
the secretary of the U.s. Department of the treasury, 
and the secretary of HUD. the Advisory council would 
meet on at least a quarterly basis to share information 
about the condition of the national economy, marketplace 
developments and innovations, and potential risks to the 
safety and soundness of the nation’s housing finance 
system.
 
with this greater independence, should be able to respond 
more quickly to contingencies in the market and operate 
with greater efficiency in making staffing, budgeting, 
procurement, policy, and other decisions related to mission 
performance. it should be given sufficient flexibility to set 
compensation levels that are at least somewhat competitive 
with other employers within the financial services industry, 
and it should have the ability to appoint and compensate 
such outside experts and consultants as necessary to assist 
the work of the organization.
to ensure continuity and build on existing government 
capabilities, ginnie mae—enhanced with greater authorities 
and flexibilities—could assume the role of Public guarantor. 
in that case, ginnie mae would be removed from HUD, 
spun out as a separate and independent institution, and 
given the necessary authorities so that it could successfully 
discharge its responsibilities as the standard-setting body 
for a large segment of the mortgage market. in addition to 
discharging its responsibilities as the Public guarantor, the 
enhanced ginnie mae would continue on an uninterrupted 
basis to perform its traditional function as the guarantor of 
the timely payment of principal and interest on mBs backed 
by single-family and multifamily loans insured by the FHA, 
VA, UsDA, and the office of Public and indian Housing.
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The Crisis in Affordable Housing
Housing Challenges Facing Our Nation’s Renters 
According to the U.s. census, the nation’s 41 million renter 
households account for 35 percent of all U.s. households. 
compared with the U.s. population as a whole, the renter 
population has lower incomes, with two-thirds of renter 
households reporting incomes below 80 percent of the area 
median income (Ami) and nearly half reporting incomes 
below 50 percent of Ami. the median household income 
for renter households in 2011 was just $30,934 compared 
with $64,063 for owner occupied homes.100 in other words, 
renters as a group earn about one-half what homeowners do.
For the most part, renters live in housing that meets basic 
quality standards, but nearly half of all renters report paying 
more than 30 percent of their income for rent, signifying 
a “moderate rent burden” under federal standards for 
affordable housing. About 25 percent of the 41 million 
renter households report a “severe rent burden,” spending 
more than half of their income for housing.101
Demand for rental housing is increasing in many regions 
throughout the United states, and the number of renters 
spending more than they can afford on housing is 
unacceptably high and growing. Demographic trends, 
described earlier in this report, clearly highlight the 
continued and growing role that rental housing will play in 
meeting the nation’s housing needs, including for young 
adults starting out and seniors looking to scale back their 
home-maintenance responsibilities. most of us will rent at 
some point in our lives, and many American households 
prefer the flexibility and convenience of rental housing. it 
is therefore important that an adequate supply of stable, 
affordable rental housing is available to meet these needs 
and preferences. 
our proposals for rental housing finance reform, described 
in the previous chapter, are designed to ensure there 
is sufficient mortgage liquidity to support the continued 
availability of rental housing that is broadly affordable 
for households at all income levels. in this chapter, our 
proposals focus on meeting the rental housing needs of the 
lowest-income households—helping to provide high-quality, 
stable housing for the most vulnerable individuals and 
families, and promoting positive outcomes like improved 
educational performance by children and better physical 
and mental health. we also propose reforms to the rental 
assistance delivery system that focus on outcomes, helping 
to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of housing 
programs and providers. 
Chapter 4. Affordable Rental Housing
Chapter 4. Affordable Rental Housing82
As chart 4-1 shows, rent burdens vary considerably by 
household income. 
Nearly 80 percent of extremely low-income renters report 
a rent burden, with most—64 percent—reporting a severe 
rent burden. the overall incidence of rent burdens is 
nearly as high for the next income group—very low-income 
renters—but severe rent burdens are much lower for this 
group. the incidence of both moderate and severe rent 
burdens continues to fall as incomes rise, with severe rent 
burdens falling to 7 percent for low-income households and 
nearly disappearing for higher-income groups.
chart 4-2 highlights a major reason why extremely low-
income renters face such high housing cost burdens: the 
mismatch between the number of extremely low-income 
renters and the number of affordable units that are currently 
available to them. 
in 2009, only 3.7 million rental housing units were 
both affordable and available to extremely low-income 
households—far fewer units than needed to provide 
affordable housing to the nation’s 10.3 million extremely 
low-income renter households. (HUD defines a unit as 
available to a particular income group when it is either 
vacant or occupied by a household with that income or a 
lower income.) this mismatch would likely be even larger if 
we considered only those homes located in safe, amenity-
rich neighborhoods with good-performing schools and 
access to jobs. By contrast, low-income households and 
higher- income households (those with incomes above 80 
percent of Ami) experience surpluses of affordable and 
available units, although these surpluses are in specific 
markets and change over time. 
“worst case needs” for rental housing—a statistic HUD 
uses to keep track of renters who do not receive housing 
assistance, and either pay half of their income for housing 
or live in severely substandard housing—grew 20 percent 
Terms and Definitions
the federal standard for affordable housing is that a 
household should pay no more than 30 percent of its income 
for rent. “rent burden” is a term used to indicate the extent 
to which a household spends a disproportionate share of its 
income on rental costs. 
if expenditures on housing (rent plus utilities) account for:
- 30 percent or less of their income, a household is not 
considered to be rent burdened.
- Between 30 and 50 percent of income, a household has a 
“moderate rent burden.”
- Above one-half of household income, a household has a 
“severe rent burden.”
these standards are general rules of thumb and do not always 
tell the whole story. For example, a single person may choose 
to take on a moderate rent burden to live in a desirable 
neighborhood or larger apartment without experiencing any 
decrease in quality of life, while a family of four may rent a 
single-family home in an outlying area and have no formal 
rent burden but very high transportation costs, leading 
to combined housing and transportation costs that are 
unaffordable.
“low income” is a term used to indicate a household’s income 
level relative to other households in the same metropolitan 
area. 
if a household has an income:
- Above 50 percent, up to and including 80 percent of the 
Ami, it’s a “low-income” household.
- Above 30 percent, up to and including 50 percent of the 
Ami, it’s a “very low-income” household.
-  At or below 30 percent of the Ami, households are 
considered “extremely low-income.”
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Chart 4-1: Housing Cost Burdens Among U.S. Renters, 2009
0-30% AMI 30-50% AMI 50-80% AMI 80-120% AMI >120% AMI Total
Severe burden 0.64 0.28 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.25
Moderate burden 0.15 0.45 0.33 0.13 0.03 0.25
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Char  4-2: Rental Units and Renters, by Afforda ility and Income Cat gories (in millions, 2009)
Units	  aﬀordable	  and	  available	  (by	  aﬀordability	  category) Households	  (by	  income	  category)
Not	  low	  income 14.0 10.8
Low	  income 14.0 7.2
Very	  low	  income 8.0 7.2
Extremely	  low	  income 3.7 10.3
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  (Washington,	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U.S.	  Department	  of	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  and	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  Policy	  Development	  and	  Research,	  
2011),	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  Based	  on	  a	  chart	  in	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  Rental	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  Gaps.	  (Washington,	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low income Housing coalition, 2010), 4.
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government support, high land prices and construction 
costs make it difficult for the private sector to develop 
non-luxury, market-rate housing.105 while much of the 
unsubsidized yet affordable stock of privately owned 
housing consists of older structures that have become more 
affordable over time, strong competition for these units 
leads to higher rents and—in many markets—the upgrading 
of these older units to meet the needs and preferences of 
higher-income households. 
in the past, the development of new apartments could lead 
renters with higher incomes to move on to updated units 
with more amenities, allowing older units to filter down to 
households lower on the income ladder. However, one of 
the problems inhibiting the filtering down of older rental 
units today to levels affordable to low-income households 
is the proliferation of barriers to new development or 
redevelopment that either prohibit certain types of 
development entirely or raise development costs to levels 
that make it economically infeasible. these barriers 
include local land-use regulations that restrict density 
directly or indirectly through the use of parking and other 
requirements, impose lengthy permitting or environmental 
review processes that may entail additional expenses in 
return for permits to build, or require a zoning variance 
to build multifamily housing developments. other barriers 
include local restrictions on innovative and efficient reuse of 
existing properties, such as the development of accessory 
apartments (sometimes known as “granny flats”) or the 
rental of excess rooms to boarders. in some cases, these 
regulations are the result of Not in my Backyard, or NimBY, 
sentiment, which adds uncertainties and obstacles to 
development.106
while many of these regulations may strive to advance 
important policy goals, in the aggregate they increase 
the cost of housing and inhibit the development of new 
affordable rental housing by extending the development 
timeframe and increasing the risks associated with 
between 2007 and 2009. But renter problems were on the 
rise before then as well, with the number of households 
with worst case needs growing 18 percent between 2001 
and 2007. renters paying excessive shares of income for 
rent and utilities often have insufficient income available to 
meet their basic needs for food, health care, education, and 
transportation—undermining child and adult health and 
contributing to residential instability that can, among other 
things, impair educational achievement and employment 
potential.102
compounding their difficulties, low-income households 
are often employed in low-wage or temporary jobs that are 
vulnerable to layoffs and reduced work hours. one study 
found that about 20 percent of households with children in 
the lowest-income quintile experience a loss of more than 
50 percent of their income in any given year, with only about 
half of these households fully recovering the lost income 
within the same one-year period.103 Unpredictable income 
shocks can lead to household stress and inability to plan for 
the future, and income volatility has been cited as a causal 
link to homelessness.104 without an ability to cushion the 
impact of this temporary loss of income, households may 
experience severe residential instability. 
Factors Driving Increases in Renter Cost Burdens
Housing cost burdens for renters have risen dramatically 
in recent years, and the factors driving these increases 
are neither novel nor difficult to identify. Unemployment, 
stagnating incomes, and volatile wages for those at the 
low end of the income spectrum greatly compromise 
families’ buying and saving power, leaving them with 
limited resources to meet basic needs such as shelter. At 
the same time, the supply of rental housing affordable to 
these families falls well short of demand, driven by the loss 
of affordable rentals to conversion, demolition, or other 
factors and an insufficient supply of rental subsidies that 
reduce renters’ monthly housing costs. in the absence of 
Housing America’s Future: New Directions for National Policy 85
Available data suggest that affordable rental housing is likely 
to become even more scarce in the coming years, with 
the production of rental housing failing to keep pace with 
demand.110 looking ahead, the nation’s demographic trends 
indicate that the number of renter households will increase 
dramatically over this decade, as echo Boomers begin to 
form their own households and as Baby Boomers seek to 
downsize from their existing homes and into living situations 
with less upkeep and fewer maintenance requirements. it 
is estimated that the construction of at least three million 
new multifamily rental units will be necessary over the next 
ten years to meet this growing demand,111 a target unlikely 
to be met without a concerted focus to help stimulate new 
production by the private sector. Absent this focus, rents are 
likely to continue to rise faster than incomes, exacerbating 
the nation’s already significant housing affordability 
challenges. And without subsidies, the private sector will 
not be able to provide housing at a cost that extremely low-
income households can afford. 
Historical Context: How We Got Where We Are Today
in 1937, the federal government began to provide rental 
assistance to the nation’s low-income households in a 
targeted way through the establishment of a public housing 
program as part of the U.s. Housing Act.112 this Act 
established a new federal agency focused on housing, the 
U.s. Housing Agency (a precursor to HUD), and required 
the establishment of local public housing authorities to 
build, own, and operate housing using debt financing 
guaranteed and paid for entirely by the federal government. 
tenants occupying the new public housing units were 
obligated to pay rents that covered building operating 
expenses, but not construction expenses. 
Following world war ii, the shortage of adequate housing, 
particularly for returning veterans, caught the nation’s 
attention. the 1949 Housing Act, along with setting a 
national housing objective of “a decent home and a suitable 
development.107 these regulations also prevent the 
construction of non-luxury rental housing that could help 
meet the needs of moderate-income households and allow 
older developments to filter down to rent levels affordable 
to low-income households. in addition, both federal and 
local regulations often discourage or inhibit the development 
of economically diverse, mixed-use neighborhoods that 
can help support educational achievement and economic 
mobility for low-income families.
Current Limits of Federal Rental Assistance
in all, federal rental assistance programs currently help 
approximately five million American households afford 
housing, providing critically needed shelter and stability for 
older adults, persons with disabilities, families with children, 
and other low-income individuals.108 However, because 
of the lack of resources, only about one in four renter 
households eligible for federal rental assistance receives 
it,109 resulting in an inequitable system in which housing 
subsidies are allocated by lottery or through ever growing 
waiting lists. many of the lottery losers become residentially 
unstable and move frequently—at great expense to their 
health and their children’s educational prospects. some 
even become homeless. 
existing federal housing assistance programs do a good 
job achieving the overarching goal of reducing housing 
costs to levels families can afford. But given the significant 
remaining unmet need for rental assistance and today’s 
fiscal challenges, the nation’s rental assistance programs 
must achieve a higher level of performance. these 
programs must also more fully realize the potential of rental 
assistance to substantially improve the life opportunities 
of assisted households—for example, helping older adults 
to lead independent lives and work-capable households 
to make progress toward economic self-sufficiency, and 
enabling families to move to neighborhoods with greater 
opportunities. 
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restructuring of a number of federal housing programs.113
During this period, increases in rents due to escalating 
operating and maintenance costs and declining resident 
incomes meant that many residents of public housing 
were spending upwards of 75 percent of their incomes 
on rent and utilities. in response, congress adopted, in 
1969, the so-called “Brooke Amendment,” championed 
by massachusetts republican senator edward w. Brooke, 
which limited a tenant’s rent to 25 percent of income 
in public housing. this action, while benefiting tenants, 
had the effect of lowering the amount of operating capital 
available to cover the costs of an affordable property. HUD 
therefore had to provide additional capital to agencies 
for the maintenance and operation of public housing 
properties, spurring adoption of annual operating subsidies 
as well as separate modernization (or “capital”) funding 
to restore aging stock. through the omnibus Budget 
reconciliation Act of 1981, congress raised the minimum 
tenant payment required from 25 to 30 percent of income, 
in part to help cover operating costs.114 the Brooke 
Amendment that established the 25 percent of income 
limit is responsible for the income-based rent structure that 
exists to this day in federal housing programs. 
in 1986, the low income Housing tax credit (liHtc) 
program was created as part of the tax reform Act with 
bipartisan support, replacing a series of other tax subsidies 
that had been in place for decades to encourage investment 
in affordable housing. liHtc created a new and more 
efficient means of developing rent-restricted, affordable 
housing using tax subsidies and became the primary means 
by which the federal government supports the development 
and preservation of affordable housing. 
During the severe recession of the early 1980s, the problem 
of large-scale homelessness appeared in America’s cities for 
the first time since the great Depression. in 1988, congress 
passed the stewart B. mckinney Homeless Assistance 
living environment for every American family,” authorized 
funding for nearly one million additional units of affordable 
public housing. 
the late 1950s and early 1960s ushered in a wave 
of innovation in affordable housing, including the 
establishment of new programs that created incentives 
for private developers and investors to produce and own 
assisted housing with the government’s support, such as the 
section 202 program for housing the elderly and the section 
23 leased Housing Program to provide leased affordable 
housing in privately owned properties. the section 236 
Program, created by congress in 1968, offered subsidies to 
reduce the interest rate paid on mortgages insured by the 
FHA in return for rent limits. 
As a result of a combination of factors—including the 
energy crisis of the early 1970s, which drove up costs in 
many privately owned, federally subsidized properties; 
corruption; and incompetent management—in 1973 
the Nixon administration declared a moratorium on all 
subsidized production in both HUD and the UsDA rural-
housing programs. the Nixon administration then followed 
up the moratorium with a series of proposals to overhaul 
the federal government’s role in rental housing assistance. 
congress responded by adopting the Housing and 
community Development Act of 1974, which created the 
section 8 program, as a more flexible means of delivering 
rental housing assistance to the lowest-income households 
by focusing on rental subsidies to or on behalf of tenants 
rather than subsidies directly paid to developers. through 
this program, funds were made available to support new 
construction, rehabilitation, and tenant-based rental 
assistance in existing properties. Although the 1974 Act 
helped to retain existing public housing units, approvals for 
new development were scaled back. the stock of public 
housing that had grown from about 150,000 units in the 
1950s to over one million units in the 1970s began to 
decline. the 1974 Act also called for the consolidation and 
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in the 1990s, the devolution of federal authority in rental 
assistance programs that began with the 1974 Act was 
further reinforced through the creation of the Home 
investment Partnerships (Home) program. this program 
introduced a flexible block grant to states and municipalities 
that builds on the existing infrastructure and partnerships 
between HUD and the public agencies, nonprofits, faith-
Act (later the mckinney-Vento Act) to put homeless 
assistance on the national housing agenda. Funding 
for homeless initiatives grew rapidly thereafter through 
the 1990s and 2000s, and numerical goals were put in 
place to end chronic homelessness through coordinated 
and comprehensive approaches that combine housing 
assistance with specialized services where necessary. 
For many years, homelessness was thought to be a temporary 
recession-related problem exacerbated by factors such as 
the deinstitutionalization of people with mental illness and the 
emerging AiDs epidemic. As a result, the interventions funded 
were largely short term: shelter, food, and transitional housing. 
HUD was the major funder, but targeted services funding was 
provided through a collection of homeless-specific programs 
at the Departments of Health and Human services, Veterans 
Affairs, labor, and education, among others. 
it soon became clear, however, that the real driver in 
homelessness was the lack of affordable housing and that 
persons with disabilities were simply the first to face the 
problem. By the end of the 1980s, despite a robust recovery, 
mass homelessness had increased and had come to affect non-
disabled adults, families, and even youth. Accordingly, over time 
and with strong support from both republicans and Democrats, 
homeless assistance was altered to include more permanent 
solutions, particularly housing. the first focus was on single-
room occupancy housing for single adults, and this later shifted 
to permanent supportive housing (subsidized housing with 
services) for people with disabilities, based on strong research 
showing its cost-effectiveness.
more recently, a new housing strategy, called rapid re-housing, 
has emerged to assist the 80 percent of homeless people 
whose problem is largely economic. By negotiating with 
landlords; providing deposits, move-in money, and short-term 
rental assistance; and connecting people with services in the 
community, rapid re-housing helps households that have lost 
their housing.
Both permanent supportive housing and rapid re-housing use 
an approach labeled “Housing First”—helping the homeless 
person to get in to housing immediately then following up with 
employment assistance, mental health treatment, or whatever 
other kinds of services are necessary to ensure that the housing 
is stabilized.
while HUD provides most of this funding, the VA has become 
increasingly involved. in partnership with HUD, it now provides 
permanent housing subsidies linked to services offered by 
the VA to high-need homeless veterans. in its new supportive 
services to Veteran Families program, it also funds rapid re-
housing. 
through these programs, and in conjunction with other 
financing sources (including liHtc), a significant amount 
of housing assistance is now being provided via homeless 
programs. in recent years, HUD has expanded the number of 
permanent supportive housing opportunities by approximately 
20,000 per year.115 there are now some 275,000 units of 
permanent supportive housing.116 well over one million 
households have been assisted with rapid re-housing funds. 
republican and Democratic administrations have made 
commitments to solve all or parts of the homeless problem, 
the most recent being the obama administration’s pledge to 
end chronic and veteran homelessness by 2015 and family 
homelessness by 2020. 
History of Homeless Assistance 
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increasing levels of poverty—particularly among children, 
elderly, and working families—give us a strong sense of 
urgency about our recommendations. working to address 
these critical needs and achieve the goal laid out in 1949 is, 
of course, an ongoing enterprise requiring a sustained policy 
commitment and the dedication of adequate resources. 
At this moment in our nation’s history, as our leaders work 
to put the federal government’s fiscal affairs in order, we 
believe there must be a rebalancing of federal expenditures 
on housing to ensure a greater focus on helping our most 
vulnerable households—homeless people and those with 
extremely low incomes—and those who are suffering a 
temporary loss of income or a short-term crisis that may 
jeopardize their housing stability. we do not believe our 
nation’s most impoverished families should be subject to 
a lottery system or spend years on a waiting list to obtain 
access to federal rental assistance. 
our recommendations to improve the inadequate affordable 
rental housing system are presented to respond to 
specific and urgent needs that are deeply interconnected. 
implementation of the entire package of proposals put 
forth by the commission would be the most effective and 
enduring way to respond to the challenges faced by our 
nation’s most vulnerable households. we estimate that these 
recommendations, fully implemented, would help meet 
the needs of an additional five million vulnerable renter 
households—through production, preservation, and rental 
assistance. However, the commission recognizes that a 
transition period will be necessary to fully realize the specific 
reforms identified. these are fiscally constrained times 
where the resources are not readily available to fully support 
the needs of unassisted households, and calling for any 
additional spending in the current fiscal environment has its 
practical limits. we therefore recommend that our approach 
for meeting the needs of the nation’s most vulnerable 
households be phased-in over time, although we make 
these recommendations with a strong sense that action is 
both possible and necessary. 
based organizations, and private entities in the affordable 
housing field. states and local governments are given wide 
discretion over how to use the funds to benefit low- and 
moderate-income households. 
more recently, two federal housing initiatives—HoPe Vi 
and choice Neighborhoods—have helped transform the 
nation’s housing stock by bringing the operating practices 
of the 20th century to public housing in order to establish 
a more effective approach to supporting the lowest-income 
households. HoPe Vi emerged from the recommendations 
of the National commission on severely Distressed Public 
Housing, and was first funded by congress in 1993. 
HoPe Vi followed a series of earlier initiatives launched by 
former HUD secretary Jack kemp, which he hoped would 
increase resident empowerment and quality of life in public 
housing. the program worked to demolish and rebuild the 
existing distressed public housing stock that had become 
synonymous with concentrated poverty and substandard 
conditions with lower-rise, higher-quality homes connected 
to services and amenities. residential empowerment was 
central to the aim of the HoPe Vi program, as was reducing 
density and promoting mixed-income communities. the 
choice Neighborhoods initiative, proposed by the obama 
administration and authorized by congress in 2011, 
built upon the success of HoPe Vi. it aims to transform 
distressed communities into mixed-income places tying the 
importance of increased access to jobs, supportive services, 
and economic and educational opportunity into housing 
developments. 
Recommendations for a Reformed 
Rental Assistance System 
the commission strongly endorses the 1949 Housing Act 
goal of a “decent home and a suitable living environment 
for every American family.” we note that the poorest 
households among us are suffering tremendous burdens. 
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housing. As a result of their limited financial resources and 
the limited availability of federal rental assistance, nearly 80 
percent of extremely low-income renters spend more than 
30 percent of their income for housing and almost two-
thirds spend more than half of their income for housing.
we recommend providing the expanded assistance through 
a reformed housing voucher program. to reduce costs, we 
further recommend that, as families currently enrolled in the 
housing voucher program turn back their subsidies due to 
rising household income or other factors, all newly available 
vouchers be issued to extremely low-income households, 
ensuring that voucher assistance is deeply targeted to 
the households with the greatest needs.118 Households 
who qualify for the program and subsequently experience 
increased income would not immediately lose assistance; 
however, these households would be expected to make an 
increased payment that is proportionate to their increase in 
income.
Helping to narrow this gap between incomes and housing 
costs not only directly benefits millions of extremely low-
income households, it is also a practical necessity to 
sustain private investment in the supply of rental housing. if 
tenants cannot afford the economic costs of their housing, 
landlords may be forced to choose between two equally 
undesirable outcomes: defer maintenance and withhold 
capital investments, or “volunteer” to support the tenants 
by foregoing a reasonable return on their investments. 
the latter choice is unreasonable and unrealistic. the 
former can lead to deteriorated homes and distressed 
communities. while rental assistance is usually categorized 
as a social program designed to help meet the basic needs 
of low-income families, it is also a large-scale investment in 
the physical infrastructure of our communities. By closing 
the gap between the cost of owning and operating decent 
housing and the rent that extremely low-income tenants can 
afford to pay, rental assistance programs sustain a valuable 
component of our physical infrastructure that otherwise 
would be jeopardized. 
in order to meet the affordable housing needs of the 
nation’s most vulnerable households and to ensure the 
overall quality of the housing stock, we recommend that the 
following five objectives guide federal housing policy:
Focus long-term rental assistance on the households with the 
greatest needs to help them afford decent homes.
Increase the supply of suitable, decent, and affordable homes 
to address both current and projected demand.
Provide short-term emergency rental assistance to assist 
families who suffer temporary setbacks that threaten to force 
them out of their homes and from which recovery can be 
difficult.
Reform existing rental assistance programs to improve 
accountability and flexibility within the delivery system, as 
well as outcomes for participating households.
Advance innovative programs that connect housing to other 
sectors like employment and education, health and human 
services, and transportation.
each of these objectives is discussed in more detail below.
Focus long-term rental assistance on households 
with the greatest needs 
we recommend the federal government increase support 
for the nation’s most vulnerable households, in order to 
make progress toward the 1949 Housing Act goal of a 
“decent home and a suitable living environment” for all 
American families. more specifically, we recommend that 
federal rental assistance be made available to all eligible 
households with incomes at or below 30 percent of Ami 
who apply for such assistance. At the national level, 30 
percent of the annual median family income ranges from 
$13,650 for a one-person household to $19,500 for a family 
of four.117 in most areas of the country, renters with incomes 
below this threshold simply cannot afford private-market 
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homelessness. All vulnerable persons with disabilities 
and elderly households would be able to count upon 
stable housing. the most vulnerable and extremely low-
income families with children would not face disruptions in 
employment or their children’s education because of the 
lack of an affordable home. 
Increase the supply of suitable, decent, and 
affordable homes
our nation has developed a stock of nearly five million 
subsidized rental homes that provide quality affordable 
housing, including units funded through the liHtc, the 
project-based section 8 program, the section 202 and 811 
supportive housing programs for the elderly and persons 
with disabilities, public housing, and the rental housing 
programs at the U.s. Department of Agriculture.122 in the 
coming years, these properties will play an even more vital 
role in housing the growing population of low-income adults 
over age 65, many of whom are aging in place in affordable 
rental units that were not initially designed to meet their 
current needs. many of these properties are aging and 
not only need repair, but are operating inefficiently, 
resulting in crippling energy costs. with adequate funding 
for maintenance and modernization, this stock can 
provide decades of additional service, helping millions of 
households obtain and remain in stable, affordable housing. 
to increase the supply of suitable, decent, and affordable 
homes, the commission recommends:
Protect and expand the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit as the bedrock of the nation’s efforts to preserve 
and increase the supply of affordable rental housing. 
the liHtc123 is a capped federal tax incentive that is 
allocated to developers through state housing finance 
agencies. Developers compete for credit awards through 
applications that are scored based on how closely the 
proposed development would meet the affordable housing 
According to an analysis prepared for the commission by 
Abt Associates, the estimated annual cost of providing this 
increased coverage is approximately $22.5 billion.d this is 
the estimated cost of providing a Housing choice Voucher 
type subsidy to currently unassisted, cost-burdened renter 
households with incomes at or below 30 percent of Ami who 
would be expected to participate in such a program were 
it available. the estimated cost takes into consideration 
resources that are projected to become available, over 
time, as the existing voucher program shifts from serving 
households up to 80 percent of Ami to serving households 
with incomes that do not exceed 30 percent of Ami.119
these estimates do not take into account any potential 
savings resulting from fewer families becoming homeless 
or reduced health care costs. Further research should be 
conducted to assess the budgetary savings that could be 
generated through reductions in the number of households 
in need of homeless or emergency care services. 
At a time when there is enormous pressure and competition 
for existing federal resources, we know this is an ambitious 
goal; however, it is one we feel is necessary to support 
the needs of our nation’s most vulnerable households. By 
placing a floor under the most vulnerable households, this 
recommendation would have a number of immediate and 
profound impacts. it could, in effect, end homelessness 
for the vast majority of those experiencing it. Virtually all 
households experiencing homelessness have incomes 
under 30 percent of Ami, and 80 percent of those who 
become homeless do so almost exclusively for economic 
reasons.120 For the approximately 20 percent of homeless 
persons with disabilities,121 stable housing would need 
to be combined with treatment and other services, but 
the affordability of the housing would effectively end their 
d. Abt Associates has prepared a memorandum on this topic that provides the details 
of their analysis. see Projections for 10-year Costs of Deep-Subsidy, Voucher-Type 
Program Offered to Unassisted Renter Households Below 30 Percent of AMI found 
on the BPc Housing commission website at  
www.bipartisanpolicy.org/housing.
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Another key feature of the program is the means by which 
it engages market forces to build affordable housing. this 
engagement occurs at a number of levels. First, developers 
compete against each other to obtain an award of credits. 
in most states, the number of applications far exceeds 
the available credits, causing developers to structure their 
applications to earn the most points possible under the 
state allocation plan. second, investors compete against 
each other to invest in properties, a process that maximizes 
the prices they are willing to pay for the credits, resulting in 
greater taxpayer efficiencies. third, profit margins for the 
companies that provide syndication services to raise equity 
capital and purchase liHtc properties are driven down 
as they compete against each other, also benefiting the 
taxpayers. 
A final feature that has made the liHtc so successful is the 
minimization of risk to the federal government. the liHtc 
is a pay-for-performance program in which the private 
sector, not the government, bears the full real estate risk 
of the investment. if for any reason the property falls out of 
compliance within the first 15 years, stringent irs recapture 
rules require the investor to pay back a portion of the tax 
credits claimed in previous years. 
the positive results are evident in the program’s track 
record. over the first 24 years of the liHtc program’s 
existence, it financed more than 16,000 properties, or 
1.2 million units, across the country. During that period 
only 98 properties experienced foreclosure, an aggregate 
foreclosure rate of just 0.62 percent.125 this record is 
unmatched by any other real estate class, including 
residential and nonresidential real estate.
in recent years, the liHtc has been called upon to carry 
a larger load in serving the affordable housing priorities of 
federal and state governments. the use of the program to 
create new affordable housing has declined as a greater 
share of credits has been used to preserve the stock of 
priorities of the state as laid out in an annual qualified 
allocation plan, or QAP. the properties must be rented to 
tenants with incomes at or below 60 percent of Ami at rents 
that are capped for a period of at least 30 years. Federal 
law requires that states give preference to properties that 
target lower incomes; as a result, about 41 percent of 
liHtc residents have incomes at or below 30 percent of 
Ami, and 80 percent have incomes below 50 percent of 
Ami, according to a recent study conducted by the Furman 
center at New York University that found that many of these 
residents were benefitting from other subsidies like section 
8, as well.124 
it is not economically feasible to develop affordable housing 
at restricted rents, so a subsidy is needed to make up 
the difference between what a property costs to develop 
and the income that can be generated to support such 
development costs. the liHtc plays that role. Because 
rental income is limited, affordable housing properties 
are not able to support sufficient levels of debt to finance 
development of the property. this contrasts with other real 
estate—both residential and nonresidential—which typically 
is substantially financed by debt. Developers use the tax 
credits to raise equity capital from investors in the property 
that serves as a substitute for higher levels of debt. equity 
investors receive a stream of tax credits for ten years that 
reduces their tax liability on a dollar for dollar basis.
the program has a number of features that have made it 
a successful tool in affordable housing development. most 
importantly, the program is administered at the state level 
by housing finance agencies that go through an annual 
process to develop allocation plans based on the housing 
needs of the state. these QAPs ensure that affordable 
housing investment is aligned with the housing needs within 
the state. this structure also builds flexibility into the system 
that enables states to continually tailor their plans to address 
evolving housing needs. 
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Provide gap funding sufficient to support an expansion 
of the LIHTC.
to help ensure effective utilization of the expanded liHtc, 
the commission recommends the provision of gap funding 
at a level sufficient to support this expansion. in most 
markets, the costs to produce or preserve an affordable 
rental housing development exceed the funds available 
through the equity raised by the liHtc and the debt that 
can be supported by projected rents. For both current 
allocations and an expansion of the liHtc to be most 
effective, some level of additional funds is needed to cover 
this gap. 
we estimate that $1.0 billion in gap funding would help 
to support the new development financed though the 
suggested incremental increase to the liHtc program. 
Beyond this funding, an additional $1.0 billion (for a total 
of $2.0 billion annually) would help support existing liHtc 
allocations that have been impacted by the substantial 
reduction in federal appropriations for the Home program 
in FY 2012. the new gap funding should be authorized 
through the Home program and restricted for use in 
conjunction with the liHtc.
Address the capital backlog and ongoing accrual 
needs in public housing to preserve the value of prior 
investments and improve housing quality for residents. 
the nation’s stock of public housing is deteriorating 
and shrinking and is in need of basic maintenance and 
modernization. this slow death-by-attrition wastes valuable 
federal housing assets and risks the loss of both high-
quality and deteriorating units alike. in addition, it penalizes 
residents. 
Accordingly, we recommend an overhaul of the public 
housing system to (1) introduce market discipline; (2) 
improve access to private capital; (3) incentivize public/
private partnerships; (4) preserve the public investment in 
properties that have been well-maintained and are located 
existing affordable housing, including both the federally 
assisted inventory of housing and older liHtc properties 
that are in need of recapitalization. As HUD expands its 
efforts to revitalize an aging public housing stock by tapping 
the private capital markets, Housing Finance Agencies will 
undoubtedly be asked to allocate an increasing share of 
housing credits for the conversion of public housing units. 
the commission strongly believes the liHtc must be 
preserved. Furthermore, to help address the growing 
demand for rental housing, we recommend that the 
annual liHtc allocation be increased by 50 percent, 
as the resources are identified, to support a higher level 
of affordable housing development. we estimate a 50 
percent increase in the allocated credit would support 
the preservation and construction of 350,000 to 400,000 
additional affordable rental housing units over a ten-year 
period at an average annual cost of $1.2 billion over the first 
ten years. 
An increase in the credits available would provide an 
opportunity to refine the targeting of credits to ensure the 
program is meeting the most critical rental housing needs. 
one approach might be to allocate additional credits based 
on a formula that measures a state’s share of cost-burdened 
renters; another approach might be to base allocation on 
the relative size of a state’s renter population. either would 
be an improvement over the existing allocation formula, 
which is based on a per capita calculation and does not 
reflect differences from state to state in the share of the 
overall population who rents or has a rent burden.126
we strongly endorse the use of liHtc resources to 
preserve existing affordable rental properties at risk of 
loss, particularly in the high-opportunity and gentrifying 
neighborhoods where owners of these units are most likely 
to exit the program when affordability requirements expire. 
However, we recommend leaving the decision on how to 
best prioritize any new liHtc resources up to the states. 
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number of units in the public housing stock, we estimate 
it would help revitalize and prevent the loss of the existing 
stock of 1.2 million public housing units over the next 
ten years. moreover, where possible, as part of a capital 
improvements program, steps to improve the energy 
efficiency of existing public housing structures should be 
undertaken. By reducing the utility costs associated with 
the operation of these units, improved energy performance 
would result in cost savings over time that could be used to 
support the ongoing maintenance and preservation of the 
stock.128
Encourage the removal of local and state barriers to 
the development of rental housing. 
the nation’s housing affordability challenges can be 
in areas of opportunity; and (5) facilitate the transfer of 
subsidies from properties that are in very poor condition or 
are located in areas of highly concentrated poverty to newer 
properties with longer lifecycles and better locations. 
while the commission stops short of endorsing HUD’s 
rental Assistance Demonstration program, we endorse its 
overall objectives of incentivizing public/private partnerships 
and facilitating access to private sources of capital by 
public housing authorities to support the revitalization and 
modernization of public housing. 
the preservation of existing public housing is estimated 
to cost an additional $4.0 billion annually.127 though this 
additional investment is not likely to increase the overall 
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special needs groups—the homeless or those at risk of 
homelessness. this authority should be broadened to 
include any low-income household with income between 
30 and 80 percent of Ami who demonstrates a need for 
temporary assistance. many of the eligible uses described 
above—security deposits and utility payments—are already 
allowable expenses through the Home program and 
should be continued. Data currently collected through the 
Home program does not sufficiently capture the level of 
detail necessary to demonstrate the effectiveness of this 
short-term assistance. grantees receiving this incremental 
funding should therefore be subject to additional data 
collection requirements. 
According to the analysis prepared for the commission 
by Abt Associates, the estimated annual cost of providing 
flexible, one-time emergency assistance to eligible renter 
households expected to participate is around $3.0 billion, 
assuming assistance levels up to $1,200 per household.129 
these households would be ineligible to receive assistance 
under the expanded housing voucher subsidy program 
for extremely low-income households outlined above, but 
nonetheless have modest incomes, may live in overcrowded 
conditions, and experience housing emergencies for which 
a temporary rental supplement could be beneficial. 
this type of program would help to reduce pressure on 
homeless shelters, lowering the number of temporarily 
displaced households seeking assistance and generating 
offsetting savings in programs serving those populations. 
HUD has experience operating larger-scale programs 
of homelessness prevention, particularly the three-
year Homelessness Prevention and rapid re-Housing 
Program (HPrP) that was part of the 2009 economic 
recovery legislation. HPrP is widely regarded as having 
been instrumental in preventing the large increase in 
homelessness that was expected to result from the great 
recession.130 
exacerbated by barriers imposed by local and state 
zoning, permitting and other policies that raise the costs of 
producing new units or restrict the effective and efficient 
use of existing ones. while it is not the federal government’s 
role to require local or state governments to adopt specific 
land-use policies, there are measures that can be taken 
to encourage better policies. Federal efforts should (1) 
ensure that communities employing highly restrictive zoning 
and building code policies that substantially drive up the 
cost of housing are not rewarded with larger allocations 
of federal housing funds; and (2) educate local and state 
leaders about the negative effects of regulatory barriers 
on affordable rental housing and highlight promising 
approaches for removing these barriers. 
Provide short-term emergency rental assistance
while the incomes of extremely low-income renters are 
generally insufficient to afford private-market rents without 
ongoing rental assistance, households with somewhat higher 
incomes can afford private-market housing on their own in 
many communities. However, the loss of a job, the death 
or departure of a working household member, or a major 
medical crisis can lead to short-term affordability crises that 
can jeopardize the residential stability of these households, 
leaving some homeless and others consigned to making 
multiple unwanted moves. this instability can undermine 
educational achievement and create or exacerbate health 
problems. short-term, targeted funding for security deposits, 
back rent, temporary rental assistance, and other limited 
forms of assistance, such as utility payments, could improve 
residential stability and help prevent homelessness for these 
renters. 
the commission recommends dedicating supplemental 
funding to the Home program to deliver one-time, 
emergency assistance to households with incomes between 
30 and 80 percent of Ami. the Home program currently 
allows tenant-based rental assistance to be provided to 
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Further study of other mechanisms for delivering temporary 
emergency assistance could be helpful. For example, 
a rental insurance program may be a promising way to 
help households with temporary emergency needs. A 
rental insurance program would require tenants to make 
an initial payment upon occupancy of a unit toward an 
insurance policy that would cover payment of rent and 
utilities in the event of an emergency. the insurance 
program would be set up to provide a fixed payment 
amount to the landlord for a fixed number of months. 
though rental insurance programs are promising, they still 
require rigorous testing to assess their overall effectiveness 
in preventing homelessness for low-income, unassisted 
renters; discouraging discrimination against lower-income 
households; and decreasing the average length of stay in 
longer-term assistance programs.
Reform existing rental assistance programs 
the changes we have proposed above will enable more 
households to access affordable rental housing. However, 
we recognize that additional benefits could be achieved if 
we also improved how housing assistance is delivered. this 
section describes improvements to the process of delivering 
rental assistance, providing an important complement to our 
recommendations for expanding availability. 
while HUD’s rental assistance programs generally do a good 
job reducing to affordable levels the rents that households 
pay, there are a number of significant challenges that must 
be overcome in order for the programs to more fully realize 
their potential to improve the life outcomes of assisted 
households. to address these challenges, the commission 
proposes a major overhaul of the incentives’ structure 
for all HUD rental assistance programs, creating stronger 
incentives for housing providerse to improve efficiency 
and housing quality among other desired outcomes. this 
A Renters’ Tax Credit 
while the commission recommends that rental assistance be 
delivered through an improved voucher program, a renters’ 
tax credit is another vehicle that illustrates how tax credits 
could be used to deliver rental assistance and may warrant 
additional consideration.
A renters’ tax credit, developed by the center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, could be administered by states working 
in public-private partnerships with lenders and/or property 
owners. this approach is similar to that taken by the liHtc 
program and the section 8 voucher program. states would 
receive an annual allocation of credits determined by either 
population or a need-based formula. credits allocated to each 
state could be used by low-income renters to reduce rents 
at a property of their choosing, by property owners offering 
affordable rental units for low-income households, or by 
lenders underwriting affordable rental properties. Property 
owners could either claim the tax credit based on the rent 
deduction provided, or pass the benefit along to the property’s 
lender in return for reduced mortgage payments. 
states would have the flexibility to set their own preferences 
for how to allocate and use the credits, including in 
combination with the liHtc, consistent with federal income 
eligibility and targeting requirements. the program could also 
be used to advance identified state policy goals that benefit 
low-income households. states would be responsible for the 
program’s administrative costs. 
such a program could help increase the ability of low-income 
households to pay prevailing rents in high-opportunity 
neighborhoods, as well as help stimulate production and 
preservation of affordable rental housing for low-income 
households and reduce homelessness. renters benefitting 
from the tax credit would be required to pay no more than 30 
percent of their income toward rent with the tax credit making 
up the gap between what a tenant could pay and the actual 
rent charge.
e. we use the term “housing providers” to refer to any entity that administers a 
housing assistance program, including both housing authorities and private 
owners of multifamily assisted housing.
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Problems with the Current Delivery System 
overall, the nation’s rental assistance programs do a good 
job of ensuring that participating families have access to 
affordable rental units. At the same time, however, it is 
clear that the system can be improved in ways that benefit 
participants while improving efficiency and reducing 
administrative burden. High-capacity housing providers and 
other stakeholders administering HUD’s rental assistance 
programs regularly express a number of concerns with the 
current delivery system, including:
Overly prescriptive and burdensome rules. the laws and 
regulations governing HUD’s rental assistance programs 
have, over time, evolved into a set of highly prescriptive 
rules, which some housing providers believe make it difficult 
to effectively adapt the programs to meet local needs 
and generate substantial compliance costs that reduce 
the ability of agencies to focus resources on improving 
outcomes for residents. these rules generally were shaped 
by experience, often a scandal in program administration, 
and were designed to prevent its repetition and provide 
essential protection for taxpayers and program participants. 
others are the result of congressional mandates or court 
rulings issued in response to lawsuits over management 
problems. whatever their provenance, however, there 
is widespread agreement among housing providers that 
many of these prescriptive rules are hindering rather than 
fostering efficiency. 
one specific concern raised by some housing providers is 
that the rules governing HUD’s rental assistance programs 
do not pay adequate attention to differences among local 
real estate markets. Providers argue that solutions must 
be crafted in the context of local real estate markets and 
the local economy. in this vein, providers argue for more 
flexibility, for example, to adjust voucher payment standards 
to account for local variations in rents and more flexibility 
to adjust inspection standards to account for neighborhood 
proposed system would reward high-performing housing 
providers with substantial deregulation, providing greater 
freedom to innovate and depart from standard HUD 
practices. At the same time, providers who fail to achieve 
acceptable results should lose the right to administer 
the programs, with new administrators chosen through 
competitions held among providers. the end result of 
these proposed changes would be more efficiency, better 
outcomes for residents, and more freedom for providers to 
innovate. 
there are important differences among the various HUD 
rental assistance programs. the outcome-based system 
we articulate will therefore need to be tailored to the 
specific characteristics of each program. Nevertheless, 
the fundamental transformation in the delivery system—a 
shift in emphasis toward outcomes rather than process, 
combined with increased accountability for results and 
greater flexibility for high performers—would benefit all of 
HUD’s rental assistance programs. we propose to apply 
this new system initially to the three main HUD rental 
assistance programs: housing vouchers, public housing, 
and project-based section 8, followed by adaptations for 
other more specialized programs, such as section 202 
and 811 supportive housing for the elderly and persons 
with disabilities, as well as eventually to rental assistance 
funded through UsDA. states could also be encouraged 
to align the housing priorities articulated in their QAPs with 
the outcomes we outline below, allowing residents of liHtc 
properties to benefit from this outcome-based approach.
A transition period will be necessary during which time 
various approaches to applying an outcome-based 
measurement system are considered and evaluated. this 
transitional period will provide a valuable opportunity to 
engage stakeholders in conversation—informed by the close 
analysis of program data—on how to improve the outcomes 
of our nation’s rental assistance programs. 
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but providers need even more assistance tracking real-
world outcomes and impacts on assisted households, as 
well as opportunities to learn from the experiences of other 
providers facing similar challenges.
remedying these concerns will require a shift in HUD’s 
general approach to managing federal housing programs—
from a rigid focus on compliance with program rules to a 
focus on achieving key outcomes, while providing support 
for innovation, entrepreneurship, and flexible administration. 
in this regard, it is important to acknowledge that additional 
staff, training, or other resources may be needed at HUD 
to ensure they can effectively manage these reformed 
programs. staffing levels at HUD today are about one-half 
what they were in the 1980s.133 it is not reasonable to layer 
more requirements for the programs HUD administers, or 
demand higher outputs and outcomes, without providing 
adequate tools and staff, or enabling flexibility in staffing 
and administration to support the agency’s ability to carry 
out such mandates.
An Improved Approach 
to address these challenges and strengthen HUD’s rental 
assistance programs, we propose a fundamental shift in the 
incentives’ structure for HUD-funded housing providers to a 
system marked by the following characteristics:
A focus on outcomes, rather than process. we propose 
establishment of a performance management system that 
measures resident outcomes across all rental assistance 
programs, focused on creating incentives for greater 
efficiency and improved housing quality, as well as ensuring 
that rental assistance meets its full potential to serve as a 
platform for the achievement of other social outcomes. 
Expanded deregulation for high performers. As an incentive 
for providers to achieve strong outcomes, we propose 
to reward high-performing providers with substantial 
devolution, giving them broad latitude to depart from HUD 
quality (such as safety and/or concentration of vacant 
homes).
Insufficient accountability for results. A historical focus 
on process, rather than outcomes, has allowed housing 
providers in HUD’s performance management systems to 
receive high scores even if their outcomes are mediocre. 
For example, in HUD’s housing voucher program, the 
performance measurement system examines the extent to 
which agencies re-inspect properties found to have had 
a deficiency in an initial inspection, but does not directly 
assess the quality of the units that residents occupy.131 
Perhaps as a result, HUD data raise serious concerns about 
the quality of housing occupied by assisted households.132 
Failing to realize the potential of housing as a platform. 
today, many housing practitioners recognize that rental 
assistance can serve as a platform for attaining broader 
social outcomes related to resident health, educational 
achievement, economic opportunity, independent living 
for older adults and persons with disabilities, and the de-
concentration of poverty. HUD has not set up a performance 
management structure that strongly incentivizes these 
outcomes, in part because of concerns by housing providers 
that they have neither full control over their achievement nor 
the ability to collect data measuring results in these areas. 
Nevertheless, some stakeholders argue that HUD should 
place more emphasis on these broader social outcomes 
through its performance management system and through 
enhanced partnerships with other relevant federal agencies. 
Insufficient support for measuring outcomes and cross-site 
learning. even as HUD invests resources in regular audits 
of local programs to make sure all the procedures are being 
followed, providers receive little assistance in measuring 
program outcomes or identifying promising approaches 
for achieving them. to its credit, HUD has stepped up 
its research program in recent years to help identify 
successful approaches for achieving a range of objectives, 
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legislation, we urge HUD to work collaboratively with the 
full range of stakeholders to consider these and other 
solutions for reducing the burden on housing providers, 
while ensuring the continuation of essential protections for 
residents. 
Learning from Other Outcome-Based 
Measurement Systems
stewards for Affordable Housing in the Future—an association 
of affordable housing developers with members who have 
properties throughout the country—has begun an initiative to 
track outcomes in areas which their members see as critical 
to helping low-income households help themselves. this 
system includes measures related to: work, income, and 
assets; youth and education; housing stability; community 
engagement; and health and wellness.
likewise, Neighborworks America has an outcome-based 
measurement system, known as the “success measures 
Data system,” that measures outcomes related to affordable 
housing, community building, and economic development. 
in translating our recommendations into practice, it would 
be useful to consider the experiences of these and similar 
measurement systems developed by high-performing 
nonprofit organizations. 
Key Desired Outcomes of HUD-Funded Rental 
Assistance
to more effectively achieve the full potential of rental 
assistance to improve participants’ life opportunities, the 
commission recommends that a new accountability system 
be established to achieve the following key outcomes: 
1. Improve housing quality. All units funded through the 
housing voucher program must pass an inspection to 
ensure they meet basic housing quality standards. Public 
program rules akin to the flexibility currently provided 
to housing authorities enrolled in the moving to work 
demonstration.134
Increased accountability through competition. At the same 
time, providers that consistently fail to deliver an acceptable 
level of performance should be held accountable for 
inadequate results by having the right to administer their 
housing subsidies taken away and assumed by a higher-
performing agency selected through a competitive process.
Real-time learning environment. to support the outcome-
based performance measurement system and stronger 
performance by housing providers, HUD (either directly 
or through contractors) should expand its role providing 
data, evaluating promising approaches, and facilitating the 
exchange of information among providers.
Greater focus on interagency partnerships. to more fully 
realize the potential of rental assistance to advance 
goals related to healthy housing, economic opportunity, 
independent living for older adults and persons with 
disabilities, and the de-concentration of poverty, we 
recommend the development of more robust interagency 
partnerships between HUD and other agencies that 
can help align performance management systems and 
resources to achieve these goals.
in addition to instituting and supporting this new 
performance measurement system, we recommend that 
HUD consider other opportunities to reduce the burden 
of regulatory compliance, particularly among small public 
housing agencies that lack staff capacity. A number of 
models have been advanced to address the concerns 
of small agencies.135 Additional ideas for simplifying the 
administrative process, including ideas for streamlining 
the property inspection and income-verification processes 
have been developed and have bipartisan support. while 
the commission stops short of addressing any specific 
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and earnings.136 research on the Jobs Plus and Family 
self-sufficiency programs—two promising housing-based 
self-sufficiency initiatives—suggests that a combination 
of work-promoting services and financial incentives can 
help households with rental assistance increase adult 
employment and earnings.137 Higher earnings, in turn, 
lead to higher rent payments by residents, reducing 
federal expenditures and enabling many households to 
transition off of assistance. 
5. Promote the de-concentration of poverty and access to 
neighborhoods of opportunity. Both research and practice 
confirm the harmful effects of concentrated poverty on 
the well-being of low-income households and the health 
and educational benefits of accessing neighborhoods with 
better schools and lower poverty rates.138 while preserving 
individual choice, housing policy should strive to increase 
opportunities for households to find affordable housing in 
areas of opportunity and avoid concentrated poverty.139
Among other strategies for achieving this goal are: 
(a) mobility counseling to help voucher-holders with 
children access available housing in high-opportunity 
neighborhoods with good schools, (b) the use of project-
based vouchers to secure affordable housing opportunities 
for older adults in walkable neighborhoods near planned 
or existing transit stations, and (c) the redevelopment of 
public housing or project-based section 8 housing in a 
manner that facilitates a greater mix of incomes.
explanations of each system component follow:
Outcome-based performance standards. 
By establishing an outcome-based measurement system, 
HUD could determine which providers are excelling in 
achieving key housing outcomes and which are not. 
of course, providers also need to be competent in 
administering basic program functions and fulfilling basic 
requirements efficiently and effectively. But given the 
potential of affordable housing to lead to meaningful and 
housing authorities and owners of assisted rental housing 
are similarly responsible for maintaining acceptable levels 
of housing quality. these rules help to direct scarce 
federal resources to high-quality housing and should be 
strengthened in a reformed system that seeks the best 
outcomes for tenants. Federal resources should not be 
dedicated to supporting substandard housing. 
2. Increase the efficiency with which housing assistance is 
delivered. the rising cost of rental assistance requires 
significant budget increases each year to continue serving 
the same number of households and puts pressure on 
funding levels for other important HUD programs. there 
is a tension between the goal of lowering costs and 
achievement of other policy objectives, such as improving 
access to neighborhoods of opportunity. But all things 
being equal, lower costs would help HUD stretch scarce 
budget resources further. in particular, we recommend 
focusing on reducing administrative costs and on 
ensuring that rents are set at levels that are at or below 
market, and not inflated. 
3. Enable the elderly and persons with disabilities to lead 
independent lives. the population that receives federal 
housing subsidies is aging and growing increasingly frail. 
while many of these households can live independently 
without additional services, many cannot—particularly 
the frail elderly and persons with severe or multiple 
disabilities. given the great expense and disruption of 
moving these households to nursing homes, the preferred 
alternative is to ensure that these households have access 
to the services that may be needed to enable them to live 
independent lives within HUD-assisted housing, such as 
coordination of health care, preparation of meals, and 
assistance with transportation. See Chapter 6, Aging in 
Place: A New Frontier in Housing.
4. Promote economic self-sufficiency for households 
capable of work. evidence indicates that housing 
assistance by itself is not enough to boost employment 
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and stops well short of identifying truly excellent programs. 
HUD’s assessment systems for public housing and 
multifamily assisted housing include a somewhat greater 
focus on outcomes—particularly housing quality 140 —but 
stop short of identifying programs that excel in achieving 
the five programmatic outcomes the commission has 
identified.141 Providers also note that HUD’s rating and 
reporting systems do not work effectively for agencies with 
moving to work authority, leading to complications and 
administrative burdens.
A new rating system will be challenging to implement, with 
providers likely to argue that they lack direct control over 
the outcomes that will be measured. the rating systems will 
Outcome-Based Performance Standards
1. improve housing quality
increased devolution for 
high performers
substandard performers 
replaced through 
competition
improved outcomes
2. increase the efficiency with which housing 
assistance is delivered
3. enable elderly and persons with disabilities 
to live independent lives
4. Promote economic self-sufficiency for 
households capable of work
5. Promote the de-concentration of poverty 
and access to neighborhoods of opportunity
rigorous experimentation and promising practices
measurable improvements in the lives of individuals, we 
recommend moving beyond a focus on rule compliance to a 
focus on outcome-based results. 
For the most part, HUD’s current rating systems fall short 
of this charge. HUD has established separate systems 
for rating the performance of local providers of section 8 
housing voucher programs, public housing programs, and 
multifamily assisted properties. the current rating system 
for section 8 housing vouchers—the section 8 management 
Assessment Program, or semAP—focuses largely on 
compliance with basic program mechanics (such as full 
utilization of vouchers and prompt follow-up on quality 
deficiencies identified during housing quality inspections) 
Figure 4-1: How the Proposed System Would Work
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has used its moving to work authority to offer participants 
in its opportunity Housing initiative a financial reward for 
higher earnings. Participants continue to pay income-
based rents, but all amounts above $300 per month go 
into an escrow account that the family can access once 
it has met the program requirements (which include 
employment and graduation from housing assistance). 
Among other benefits, the housing authority believes 
this variation on the traditional Family self-sufficiency 
program model is more likely to be cost-neutral or even 
revenue positive, allowing it to offer the incentive more 
broadly. 
•	 The	ability	to	extend	housing	quality	standards	to	
incorporate neighborhood quality - in Atlanta the housing 
authority decided that the use of a housing voucher to 
rent a unit in a dangerous neighborhood was not an 
acceptable outcome, even if the unit itself would meet 
traditional HUD housing quality standards. Accordingly, 
Atlanta has modified the standards that it uses to 
determine whether to approve a rental opportunity—
offered to a family with a housing voucher—to include 
such issues as the extent of vacant and abandoned 
property nearby, as well as signs of suspicious illegal 
activity.142
•	 The	ability	of	owners	of	multifamily	assisted	properties	to	
achieve economies of scale by operating on a portfolio 
basis.143 - current housing policies and programs drive 
affordable housing owners to manage each housing 
development as a separate stand-alone entity with its 
own financing, compliance, and reserves. For mission-
oriented owner/operators who have large portfolios of 
properties, this approach needlessly raises operating and 
compliance costs, makes it difficult or impossible to raise 
capital at the enterprise level, and prevents deployment 
of capital and excess cash proceeds to achieve better 
outcomes for the people they serve. the commission 
supports consideration of policy changes that allow and 
also need to account for differences in housing markets, 
as well as differences between rental assistance programs. 
For example, it will be much easier to promote the de-
concentration of poverty in a tenant-based program like 
the housing voucher program than in a project-based 
program like public housing or project-based section 8, 
where the physical location of a property is fixed. Despite 
these challenges, measures of program excellence need to 
be developed as the prerequisite for a system designed to 
promote better outcomes for participating households.
some housing providers have expressed a preference for 
having a third party administer the rating system, rather 
than HUD. we do not express a specific opinion about who 
does the evaluation but rather emphasize the importance 
of ensuring that outcomes are measured effectively and 
objectively.
Increased devolution for high performers. 
HUD should provide greater flexibility to agencies that have 
demonstrated their competence by excelling in achieving 
the outcomes measured by the new accountability system 
we propose. this flexibility should be broad—similar to 
that provided to public housing agencies participating in 
the moving to work demonstration. At the same time, this 
shift should be closely monitored to ensure that program 
beneficiaries are not inadvertently hurt. special care should 
be taken to ensure that increased flexibility does not 
adversely impact the elderly and persons with disabilities.
Providers receiving this flexibility should continue to be 
monitored to ensure continued excellence, with penalties 
imposed if their performance declines sharply. the following 
are examples of the kind of flexibility that high-performing 
providers could use to better achieve key programmatic 
outcomes:
•	 The	ability	to	modify	rent	rules	to	promote	economic	self-
sufficiency - in Portland, oregon the housing authority 
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in many cases, neighboring housing authorities or other 
local providers will be strong candidates for winning 
these competitions. given the benefits of consolidating 
administration of smaller voucher programs, HUD may elect 
to make consolidation an explicit goal of the competition 
process.
in developing new accountability policies, it will be essential 
to recognize the impact of inadequate and uncertain 
funding on providers’ ability to meet their responsibilities 
and run excellent programs. Public housing authorities, for 
example, report receiving funding at levels well below those 
necessary to operate their programs effectively, leading to 
reductions in housing quality and numbers of households 
served. owners of project-based section 8 developments 
raise similar concerns. the sweeping of provider reserve 
funds could likewise jeopardize provider flexibility to meet 
changed circumstances and adversely affect the ability of 
providers to attract talent and implement innovation. 
Rigorous experimentation and promising practices.
Flexibility in program rules can create incentives for 
high performance. But flexibility also may lead to new 
approaches that yield better outcomes for households. 
when new approaches are tried and proven to be 
successful, without causing hardship or undermining other 
programmatic goals, they should be made available as 
options for all providers, including standard performers that 
may not have moving to work–type authority. 
rigorous evaluation of new approaches can help provide 
the data necessary to determine if a particular approach 
is effective, and HUD and congress should invest in the 
data collection and evaluation tools needed to track and 
confirm the costs and benefits. the new approaches 
taken by high-performing providers through devolution 
provide a natural testing ground for evaluating new ideas. 
By tracking outcomes and constructing and executing 
research frameworks built around these ideas,145 HUD can 
encourage the strongest, performance-oriented providers 
to manage their properties at a portfolio level to increase 
the impact of these resources. See Text Box, Entity-level 
Finance and Operations.
Entity-level Finance and Operations 
equity, excess reserves, and residual receipts associated 
with a property that is operating well are now locked in that 
property. if portfolio owners could move resources to a weaker 
property in the portfolio to improve its operating performance 
or preserve it as affordable housing over a longer period of 
time, the overall quality of the housing would be maintained 
and costly deferred maintenance avoided. entity-level finance 
would enable owners or property managers to provide HUD 
and state housing officials with a single audit for a portfolio 
of properties rather than pay for an audit of each property 
as required under current practice. Flexible management of 
portfolios would also allow organizations to more efficiently 
raise larger amounts of capital at the enterprise level and 
then deploy this capital to those places in their portfolios with 
the greatest needs and the greatest return on the investment 
dollar. Finally, the management of rental assistance contracts 
at a portfolio level would make the system more efficient and 
effective by allowing owners to reposition the rental assistance 
on other properties in their portfolios or to new properties. 
Substandard performers replaced through competition.144
the prospect of competition should promote stronger 
performance among providers, while the competition 
process itself would strengthen administration by bringing 
in proven providers to run struggling programs. to protect 
residents, the competition should be limited to providers 
with a track record running the program in other locations. 
to gain experience, prospective providers who are not 
already operating a program could start out acting as sub-
contractors to existing program providers.
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this would not be a regulatory function—no local housing 
agency will be forced to adopt any of the policies highlighted 
in these reviews—but rather a support function designed 
to provide timely and relevant information to local providers 
to help them develop more effective rental assistance 
programs. the practices covered by this documentation 
and information-sharing process will include both the details 
of program administration (e.g., how to increase utilization 
of housing vouchers or improve the accuracy of income 
verification) as well as practices to better achieve key 
programmatic outcomes.
many details will need to be worked out in order to fully 
implement an accountability system that improves the 
delivery of rental assistance. A transition period will help to 
appropriately identify and phase in the relevant metrics for 
measuring the identified outcomes. During the transition 
process, well-accepted measures of outcomes or outputs 
could be adopted and implemented on a phased-in basis, 
even as new measures are developed and existing ones 
are strengthened. in developing the new measures, it will 
be important to identify those that apply both to agencies 
operating under standard rules and the high-performing 
agencies that have received opportunities to depart from 
these rules. 
the commission hopes to encourage a data-driven 
debate about what the nation ultimately wishes to achieve 
through its rental assistance programs, beyond the core 
value of affordability. As a transition period proceeds, it 
will be important to ensure that the debate itself does not 
undermine progress in developing and implementing the 
new system. the new performance measures should be 
thoroughly vetted and tested, but we cannot let the perfect 
be the enemy of the good. the perfect accountability system 
may be unattainable, but a much improved, reformed 
system is definitely achievable and will lead to stronger 
ensure that new ideas are thoroughly studied before being 
incorporated into the program rules applicable to standard 
agencies.
A number of current studies by HUD’s office of Policy 
Development and research (PD&r) illustrate the potential 
of rigorous evaluation to generate the evidence base needed 
to determine whether new program options should be 
made broadly available to all administrating agencies. For 
example, PD&r is studying the effect of applying small Area 
Fair market rents (Fmrs) in six metropolitan regions across 
the country. in these trial areas, public housing authorities 
are able to use Fmrs calculated at the zip-code level rather 
than the metropolitan or core Based statistical Area level, 
as is currently the case. one purpose of this effort is to 
provide assisted households accessibility to a broader range 
of neighborhoods, including high-opportunity areas that 
might otherwise be prohibitively expensive for low-income 
families. early evidence from a Dallas case study suggests 
that significant shares of voucher-holders are moving to 
safer neighborhoods after a year of the small Area Fmrs 
being in effect. Additional research is needed to determine 
the fiscal impact of these changes and their impact in other 
study sites. 
more robust efforts are needed to facilitate the 
documentation of innovative approaches and sharing of 
promising practices among program providers. with multiple 
providers trying new approaches for achieving similar 
objectives, strong lines of communication will be needed to 
ensure they have opportunities to learn from each other both 
about approaches that appear to lead to better outcomes 
and approaches that do not generate the expected benefits 
or lead to unexpected costs or other problems. rather than 
asking each local agency to investigate and evaluate the 
practices of other providers on its own, it would be much 
more efficient and effective to assign this function to a single 
entity or consortium of entities with complementary expertise 
funded centrally by HUD. 
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the access of older adults and persons with disabilities with 
rental assistance to the services needed for them to live 
independently. if implemented robustly, this partnership 
could, for example, facilitate the use of medicaid for services 
that help older adults remain in HUD-assisted housing, 
rather than transitioning to nursing homes. research is 
now underway to test the extent to which service-enriched 
housing can help reduce medicaid and medicare expenses; 
to the extent this research demonstrates savings, there 
will be additional benefits to this type of interagency 
collaboration. See Chapter 6, Aging in Place: A New Frontier 
in Housing.
other promising areas of interagency collaboration include: 
combating homelessness, meeting the housing needs 
of veterans, promoting healthy homes, improving energy 
efficiency, and ensuring that families of all incomes have 
access to emerging areas of opportunity near public-transit 
stations, job centers, and other areas with low transportation 
costs. the commission applauds the federal government for 
its efforts to date in building partnerships between federal 
agencies and recommends that these efforts be continued 
and strengthened to more effectively meet the cross-sectoral 
challenges of housing, poverty, health, aging, and economic 
growth.
Summary of Recommendations 
table 4-1 summarizes the commission’s recommendations 
for affordable rental assistance and provides estimated 
annual costs for each recommendation. 
the commission is aware of the difficult issues that will need 
to be addressed in the coming years to balance federal 
budget priorities. the federal government currently provides 
substantial resources in support of housing, the majority of 
which is in the form of tax subsidies for homeownership, 
as set forth in Figure 4-2 below. the commission supports 
the continuation of tax incentives for homeownership—
outcomes for the millions of households participating in 
federal rental assistance programs. 
Advance innovative programs that connect housing 
to other sectors
there is much that local housing providers can do on their 
own initiative to make progress in achieving goals such as 
increased economic self-sufficiency for residents and an 
increased ability of older adults and persons with disabilities 
to lead independent lives. However, the likelihood of 
achieving these goals will be increased substantially if 
housing providers can count on the active collaboration of 
partner agencies working at the local level on issues like 
education, workforce development, human services, health, 
aging and disability, and transportation.
Accordingly, HUD should continue to build strong 
relationships with other federal agencies to develop 
coordinated guidance at the federal level to promote the 
more efficient use of existing resources at the local level. 
Federal interagency efforts should be designed to generate 
guidance on specific actions that local agencies can take to 
advance shared goals.
in the area of economic self-sufficiency, for example, 
interagency partnerships among HUD, the Department 
of labor (Dol), and the Department of Health and 
Human services (HHs) could focus on coordinating the 
services offered by Dol and HHs grantees with family 
self-sufficiency programs administered by local housing 
providers to expand the number of families benefitting from 
a comprehensive array of services that can together help 
boost earnings and employment: stable affordable housing, 
economic incentives to increase earnings and build assets, 
work-promoting case management or coaching, and access 
to work-promoting services.
similarly, an already-established partnership between HUD 
and HHs is focused (among other things) on maximizing 
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in addition, the commission recommends retaining in 
a reformed housing finance system the fee adopted by 
congress in the Housing and economic recovery Act of 
2008 (HerA) and intended to be collected by the gses, 
to apply only to mortgages guaranteed by the Public 
guarantor. revenue generated should be used to fund the 
National Housing trust Fund and the capital magnet Fund, 
with eligible activities to include housing counseling for first-
time homebuyers and support for affordable rental housing. 
The commission strongly opposes using fees imposed on 
mortgages to finance governmental expenditures outside 
of the housing sector. in 2011, congress enacted a 
supplemental 10 basis point fee on single-family mortgages 
guaranteed by Fannie mae and Freddie mac to cover a 
portion of the cost of extending social security payroll tax 
relief. Proceeds from this fee are included in the cost of new 
mortgages guaranteed by the companies and the proceeds 
deposited in the general treasury. in November 2012 the 
recognizing the importance of this tax policy to homeowners 
in the United states today. the commission notes that 
various tax benefits provided to homeowners, including 
the mortgage interest deduction, have been modified 
over the years. in the ongoing debate over tax reform and 
budget priorities, all revenue options must be evaluated. in 
that context, the commission recommends consideration 
of further modifications to federal tax incentives for 
homeownership to allow for an increase in the level of 
support provided to affordable rental housing. Any changes 
should be made with careful attention to their effect on 
home prices and should be phased in to minimize any 
potential disruption to the housing market. A portion of 
any revenue generated from changes in tax subsidies for 
homeownership should be devoted to expanding support for 
rental housing programs for low-income populations in need 
of affordable housing.
Table 4-1: Estimated Annual Costs and Potential Impact 
Estimated Annual Costs 
(in billions)
Estimated Number of Units Produced/ 
Preserved or Households Served
rental assistance to households with incomes at or 
below 30% Ami
$22.5 2.5 million
short-term assistance to households experiencing 
residential instability 
$3.0 2.4 million
Protect and expand the liHtc program $1.2 35,000 – 40,000
gap financing to support an expansion of the liHtc 
program 
$1.0 – $2.0 N/A
capital backlog and ongoing accrual needs in public 
housing 
$4.0 110,000
Notes: in all cases, the dollar amount listed and units produced are incremental, on top of what is currently being spent and produced. estimated annual cost for rental assistance 
to households with incomes at or below 30 percent Ami is based on participation rates in the supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (sNAP) among households with incomes 
below 30 percent of Ami. Average annual cost of Protect and expand the liHtc program is over ten years—annual costs would range from $0.26 billion in year three to $2.9 billion 
by year 10 after enactment. (Because of lag time between allocation and production, no increases in tax expenditures would be experienced in the first two years.) the difference 
between the estimated accrual need and the actual accrual need in public housing will continue to grow if the capital backlog is not addressed. Addressing the capital backlog in the 
near future will decrease accrual needs in the long term. the estimates do not include administrative costs. 
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Affordable Housing Program: Making the 
Connection
the Federal Home loan Banks’ Affordable Housing Program 
(AHP) is a working example of a federal housing policy that 
promotes access to private capital. created by the Financial 
institutions reform, recovery, and enforcement Act of 1989 
(FirreA), the AHP requires each Federal Home loan Bank to 
set aside 10 percent of its net income each year for assistance 
to low- and moderate-income families and individuals. Awards 
made through the program may be provided as grants or 
loans and can serve a variety of purposes related to affordable 
housing, including acquisition, construction, or rehabilitation 
of rental and owner-occupied housing. set-asides may also 
be provided for homeownership assistance and housing 
counseling. eligibility for AHP is limited to the member 
institutions of each Home loan Bank, which partner with local 
housing developers and community organizations to submit 
applications and benefit from the opportunity to earn credit 
toward their community investment goals.
House of representatives approved legislation to extend 
this fee for a year beyond its october 21, 2021, expiration 
to finance immigration reform legislation. there is no policy 
justification for requiring that the single-family mortgage 
finance system bear the burdens of programs that have no 
relationship to housing. 
However, the adoption of fees to support targeted 
expenditures is well-established in social security, 
medicare, transportation, and airport funding. HerA 
established a 4.2 basis point mortgage fee on new single-
family mortgages guaranteed by Fannie mae and Freddie 
mac. the funds were allocated specifically to the National 
Housing trust Fund to finance affordable housing for very 
low-income households, and the capital magnet Fund in 
the U.s. treasury for cDFis carrying out affordable housing 
and community and economic development lending. No 
fees were ever collected because shortly thereafter Fannie 
mae and Freddie mac were put into conservatorship 
and collection of the fees was suspended by the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency. 
Notes: summing tax expenditures can lead to an 
overestimate of the total tax benefit. each estimate, in 
isolation, treats itemization separately. this can result 
in an over count of the total estimate. see: Altshuler, 
rosanne and robert Dietz, “reconsidering tax 
expenditure estimation,” National Tax Journal 64, no. 2, 
part 2 (2011), 459–489. 
Other tax expenditures - owner includes exclusion of 
interest on government qualified private activity bonds 
for owner-occupied housing ($1.1 billion) and exclusion 
of income attributable to the discharge of principal 
residence acquisition indebtedness ($1.3 billion); Other 
appropriations - owner includes block grant programs 
(Home and cDBg) owner activities ($1.5 billion) and 
UsDA programs ($1.0 billion); Other tax expenditures - 
renter includes deferral of gain on like-kind exchanges 
($2.5 billion - includes all real estate transactions that 
utilize the section 1031 like-kind exchange rules and 
assumes that the exchange of apartment buildings is 
approximately 40 percent of the total of both corporate 
and individual deferrals), exclusion of interest on 
government qualified private activity bonds for rental 
housing ($0.8 billion), and credit for rehabilitation of 
structures ($0.9 billion); Other appropriations - renter 
includes homeless assistance and other HUD programs 
($3.6 billion), block grant programs (Home and cDBg) 
rental activities ($2.7 billion), and UsDA section 521 
rental assistance and other UsDA programs ($1.1 
billion).
Preferred rate on capital gains estimate based on Joint 
committee on taxation estimate of the tax expenditure for 
the preferred tax rate on gains and dividends, assuming 
4 percent of the value is due to residential rental 
property, consistent with the share of gains income found 
in the 2007 irs sales of capital Assets (socA) data.
sources: tax expenditure numbers from the Joint 
committee on taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax 
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2012-2017 (washington, 
D.c.: U.s. government Printing office, 2013). 
Appropriations numbers from mccarty, maggie and 
David randall Peterman, Transportation, Housing and 
Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD): 
FY2013 Appropriations (washington, D.c.: congressional 
research services, 2012). 
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2012 Federal Housing Expenditures and Appropriations 
Deduction for mortgage interest on owner-occupied residences 
Deduction for property taxes on real property 
Exclusion of capital gains on sales of principal residences 
Other tax expenditures - owner 
Other appropriations - owner 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Preferred rate on capital gains (15%) 
Depreciation of rental housing in excess of alternative depreciation system 
Other tax expenditures - renter 
Tenant-based rental assistance 
Project-based rental assistance 
Other appropriations - renter 
Public housing 
Blue Gradient - Tax Expenditures 
Red Gradient - Appropriations 
Owner	  
Owner Renter 
Owner 
Renter 
OWNER
FY 2012 Dollars  
in billions
Tax Expenditures 
Deduction for mortgage interest on 
owner-occupied residences
68.5
Deduction for property taxes on real 
property
24.5
exclusion of capital gains on sales of 
principal residences
22.3
other tax expenditures - owner 2.4
TOTAL 117.7
Appropriations
other appropriations - owner 2.5
TOTAL 2.5
RENTER
FY 2012 Dollars  
in billions
Tax Expenditures 
low income Housing tax credit 6.0
Preferred rate on capital gains (15%) 5.2
Depreciation of rental housing in excess 
of alternative depreciation system
4.7
other tax expenditures - renter 4.2
TOTAL 20.1
Appropriations
tenant-based rental assistance 18.9
Project-based rental assistance 9.3
other appropriations - renter 7.4
Public housing 5.8
TOTAL 41.5
Figure 4-2:  Estimates of Federal Tax and Spending Supports for Housing
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rental housing is an important housing option in rural 
America. while renters from rural areas occupy 17 percent 
of all U.s. rental-housing units, rural renters are more 
likely to live in single-family homes or smaller multifamily 
structures (with fewer than five units) than their urban and 
suburban counterparts. in addition, a far larger percentage 
of rural renters occupy manufactured homes. rural rental 
housing is also generally older than rural owner-occupied 
homes, with approximately 35 percent of rural rentals built 
more than 50 years ago.155
the same demographic trends that are transforming 
the country are also at work in rural America. while the 
population of rural America is generally older than that of 
the nation at large, rural parts of the country are graying 
with the aging of their Baby Boomer populations and the 
outmigration of younger households, many of whom are 
seeking employment opportunities elsewhere. in addition, 
Hispanics now rank as the largest minority group in rural 
America, with much of the population growth in rural 
communities attributable to the growth in the number of 
Hispanics who live there.156
Federal Role in Rural Housing
the federal role in supporting rural housing can be traced 
back to the Housing Act of 1949, which authorized the 
Farmers Home Administration to issue mortgages for the 
purchase and repair of rural single-family houses, as well 
as to provide financial support for rural rental housing. 
subsequent federal legislation shifted these responsibilities 
to the rural Housing service (rHs), the agency within the 
U.s. Department of Agriculture that today administers the 
UsDA’s rural housing programs. 
Although housing costs are generally lower in rural 
communities, lower incomes and higher poverty rates make 
housing unaffordable for many rural residents. overall, 
the median income for rural households ($40,038) is 20 
percent lower than the national median income ($50,046) 
and more than 20 percent lower than the median income 
for urban households ($51,998).146 in 2010, the U.s. 
poverty rate was at its highest since 1993 at 15.1 percent;147 
yet, the rural poverty rate was even higher at 16.5 
percent.148 many rural households live in counties classified 
as high poverty areas with a poverty rate of 20 percent or 
more.149
more than seven million families—or nearly 30 percent 
of all rural households—spend more than 30 percent of 
their monthly income on housing costs and are considered 
cost-burdened.150 the lack of affordable housing prevents 
households from meeting other basic needs, such as 
nutrition and health care, or saving for their future.
Although rural homeownership rates are higher than the 
national average151 and mortgage-free homeownership is 
more common in rural America than in urban and suburban 
areas,152 the home values in rural parts of the country are 
generally lower, with more than 40 percent of rural homes 
valued at less than $100,000.153 in addition, rural homes 
are more likely to be in a substandard condition. Nearly 6 
percent of rural homes are either moderately or severely 
substandard, without hot water, or with leaking roofs, rodent 
problems, or inadequate heating systems.154 these poor 
housing conditions put additional financial constraints on 
low-income families.
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to be eligible for a UsDA housing program, the beneficiary 
of the program must live in a rural area, which includes for 
purposes of these programs:
Any open country, or any place, town, village, or city which 
is not part of or associated with an urban area and which
(1) Has a population not in excess of 2,500 inhabitants, or 
(2) Has a population in excess of 2,500 but not in excess of 
10,000 if it is rural in character, or 
(3) Has a population in excess of 10,000 but not in excess 
of 20,000, and (A) is not contained within a standard 
metropolitan statistical area, and (B) has a serious lack of 
Homeownership programs
•	 Section	502	Guaranteed	Loan	–	Guarantee	of	up	to	90	
percent of principal on mortgage loans issued by private 
lenders to low- and moderate-income families, in amounts up 
to 102 percent (including a 2 percent guarantee fee) of the 
home’s market value or acquisition cost (Funding in FY 2012: 
$24 billion)
•	 Section	502	Direct	Loan	-	Direct,	fixed-interest	financing	in	
amounts up to 100 percent of the home’s market value or 
acquisition cost to low-income individuals to purchase, build, 
repair, or renovate homes (Funding in FY 2012: $900 million)
•	 Section	504	Very	Low-Income	Rural	Housing	Repair	Loan	
and Housing Assistance grants - Direct loans up to $20,000 
and, for very low-income elderly homeowners only, grants up 
to $7,500, for housing repairs and improvements (Funding in 
FY 2012: $39.5 million)
•	 Section	523	Mutual	and	Self-Help	Grant	-	Grant	funding	for	
local providers to deliver technical assistance to groups of 
low- and very-low income families who work cooperatively to 
build their houses (Funding in FY 2012: $30 million)
Rental programs
•	 Section	521	Rental	Assistance	-	Project-based	rent	assistance	
to owners of rural Housing service-financed projects 
(Funding in FY 2012: $905 million)
•	 Section	538	Multi-Family	Housing	Guaranteed	Loans	–	
guarantee of up to 90 percent of principal (97 percent for 
nonprofit developers) on loans issued by private lenders 
to support construction, acquisition, and rehabilitation 
of multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income 
households (Funding in FY 2012: $130 million)
•	 Section	515	Rural	Rental	Housing	Direct	Loans	-	Long-term,	
low-interest loans to limited-profit and nonprofit developers 
to support the construction, acquisition, and rehabilitation of 
multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income renters 
(Funding in FY 2012: $64.5 million)
Other programs
•	 Section	514	and	516	Farm	Labor	Housing	Loans	and	Grants	
- loans and grants to farm owners, nonprofit organizations, 
and others to buy, build, improve, or repair housing for farm 
laborers (Funding in FY 2012: $27.9 million)
Key USDA Housing Programs
mortgage credit for lower and moderate income families, as 
determined by the secretaries of Agriculture and HUD.157
this definition of “rural area” encompasses approximately 
109 million individuals, or 34 percent of the U.s. 
population.158
UsDA programs have proven cost-effective and efficient 
at serving some of the nation’s most vulnerable rural 
households, and support for and preservation of these 
programs must be given priority attention. For example, in 
FY 2012 the total cost to the federal government of enabling 
a low-income rural family to become a homeowner through 
the section 502 Direct loan program was $7,200 over the 
life of the loan.159 likewise, the annual section 521 rental 
the following are brief summaries of the major rural housing programs provided by UsDA.f these programs are often used in 
combination, and provide loans, grants, loan guarantees, and other support to help meet housing needs in rural America. 
f. summaries of UsDA rural housing programs rely on information contained in 
tadlock cowan, An Overview of USDA Rural Housing Programs (washington, D.c.: 
congressional research service, 2010). 
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communities continue to access low-cost loans, grants, 
and other needed assistance, as well as provide certainty 
to housing developers on where they can build utilizing the 
resources of UsDA rural housing programs.
3. Increase budget allocations to serve more households. 
today, UsDA holds or guarantees 944,000 loans totaling 
$84.4 billion, or less than 1 percent of the $9.4 trillion in 
U.s. mortgage debt outstanding. since 2007, however, 
UsDA’s loan volumes have tripled. in FY 2011, the 
department guaranteed $16.9 billion in loans and issued 
$1.1 billion in direct loans.165 many of these loans are 
securitized, and ginnie mae guarantees the timely payment 
of principal and interest on these securities. Additional 
funding for the section 502 Direct loan program would 
enable more rural households to become homeowners at 
relatively low cost to the federal government. However, any 
additional federal appropriations for the section 502 Direct 
loan program should be contingent on an evaluation of 
underwriting risks associated with the program, which for 
the past four years has carried delinquency rates hovering 
around 14 percent.166 specifically, the program’s current no-
down-payment requirement should be reconsidered with a 
minimum down payment required on all future loans. 
4. Dedicate resources for capacity-building and technology 
to strengthen USDA providers. A portion of the resources 
available for rural communities should be dedicated to 
providing technical assistance to nonprofit providers 
operating in rural communities, as well as to modernizing 
the technology that UsDA providers use for loan processing, 
some of which is still done by hand. specifically, local 
agencies receiving UsDA funds should be incentivized 
to operate on compatible software to ease data and 
information sharing. these improvements could help UsDA 
monitor and improve the performance of its rural housing 
programs. 
Assistance for households living in section 515 rural rental 
Housing was $4,400 in 2011,160 compared with $7,640 in 
the Housing choice Voucher program.161 in 2011, UsDA 
housing programs helped nearly 140,000 rural families 
become homeowners and assisted in meeting the rental 
housing needs of an additional 470,000 individuals.162 the 
following recommendations aim to strengthen successful 
programs in a way that can serve a greater number of the 
most vulnerable rural households. 
Policy Recommendations 
1. Support and strengthen USDA’s role in rural housing. 
UsDA has a presence in rural communities that is critical 
for administering support to vulnerable households. while 
increased collaboration and efficiency across agencies is 
important, congress should not pursue proposals to shift 
UsDA programs to other government agencies where 
they will be absorbed by other federal programs.163 UsDA 
is well-positioned to leverage the existing resources and 
infrastructure of rural service providers that understand the 
unique conditions of local markets.
2. Extend the current definition of rural areas through the 
year 2020. Any area currently classified as rural for the 
purposes of UsDA housing programs should remain so 
at least until after the receipt of data from the decennial 
census in 2020, provided the area’s population does not 
exceed 25,000. 
without congressional action, hundreds of rural 
communities are at risk of losing eligibility for funding 
designated for rural areas. A change in the definition would 
sweep up many small towns and farming communities 
into larger metro areas, reducing the population eligible for 
rural housing assistance by roughly 8 percent.164 extending 
the definition would help to ensure low-income rural 
families, elderly, and persons with disabilities living in these 
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workers supporting more retirees, will strain the budgets 
of already overburdened state and local governments. 
And, as America’s senior population grows, we will need to 
reexamine our housing priorities to determine how best to 
meet the needs of the overwhelming majority of seniors who 
wish to age in place.
“Aging in place” is defined as “the ability to live in one’s 
own home and community safely, independently, and 
comfortably, regardless of age, income, or ability level.”168 
studies show that some 70 percent of Americans aged 
65 and older live in single-family detached homes, and 
nearly 90 percent intend to age in place and remain in 
their homes permanently.169 For most seniors, the desire 
to age at home is the most cost-effective and financially 
sensible housing option, so long as their physical abilities 
allow. Understandably, seniors wish to remain linked to 
their family, friends, and communities, supported by the 
very connections that have given meaning to their lives and 
provide a sense of belonging, independence, and peace 
of mind. For the 30 percent of seniors who are renters and 
typically have lower incomes than homeowners, aging in 
place means the ability to achieve similar goals in their 
apartments. 
Yet, this strong desire to age in place runs into a harsh 
reality: many of today’s homes and neighborhoods were 
designed at an earlier time before the demographic changes 
now transforming the country were even recognized. For 
many seniors, their homes lack the necessary structural 
features and support systems that can make independent 
living into old age a viable, safe option. similarly, many of 
our nation’s communities fail to provide for adequate street 
lighting, accessible sidewalks and transportation options, 
and other services and amenities that would make aging in 
place in those communities a realistic choice.170
in 2011, the first members of the Baby Boom generation 
turned age 65. in the coming decades, millions more Baby 
Boomers will enter their retirement years. As indicated in 
chart 6-1, the number of Americans aged 65 or older will 
rise from 35 million in 2000 to nearly 73 million in 2030 and 
more than 90 million in 2060. the very oldest Americans, 
those aged 85 and older, will increase in number from 4.2 
million in 2000 to nearly nine million in 2030 and then to 
18.2 million in 2060. At the same time, the ratio of working-
age people to those who have reached retirement age will 
fall significantly.167
Chart 6-1: U.S. Population Aged 65 and Older
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these unprecedented demographic changes will have a 
profound impact on American society. cultural attitudes 
about aging and the role of seniors in our communities 
are likely to change. the graying of America, with fewer 
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contributions to society. And, as more seniors forego long-
term care in costly institutionalized settings, they also have 
the potential to produce real long-term savings for cash-
strapped governments at all levels. studies of programs in 
Japan and the United kingdom, for example, suggest that 
retrofitting existing properties to accommodate the needs 
of seniors could produce significant savings as the cost of 
medical care and other services is reduced.171 savings in the 
health care system can be used to support further extensions 
of these services and take advantage of the virtuous circle 
created by helping seniors remain in their homes.
modifying existing single-family houses, apartments, and 
communities—as well as designing new ones—to support 
aging in place for those millions of Baby Boomers now 
entering their retirement years must become a far greater 
national priority.
Any discussion of modifying our homes and communities 
to accommodate the desire of seniors to age in place must 
take cost into account. For some seniors and their families, 
personal savings and retirement earnings may be sufficient 
to finance home modifications. reverse mortgages and 
Rising to the Challenge
this new demographic reality demands that we think 
creatively about how the houses in which we live affect 
our health, longevity, and the cost of caring for an 
aging population. At every stage of life, our houses and 
apartments are both the shelter we seek for ourselves and 
our families, and the platform from which we engage with 
nearly every other aspect of our lives. this is true to perhaps 
the greatest extent in promoting healthy independent lives 
for seniors. when we broaden our focus on housing’s 
role in our lives—including as a vehicle for the delivery of 
lower-cost and more effective health care for seniors—we 
can begin to think more strategically about how we make 
housing-related investments, taking into account the full life-
cycle costs of both housing infrastructure and health care 
expenses. 
A key focus of this effort must be strengthening our nation’s 
capacity to deliver health care and other critical services in 
residential and community-based settings. if implemented 
properly, these new approaches have the potential to 
empower our nation’s seniors to make even greater 
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spend more than 30 percent of their income on mortgage 
or rental costs, leaving little left over to cover the cost of 
even basic maintenance that can greatly impact safety in 
the home. even worse, some 5.1 million senior households 
spend more than half their income to cover housing costs.177 
these households may be forced to make difficult choices 
between covering housing costs and purchasing needed 
medication or nutritious food.
home equity lines of credit offer other financing options, 
particularly for seniors with little or no outstanding mortgage 
obligations. state and local tax benefits and grant programs 
may provide additional help. But for many seniors, 
whose earnings have fallen dramatically since leaving the 
workforce, financing options are more limited. in fact, 9.5 
million households headed by someone over the age of 65 
Numerous private and public institutions have already begun 
to respond to the challenges posed by the graying of the 
population and the desire to age in place. organizations such 
as the American Association of retired Persons (AArP), the 
National Association of Home Builders, the American institute 
of Architects, and the American society of interior Designers 
have all initiated programs to educate professionals in their 
respective fields about relatively simple steps that can be taken 
to transform an existing home into one that is livable and safe 
for an elderly person. Better home lighting, use of contrasting 
colors on the edges of furniture and steps, strategic placement 
of handrails and grab bars, modest structural alterations to 
bathrooms and kitchens, and the removal of tripping hazards 
such as throw rugs and electrical cords are just some of 
the suggestions that can make a big difference in the living 
conditions of seniors. these organizations also emphasize the 
importance of applying universal design principles to new home 
construction so that a home built today has structural features, 
such as a zero-step entrance and wider doors and hallways, 
that will allow the home’s initial owners to age in place if they 
choose.172
state and local governments are also beginning to respond 
to the challenge. All across the country, neighborhoods are 
naturally being transformed into concentrated pockets of older 
residents who are aging in place. there is even a name for these 
neighborhoods: Naturally occurring retirement communities, 
or Norcs. A Norc can take a variety of forms. it can be a large 
multifamily rental complex or a neighborhood populated with 
single-family homes whose residents are growing older. Norcs 
exist in central cities, in suburbs, and even in rural areas. the 
AArP estimates there are some 5,000 Norcs throughout the 
United states but cautions they are “the most dormant and 
overlooked form of senior housing.”173
some states, including georgia, maryland, massachusetts, 
missouri, New York and Pennsylvania, encourage the use of 
Norcs as efficient and cost-effective venues to deliver health 
care and other services to senior residents.174 in New York 
alone, there are more than 50,000 seniors living in Norcs and 
benefiting from the supportive services delivered through these 
communities. the federal government is also playing a role: the 
U.s. Department of Health and Human services (HHs), through 
its Administration on Aging, helps fund the development of 
Norcs in some twenty-five states.175
Another state-level model that combines housing with supportive 
services is “communities for a lifetime.” A major goal of this 
model is to establish neighborhoods that support aging in 
place and more deliberately integrate seniors into community 
life. key elements of this approach include ensuring senior-
friendly transportation options and land-use planning. states 
such as Florida, indiana, michigan, and North carolina are 
actively promoting “communities for a lifetime” programs and 
activities.176
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The Federal Response
the federal response to meeting the housing needs of 
low-income seniors historically has focused on construction 
and rehabilitation programs to produce or preserve housing 
either designated for seniors or that increasingly over time 
has come to serve seniors who have aged in place. the 
section 202 supportive Housing for the elderly Program 
is designed exclusively to meet the needs of low-income 
seniors, and has taken several forms since 1959. However, 
funding for new section 202 housing has been very limited 
since the early 1980s. in recent years, there were ten 
applicants on the waiting list for every unit that becomes 
available annually.178 most seniors in HUD-subsidized 
housing live in public or privately owned assisted housing 
that, in general, was not designed to house this increasingly 
frail population. 
other HUD programs that provide assisted housing to low-
income seniors are the section 221(d)(3) Below market 
interest rate and section 236 programs that offer mortgage 
subsidies and support properties specifically dedicated to 
the elderly and date back to the 1960s and 1970s. the 
project-based section 8 housing programs, begun in 1974 
and ended as a new construction or rehabilitation program 
in 1983, as well as rural housing programs administered by 
UsDA, also support projects that serve senior households.179 
Finally, some states allocate a share of their low income 
Housing tax credit financing for senior housing. According 
to some estimates, 14 percent of liHtc properties limit 
residency to tenants aged 55 or older.180
Affordable rental housing can also be a platform for 
delivering services that enable aging in place, often 
averting high-cost institutional care. For example, stewards 
of Affordable Housing for the Future, leadingAge, and 
enterprise community Partners, with their nonprofit 
members, have done pioneering work to develop strategies 
that link senior housing with health care and supportive 
services. innovative providers are not only working with 
traditional fee-for-services approaches and waiver-enabled 
programs, but also sorting out how they could work 
effectively with the accountable care organizations and 
managed care entities that are increasingly serving the 
low-income elderly. multi-state providers such as National 
church residences and mercy Housing, and smaller scale 
organizations such as the cathedral square corporation in 
Vermont and sanborn Place in massachusetts, are using 
residential solutions to achieve the triple aim of improving 
health, improving the experience of those who are served, 
and reducing the per capita cost of health care. these 
strategies have the potential to enable low-income seniors 
to remain in their apartments and communities and to 
enhance care and coordination for the high-cost population 
eligible for both medicare and medicaid. 
Finally, there is a group of older Americans for whom there 
are much more basic problems of affordability. while social 
security has made dire poverty among older Americans a 
less common phenomenon than it would otherwise be, it 
has not eliminated it entirely. the commission’s proposal 
for long-term rental assistance for the most vulnerable 
Americans with incomes at or below 30 percent of Ami 
would provide a solid floor, ensuring that those older 
households with the lowest incomes would at least have 
their basic housing needs met, and providing a foundation 
for some of the other improvements discussed above. See 
Chapter 4, Affordable Rental Housing.
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as the community Development Block grant and Home 
investment Partnerships programs, support multiple, and 
sometimes competing, housing priorities but could be used to 
help finance local aging-in-place initiatives. 
these efforts are all worthwhile, but except for the liHtc 
program, none is producing new units. in addition, many of 
the remaining federally assisted units, especially in public 
housing, need modernization and rehabilitation. moreover, 
aging senior properties typically house the oldest and frailest 
residents, yet they often lack the necessary features to meet 
these residents’ needs, such as hand rails, barrier-free 
entrances, or roll-in showers. 
many of the recommendations presented in chapter 4, 
Affordable rental Housing, will help to address these 
challenges. the following are some additional policy 
recommendations that can help provide a more dedicated 
focus on responding to the housing challenges of a growing 
senior population.
Policy Recommendations 
1. Better coordination of housing and health care. HUD 
and HHs should jointly identify and remove barriers to the 
creative use of residential platforms for meeting the health 
and long-term care needs of low- and moderate-income 
senior residents and seniors who live in the surrounding 
community. HUD and HHs should encourage accountable 
care organizations, medical homes, federally qualified 
health centers, and other managed care entities to partner 
with housing providers to create more integrated systems 
of services to meet the needs of residents, enable them to 
age in place, and achieve cost savings for the medicare 
and medicaid programs. in evaluating the costs of housing 
programs that serve frail seniors, congress and the office 
of management and Budget should identify and take into 
account savings to the health care system made possible by 
the use of housing platforms with supportive services. 
Table 6-1: Federal Rental Housing Programs for Low-
Income Elderly Households
Share of Units 
Occupied 
by Elderly 
Households
Number of 
Units Occupied 
by Elderly 
Households
section 8 Project-
Based rental 
Assistance
47% 593,772
Housing choice 
Vouchers
19% 408,047
Public Housing 31% 346,566
UsDA section 
521 rental 
Assistance
59% 160,243
supportive 
Housing for 
elderly and People 
with Disabilities 
(202/811)
81% 121,009
other HUD 
Programs
25% 9,329
Total 31% 1,546,039
source: center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Federal Rental Assistance Facts 
(December 19, 2012).
in addition, HUD operates four supportive services programs 
for those seniors living in HUD-assisted properties. the 
congregate Housing program, the service coordinator 
program, and the resident opportunity and self-sufficiency 
service coordinator program each offer meals and other 
forms of assistance to help seniors with the activities of daily 
life. the Assisted living conversion program makes grants to 
HUD-assisted properties for purposes of converting some or 
all units into assisted living facilities.181 other programs, such 
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provided weatherization services to more than 6.4 million 
low-income households since inception, reducing annual 
energy bills for these households by an average of $437.183 
weatherizing homes to reduce energy costs and improve 
living conditions and health outcomes is an important 
element of any aging-in-place strategy.184 Funding for the 
program should continue and its scope expanded to include 
home assessments and modifications for aging in place. 
energy conservation retrofits are equally important for senior 
apartments, although unique challenges in multifamily 
properties call for a different strategy.185 modest retrofits 
can produce material energy and cost savings, especially 
in older buildings, and can be funded in large part with 
borrowed money that is repaid from savings on utility costs. 
in subsidized properties, most of the eventual savings will 
flow to the federal government. working with affordable 
housing providers, technology firms, and others, HUD has 
already started to explore approaches to jump-starting these 
approaches186 and should continue work to take them to 
scale.
3. Better integration of aging-in-place priorities into existing 
federal programs. existing housing programs such as the 
community Development Block grant (cDBg) and the Home 
investment Partnerships programs should place greater 
emphasis on supporting local aging-in-place strategies. 
many states and communities already use a portion of 
these flexible funds on senior households—for example, by 
allocating cDBg funds to local Area Agencies on Aging and 
other community groups to offer home rehab services for 
low-income homeowners aged 62 and older or to provide in-
home services—but there is room for even further support for 
aging-in-place priorities. in addition, the federal Partnership 
for sustainable communities—a collaborative project of 
HUD, the U.s. Department of transportation (Dot), and the 
U.s. environmental Protection Agency—should reinforce the 
importance of affordable senior housing and senior-friendly 
transportation planning in its outreach, education, and 
many public housing and multifamily assisted properties 
already provide services designed to help older adults and 
persons with disabilities live independent lives. working in 
partnership with states and localities, nonprofit providers 
such as mercy Housing and National church residences, 
have already made great strides in improving coordination of 
housing, health care, and supportive services for low-income 
seniors, including through co-location of housing with health 
care and fitness centers, social programming, and assisted 
living for residents who need a higher level of care. At the 
state level, the Vermont support and services at Home 
(sAsH) demonstration is another promising approach that 
bears close attention. the initiative uses multifamily assisted 
housing as a platform for providing integrated health services, 
with funding from medicaid and medicare.182 As evaluation 
results come out in the coming years, the sAsH program may 
serve as a model for similar programs in other states. 
in states and localities that do not yet have an aging-in-
place strategy, the proposed reforms to existing federal 
housing programs described in chapter 4—particularly 
those related to the goal of enabling the elderly and persons 
with disabilities to live independent lives—will help providers 
measure the effectiveness of these services and encourage 
adoption of best practices to improve quality of life for 
assisted residents. 
2. Support initiatives to retrofit homes and apartments 
for energy conservation and aging in place. the energy 
Department’s weatherization Assistance Program helps 
low-income families permanently reduce their energy 
bills by taking simple steps to make their homes more 
energy efficient, such as sealing leaks around windows 
and doors and installing insulation. Under the program, 
the federal government provides funding to states and 
indian tribal governments, which in turn support local 
community action agencies, nonprofit organizations, and 
local governments that provide weatherization services. 
the energy Department estimates that the program has 
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available, although they may be more difficult to obtain as 
the FHA makes further changes to its loan programs. efforts 
to develop safe new home equity products would help to 
ensure the effective use and orderly draw-down of this 
valuable asset to manage financial risk in retirement. 
5. Convene a White House conference on aging in place. 
the white House conference on Aging is a once-in-a-
decade conference sponsored by the executive office of 
the President. the first such conference was held in 1961 
and the last in 2005. to draw national attention to the issue 
of senior housing and provide a high-level forum for the 
sharing of ideas and best practices, the President should 
convene a white House conference on Aging with a focus 
on aging in place. Participants in this conference should 
include representatives of all levels of government—mayors, 
county executives, governors, as well as top federal officials 
such as the secretaries of HUD, HHs, Dot, UsDA, and the 
VA. other participants should include housing practitioners, 
community planners, and health care providers from across 
the country with substantial experience serving the needs 
of the elderly, and representatives of the homebuilding, 
architecture, remodeling, and interior design industries. 
in advance of the conference, HUD should convene a series 
of meetings with members of the housing community to 
share best practices and identify innovative private-sector 
solutions that could be brought to scale. these innovations 
include prototype homes, new appliances and accessories, 
and creative market options such as co-housing and live/
work flex housing that allows seniors to continue to pursue 
careers while working at home. moreover, these meetings 
should highlight innovative efforts to weave together 
community services in support of the elderly, such as 
the Virtual Village-to-Village Network. to ensure broad 
dissemination of this information, HUD should develop 
a publicly available catalogue of best practices related to 
accessible home modification and new construction and 
home assessment tools.
grant-making activities. Policy makers should also consider 
integrating aging-in-place priorities into a broader range 
of federal programs, such as programs under the older 
Americans Act and the federal transportation reauthorization.
4. Reverse mortgages and other home equity access 
products. For seniors who have spent a lifetime making 
mortgage payments, their home is typically their most 
valuable asset. in 2009, for example, half of homeowners 
aged 62 and older had at least 55 percent of their net worth 
tied up in home equity.187 currently, reverse mortgages 
are the main option for homeowners to tap into this equity 
to fund retirement needs and to support their desire to 
age in place. However, in a recent report to congress, the 
consumer Financial Protection Bureau concluded that 
few consumers fully understood the financial mechanics 
of these loans and that the increasingly complex product 
choices in the reverse mortgage market were making it 
much more difficult for housing counselors to provide 
effective guidance to their clients.188
with limited retirement savings among some aging Baby 
Boomers, and a shrinking social safety net, consumer 
interest in this type of mortgage product is likely to 
increase significantly, and it will be imperative that older 
homeowners have access to low-cost and effective reverse 
mortgage counseling so they can learn about the risks and 
potential benefits of these mortgage products before they 
face a financial crisis. congress should also promote the 
development of alternative, low-cost home equity access 
products, particularly for seniors and family caregivers who 
face substantial out-of-pocket long-term care expenses. 
in December 2012, FHA, which currently insures virtually 
all reverse mortgages through its Home equity conversion 
mortgage (Hecm) program, announced a moratorium 
on a popular lump-sum reverse mortgage option, due to 
disproportionately large losses to the FHA’s insurance fund 
stemming from the program. looking ahead, other FHA-
insured reverse mortgage products will continue to be 
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•	 A	more	targeted	approach	to	providing	rental	assistance	
that would direct scarce resources to the lowest-income 
renters while insisting on a high level of performance by 
housing providers.
•	 A	more	comprehensive	focus	on	meeting	the	housing	
needs of our nation’s seniors that responds to their 
desire to age in place and recognizes the importance of 
integrating housing with health care and other services.
the problems we face in housing are so significant and so 
urgent today that inaction is no longer a viable option. in 
responding to these problems, we have an opportunity to 
improve the lives of millions and make America a stronger 
and more economically vibrant country, today and well into 
the future. it is therefore the commission’s hope that 2013 
will be the year that congress and the administration finally 
elevate housing to the top of the national policy agenda 
and give housing the dedicated attention it deserves. the 
commission’s 21 members, Democrats and republicans, 
stand ready to help in this effort.
 
our nation’s housing system is broken. Homeownership 
remains out of reach for far too many families who stand 
prepared to assume its financial and other obligations, while 
limited access to affordable mortgage credit impedes our 
nation’s economic recovery and future growth. the country’s 
lowest-income households continue to suffer under the 
crushing burden of high rental housing costs that are rising 
even more as rental demand increases. And we are not 
equipped to respond to the desires of millions of Americans 
who wish to stay in their own homes and age in place during 
their senior years. 
the commission hopes that this report provides some 
valuable guidance on how best to respond to these 
challenges and will serve as a catalyst for action. this report 
has proposed:
•	 A	responsible,	sustainable	approach	to	homeownership	
that will help ensure that all creditworthy households have 
access to homeownership and its considerable benefits.
•	 A	reformed	system	of	housing	finance	in	which	the	
private sector plays a far more prominent role in bearing 
credit risk while promoting a greater diversity of funding 
sources available for mortgage financing.
Chapter 7. Concluding Thoughts:  
A Call to Action
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Aerial view of BPc Housing commission regional Housing forum in Bar Harbor, maine at college of the Atlantic, July 25, 2012.
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Additional research and analysis was conducted to inform 
the commission’s deliberations, including contributions by 
Norman k. carleton, former Director, office of Federal Finance 
Policy Analysis, U.s. Department of treasury; robert D. Dietz, 
Assistant Vice President, tax and Policy issues, economics 
and Housing Policy, National Association of Home Builders; 
richard k. green, Professor, Director and chair of the Usc 
lusk center for real estate; Ann B. schnare, Principal, AB 
schnare Associates, llc; kristin siglin, Vice President-Policy, 
Housing Partnership Network; eric toder, institute Fellow, 
Urban institute and co-director, Urban-Brookings tax Policy 
center; and Paul weech, executive Vice President-Policy and 
member engagement, Housing Partnership Network. 
key partners who assisted the commission with roundtable 
discussions include Vicki Been, Boxer Family Professor of law 
at New York University school of law, Associate Professor of 
Public Policy at NYU’s robert F. wagner graduate school of 
Public service, and Director of the Furman center at NYU; 
mark willis, resident research Fellow, the Furman center at 
NYU; Janis Bowdler, Director, wealth-Building Policy Project, 
National council of la raza; marcie chavez, Vice President, 
community Development commission/Housing Authority of the 
county of los Angeles; terry gonzalez, Director, community 
Development Block grant Division and intergovernmental 
relations, cDc/HAclA; sean rogan, executive Director, cDc/
HAclA; elisa Vasquez, intergovernmental relations/Public 
information, cDc/HAclA; eve o’toole, senior Policy Advisor, 
Holland & knight; Daniel D. clute, senior Vice President, 
Federal Home loan Bank of Des moines; curt Heidt, Vice 
President, external relations, Federal Home loan Bank of Des 
moines; gary kain, President and chief investment officer, 
American capital AgNc management, llc and American 
capital mortgage mtge management, llc; sarah mickelson, 
Policy Associate, rapoza Associates; robert A. rapoza, 
President and Principal, rapoza Associates; mary white Vasys, 
President, Vasys consulting ltd.; and susan m. wachter, 
richard B. worley Professor of Financial management, 
Professor of real estate and Finance, co-Director - institute 
for Urban research, the wharton school, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Regional Housing Forums 
the Bipartisan Policy center (BPc) Housing commission 
in partnership with the Jack kemp Foundation hosted four 
regional forums to solicit input on key housing issues and 
best practices from stakeholders across the country. Public 
input was an integral part of the commission’s process to 
craft a package of realistic and actionable recommendations 
for improving the nation’s housing policy. All forums were 
open to the public and available by live webcast. 
•	 San	Antonio,	Texas	—	March	6,	2012
•	 Orlando,	Florida	—	April	17,	2012
•	 St.	Louis,	Missouri	—	June	5,	2012
•	 Bar	Harbor,	Maine	—	July	25,	2012
Research Undertaken by the 
Commission
Four research papers were prepared by consultants to the 
BPc as background for the deliberations of the commission. 
these papers were presented and discussed during the 
regional forums, and made available to the public on the 
BPc website, www.bipartisanpolicy.org/housing.
•	 Demographic Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. 
Housing Markets  
By rolf Pendall, lesley Freiman, Dowell myers, and 
selma Hepp
•	 A Comparative Context for U.S. Housing Policy: Housing 
Markets and the Financial Crisis in Europe, Asia, and 
Beyond  
By Ashok Bardhan, robert edelstein, and cynthia kroll
•	 Housing Programs in the United States: Responding to 
Current and Future Challenges  
By Diane levy, rolf Pendall, marty Abravanel, and 
Jennifer Biess
•	 The State of the Residential Construction Industry 
By carlos martín and stephen whitlow
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•	 Barry	Rutenberg,	Immediate	Past	Chairman,	 
National Association of Home Builders
•	 Barbara	Sard,	Vice	President	for	Housing	Policy,	 
center on Budget and Policy Priorities
•	 Dennis	Shea,	Founder	and	Principal,	 
shea Public strategies, llc
•	 David	A.	Smith,	Founder	and	Chairman,	 
recap real estate Advisors
•	 Ali	Solis,	Senior	Vice	President,	Public	Policy	and	
corporate Affairs, enterprise community Partners
•	 Frank	J.	Vaccarella,	President,	 
Vaccarella & Associates, consulting, llP
•	 Joseph	M.	Ventrone,	Vice	President,	Regulatory	and	
industry relations, National Association of realtors
•	 Kent	Watkins,	Chairman,	National	Academy	of	Housing	
and sustainable Development
•	 Paul	S.	Willen,	Senior	Economist	and	Policy	Advisor,	
Federal reserve Bank of Boston
Website
the commission’s website provided a platform for the 
commission to discuss its work, as well as for housing 
leaders to gain insight into the issues the commission 
considered throughout its year of deliberation. some of the 
features of the website, www.bipartisanpolicy.org/housing, 
include: 
•	 Housing	by	the	Numbers:	an	interactive	dashboard	of	key	
housing market indicators. 
•	 Infographics:	visual	representations	and	explanations	of	
trends that affect housing policy.
 o  Household Formation and Demographic Trends 
 o  Housing’s Impact on the Economy
 o  Rental Housing Market Trends
Housing Expert Forum 
on a monthly basis, the commission collected responses to 
questions on pressing housing policy issues from experts 
across the industry. the expert responses were shared 
on the commission’s website in an effort to help educate 
the public and policy makers, as well as to add to the 
commission’s own research. 
contributors included: 
•	 Angela	Antonelli,	Former	Chief	Financial	Officer	(CFO),	
U.s. Department of Housing and Urban Development
•	 Joseph	N.	Belden,	Deputy	Executive	Director,	 
Housing Assistance council
•	 Michael	Bodaken,	President,	National	Housing	Trust
•	 Mark	A.	Calabria,	Director	of	Financial	Regulation	
studies, cato institute
•	 Robert	J.	Cristiano,	President,	L88	Investments	LLC
•	 Conrad	Egan,	Senior	Advisor,	Affordable	Housing	Institute
•	 Eileen	Fitzgerald,	CEO,	NeighborWorks	America
•	 Kevin	Igoe,	Owner,	IGOE/Associates
•	 Bill	Kelly,	President	&	Co-Founder,	 
stewards of Affordable Housing for the Future
•	 James	Kemp,	President,	Jack	Kemp	Foundation
•	 Jeffrey	Lubell,	Executive	Director,	 
center for Housing Policy
•	 Lora	McCray,	Manager,	Housing	Opportunity,	 
National Association of realtors
•	 Brian	Montgomery,	Chairman,	 
the collingwood group
•	 Jeremy	Nowak,	former	President	and	CEO,	 
william Penn Foundation
•	 Jonathan	T.M.	Reckford,	Chief	Executive	Officer,	 
Habitat for Humanity international
Housing America’s Future: New Directions for National Policy 125
commission’s proposals. these gatherings throughout the 
past year were as follows: 
•	 Roundtable	on	Affordable	Rental	Housing	—	February	3,	
2012
•	 Roundtable	on	Affordable	Rental	Housing	—	February	
10, 2012
•	 Roundtable	on	Affordable	Rental	Housing	—	April	2,	
2012
•	 Capital	Markets	—	April	4,	2012
•	 Community	Lending	Roundtable	—	June	4,	2012
•	 Multifamily	Housing	Finance	Industry	Roundtable	—	
June 11, 2012
•	 Addressing	Challenges	in	the	Small	Rental	Stock,	in	
partnership with the John D. and catherine t. macArthur 
Foundation — August 14, 2012 
•	 Roundtable	Discussion	on	Section	8	—	August	17,	2012
•	 Obstacles,	Costs,	and	Opportunities	for	Bringing	More	
Private, credit risk-taking capital into the Housing 
market, in partnership with the Furman center at NYU — 
september 19, 2012
•	 Accessibility	and	Affordability	in	the	Mortgage	Market,	
in partnership with the National council of la raza — 
september 25, 2012
•	 Positioning	the	Federal	Role	in	the	Future	U.S.	
multifamily Housing Finance system, in partnership 
with the wharton school, University of Pennsylvania — 
september 27, 2012
•	 Housing	Commission	Discussion	with	Rural	Housing	
Providers — october 18, 2012
•	 Housing	Commission	Discussion	with	Community	
Development commission/Housing Authority of the 
county of los Angeles — December 3, 2012
•	 What	We’re	Reading:	a	review	of	top	news	stories	that	
address critical developments in housing policy.
•	 Housing	Visualized:	a	compilation	of	useful	graphic	and	
multimedia resources that explain economic indicators 
and statistical trends.
•	 Commission	in	the	News:	an	aggregator	of	news	articles	
and multimedia featuring commission members.
Commission Meetings
the full commission met regularly throughout the past 
year. in addition to these meetings, smaller groups 
of commissioners met frequently to focus on specific 
topics, such as single-family finance, multifamily finance, 
affordable rental housing, and homeownership. Full 
commission meeting dates were as follows:
•	 December	14/15,	2011
•	 February	13/14,	2012
•	 May	14/15,	2012
•	 July	25/26,	2012
•	 October	16,	2012
•	 November	27/28,	2012
•	 January	10,	2013
Roundtable Discussions with Invited 
Housing Practitioners 
the commission held a number of roundtable discussions 
with practitioners in various areas of the housing 
field to solicit ideas about the appropriate role of the 
federal government in the housing sector, the need for 
reforming specific housing-related programs and funding 
mechanisms, as well as to get preliminary reactions to the 
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1. As of october 2012, Fannie mae and Freddie mac had taken $187.5 billion in 
treasury draws, with cumulative projected draws at the end of 2015 ranging 
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